fly on to bite the rich as well. In Brazil in 1974, an epidemic of spinal meningitis aroused public concern—in response, 80 million people were vaccinated within 10 months, stopping the epidemic.

Human development programs are also seen almost everywhere as contributing to national unity. Universal primary education in particular can provide all citizens with a common intellectual heritage and help overcome the potentially divisive effects of regionalism, tribalism, race and caste and class distinctions. In addition, governments often see human development as helping to build broad-based political support among potentially antagonistic groups.

The appeal of and political commitment to human development cut across ideological boundaries: China, Cuba and North Korea have placed great emphasis on such programs, but so have South Korea and Costa Rica. Their appeal is reinforced by international and ethical support. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 included the rights to food, health and education. The United Nations and its specialized agencies have played an important role in focusing international attention on human development and on population issues. All the major religions also provide strong backing for efforts to improve the health, nutrition and education of the poor.

How much would it cost?

Take an illustrative list of human development needs: five years at school; adequate nutrition; primary health care no more than an hour away; family planning services; at least 20 liters a day of pure water within 100 yards of home; and a pit latrine. How much would it cost a government in a developing country to provide this for everyone?

The answer varies from country to country, depending first (and most importantly) on the standard of service; second on such factors as climate, communications and population dispersion; and third on the balance between capital and operating costs (most budgets do not provide enough for the operating costs that an effective service would need). But there are also two general rules that affect cost: one, for any given standard the proportion of GNP required falls as GNP rises, partly because higher-income countries have more educated people—whose wages are therefore relatively lower—to implement the programs, and partly because nonlabor costs rise more slowly than GNP. And two, marginal unit costs usually fall as coverage rises, but only up to a point: the costs of reaching the last 10–20 percent of the population may be several times the average costs for the first 80–90 percent because of physical inaccessibility or inadequate demand.

Some examples from different countries:

- Education. The average gross enrollment ratio for primary school in developing countries in the early 1970s was about 70 percent; central governments were then spending an average of 1.7 percent of GNP on primary education. Few governments have provided universal elementary education for less than 3 percent of GNP. Peninsular Malaysia spent 2.7 percent in the mid-1970s and had a gross enrollment rate of 93 percent.
- Nutrition. In 1979, when subsidized rations were restricted to the poorer half of the population in Sri Lanka, they still cost 4 percent of GNP. Eliminating food deficits in Brazil—with its much higher income—could cost from 1 to 2 percent of GNP in 1980, depending on the type of food provided.
- Health and family planning. Malaysia's system of public health care covered more than 75 percent of the population in 1974. It relied heavily on low-cost paramedical staff—and its operating costs were nearly 2 percent of GNP. Sri Lanka's government spent about 1.7 percent in the mid-1970s. China's central government spent less than 1 percent on health in 1978, but much of the primary care system was financed locally; Brazil's spent about 2.5 percent of GNP in 1975, but public health insurance was biased toward hospitals and urban areas—covering almost 80 percent of urban dwellers but much less of the 40 percent of people in rural areas.
- Water. A recent World Bank estimate suggests that it would cost the Tanzanian government about 1.8 percent of GNP a year over a 10-year period to supply every village with pure and reliable water, plus 0.8 percent for operating costs once the system is fully established. In Brazil the investment needed to cover the whole population by 2000 has been estimated at less than 0.1 percent a year of a much larger and faster-growing GNP in rural areas (allowing for higher costs to reach the last 10 percent of the rural population) and perhaps 0.1 to 0.2 percent a year in urban areas depending on GNP growth. Coverage of the rural and urban populations was 62 and 14 percent, respectively, in 1976. Operating costs are borne by the users.
- Sanitation. In Brazil, where 37 percent of urban houses had sewers or septic tanks in 1976, extending the sewer network to cover them all by 2000 would require annual investments of about 0.2 to 0.3 percent of GNP. Providing latrines in rural areas would cost only between 0.01 and 0.02 percent of GNP.

Easing the financial constraint

Finance ministers everywhere (with the exception of some mineral-rich countries) find that available funds cannot meet the many competing demands placed on them. In the poorer countries, public revenue (taxes, other domestic revenue and foreign assistance) usually is less than 20 percent of GNP, while expenditures other than on social programs (agriculture, infrastructure, debt service, defense and so on) commonly exceed 12 percent of GNP. Yet governments that have assured virtually everyone primary education, health care, family planning services, adequate food, pure water and sanitation have generally spent more than 10 percent of GNP (and often a good deal more) on doing so.

The costs involved depend on many factors (see box), among the most important of which are the range and standard of services. Thus governments in some poor countries—notably Sri Lanka and

probably China—have managed to provide the essential services (primary education, food supplements and basic health and family planning facilities) to almost everyone for less than 10 percent of GNP. Typically, though, governments are spending from 3 to 10 percent of GNP for human development programs that are far from comprehensive—and whose effectiveness is often reduced by lack of money for operating costs (wages for health workers and teachers, maintenance of water supply systems, gasoline for transportation of doctors in rural areas, textbooks in schools).

How can financial constraints on human development programs be eased? There are four ways: increasing taxes, reallocating revenues, reducing costs and using resources other than those obtained from national taxes and duties.

Increasing tax revenues

Many developing countries have already made impressive progress in improving their tax-gathering (see Table 6.1). Since 1975, however, tax ratios in developing countries have not increased; although some obvious steps can be taken (making taxes more progressive and reducing evasion and arrears), the scope for raising taxation is less now than it was 20 years ago.

This is especially true of the poorer countries—even where foreign trade is a substantial share of output. Their tax administration is generally weaker, there is usually substantial unmarketed output, and their taxable surplus accounts for a smaller share of their GNP. Even a tax-to-GNP ratio of 15 percent in such countries implies a heavy tax burden. Take India as an example: its taxable surplus may be defined as all income beyond the poverty line (defined there as the income of the fortieth percentile in the distribution of income). On this basis, India's taxable surplus in 1975 was 41 percent of aggregate income; the ratio of taxes to taxable surplus therefore was 34 percent —comparable with the tax-to-GNP ratios of industrialized nations.

Table 6.1 Taxes as a percentage of GNP

Group of countries	1953–55	1972–76	Percentage increase
7 low-income developing countries	11.2	16.0	43
17 middle-income developing countries	12.1	16.4	36
Total (24 developing countries)	11.8	16.3	38
15 developed countries	26.2	36.2	38

Note: Taxes include social security taxes.

Earmarking taxes for programs with strong ethical or political appeal can raise extra money when further general taxation is not feasible. In Colombia a share of the beer tax is reserved for public hospitals. Many Latin American countries finance their health and social security budgets by a payroll tax. (But payroll taxes cover only formal employment, and they tend to reduce growth in jobs by raising the cost of labor relative to capital.) Motor fuel taxes are good for earmarking, for several reasons. They are easy to collect, are progressive, help curb oil consumption, and have high revenue potential—in some cases exceeding 1 percent of GNP. But like all earmarked taxes, they should be used only sparingly, because they increase the rigidity of the way government revenues are spent.

Reallocating existing revenues

Public spending on human development can be increased by reallocating government revenue from less productive uses, including wasteful showcase projects, subsidizing inefficient enterprises and, so far as security considerations permit, military spending (which on average in East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East exceeds public outlays on education and health combined). And within human development programs there is often room to reallocate budget shares away from high-cost and less-urgent projects (such as urban hospitals and universities largely serving the relatively well-off) and toward more basic programs (such as primary health care and education).

Keeping costs down

By modesty in standards and efficient choice of technology, governments can provide services relatively cheaply—and without precluding future improvement. (For example, public standpipes can supply safe water at some sacrifice in convenience but at less than half the cost of individual house connections.) This general approach will often be opposed by teachers, doctors, architects, engineers and other professionals who insist on high standards—and correspondingly high costs. Not surprisingly, the financial constraint is then said to prevent the extension of services to poor rural areas. Political leaders have sometimes felt that it was better to accept unaffordably expensive standards than to risk the charge that they were backing "second rate" projects. But the World Bank's experience in health, education and urban development projects suggests that many governments now see political as well as economic benefits from being able to reach the poor by accepting lower standards initially.

Chapter 5 discussed a number of specific ways of economizing in health, education and nutrition programs. China's barefoot doctors (see box overleaf) are an excel-

China's barefoot doctors

Best known for its use of "barefoot doctors" at the grass roots, China's rural health care system has several other faces—specialized urban hospitals serving the surrounding areas, well-equipped county hospitals, and health clinics at commune centers. These facilities provide indispensable support for the extensive coverage provided at the "brigade" level—catering to a large village or several small ones. Each brigade sets up a program with financial support from the government; but once established, it must be self-financing (though the government may help in exceptional circumstances). A majority decision of the brigade members is enough to start or end a program; individuals can choose to join—and leave—it.

China's 1.6 million barefoot doctors (roughly one per 600 people) operate at the brigade level in rural areas. Many are women, selected by the brigade members for training, and supported by them during training (which usually takes place in the slack agricultural season). After completing training, the barefoot doctors return to their brigade, continuing to devote part of their time to farm work.

Barefoot doctors are trained to use both modern techniques and traditional Chinese medicine—acupuncture and herbal cures, for example. By combining the two, they increase acceptance of modern treatment and reduce costs—since they prepare herbal medicines from locally grown ingredients.

As a rule, the brigade program is financed from four sources: an annual premium paid by members; charges for the service; appropriations from the brigade's social welfare fund (collected through a tax on each production team's income); and, sometimes, subsidies from the county government.

The annual premium, 1–2 yuan ($0.60–1.20) per person or 5–10 yuan ($3–6) per family, depending on the locality, is a considerable sum for peasants whose incomes average only about 100 yuan ($60) a year (only a small proportion of which is cash income). The brigade's social welfare fund is a fixed percentage of its total income, so the contribution from the fund to the health program depends on the brigade's income. Members pay for each visit to the brigade health station. In complicated cases, they may have to go to the commune health center or the county hospital. Charges at the commune health center are normally paid out of the brigade's health fund; but patients attending the county or specialized hospitals must pay at least part of the fees themselves.

Like other primary health care systems relying on community health workers, China's has faced problems of credibility and training, and of uneven levels of service. Steps are now being taken to address these problems, including more emphasis on initial and in-service training of barefoot doctors. The intention is to upgrade the services as funding and staff skills permit.

lent example both of keeping costs down and of upgrading services as the economy grows—the Chinese are now providing their primary health workers with additional training and better support. Restricting subsidies to those who cannot afford to pay for services can also help keep costs down (see pages 62–63 for examples of how this can be done in nutrition programs). But overly narrow targeting may sacrifice some political support from middle- and upper-income groups—support that may be critical in establishing a program to reach the poor, too. Various ways of cutting unit costs in higher education—by far the most expensive part of the educational system—were also discussed earlier (see page 50).

Using resources other than national tax revenue

The state invariably plays a central role in education, health and nutrition programs. But it is by no means the only source of finance for human development. With the proper incentives, individuals, private firms and other nongovernmental organizations can play an important role.

Most food consumption, of course, is privately financed. Moreover, the relatively well-off are often willing to pay for private education and medical treatment. Where the expansion of private education and health care is not inconsistent with national policy, this would allow scarce government funds to be concentrated on the poor. But if the middle classes invariably send their children to private schools, much of the necessary political support for high-quality public education may be lost.

One way of mobilizing private funds for education is by restricting the number of places in public universities, maintaining high standards there, and then allowing the private sector to cater to those who can afford it but do not succeed in the stiff competition for the places in public universities. Scholarships to public universities can be provided for those who cannot afford tuition fees. This has been done in South Korea, where 72 percent of higher education enrollments are in private institutions, while in primary education (which is virtually universal) 99 percent of the enrollments are in public schools.

In some cases it is even possible to charge the better-off enough to subsidize services for the poor. In many countries, for example, fees for private and semiprivate hospital rooms are set well above costs and the surplus used to subsidize poorer ward patients. There are even better opportunities for this type of cross-subsidy in urban water and sanitation systems, where the subsidy can be virtually automatic. The well-off are generally willing to pay more than the actual cost of the service because the alternative to being connected to the public system is a private well or septic tank, at much higher cost.

Local resources can also reduce the financial burden on the center. In Tanzania in the mid-1970s, self-help labor was equal to about 10

percent of the development budget. The Tanzanian government typically provides construction materials for projects, and the local communities provide the labor. Self-help organizations exist in many developing countries: one example is Sri Lanka's Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement (see box.) Most self-help projects in the developing world involve building such things as wells, schools and health clinics. But they do not stop there: in many countries local people provide food and housing for primary school teachers. It is more difficult, however, to mobilize sustained support for recurrent costs than for one-time efforts, such as construction projects.

Self-help in Sri Lanka

From small beginnings in 1958, the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement now employs some 6,000 full-time workers and reaches more than 10 percent of the country's rural population. It has full-scale programs in some 300 villages, but is active in another 2,500. It has organized education, health, nutrition, sanitation and housing; set up agricultural and handicraft programs; and is starting to promote other small-scale rural industries.

The village of Panakura, in the poor hilly district of Kegalle, provides a good example of the Movement's work. Simon Jayawickrama had graduated from Panakura's primary school and was doing well in the secondary school two miles away; then he had to drop out in the tenth grade to help support his family. Through his former teacher and the local Buddhist monk, he made contact with the Movement; with the help of the local Sarvodaya workers in nearby Atulugama, Simon began working amongst Panakura's 81 families. After intermittent visits over a two-week period, a first Shramadana workcamp was organized—to build a road to the village. A second camp began building a community center—both projects chosen by the villagers themselves.

The Sarvodaya Movement provided cement, reinforcing rods and skilled labor. For 15 weekends, 80 percent of the villagers put in 6-8 hours of manual labor a day. With the help of 100 young workers from Sarvodaya groups in other villages, they established a community kitchen where everyone pooled and prepared their food; took part in community meditation, singing, dancing and other cultural activities; and held two daily community meetings (called "family gatherings") where everyone, young and old, had an opportunity to discuss their problems and ways of solving them.

Following the workcamps, Simon and 10 others went to the Sarvodaya regional training institute at Kegalle for a two-week leadership training course. On their return they began forming what Sarvodaya calls the "social infrastructure"—groups for mothers, farmers and so on. Representatives from each group made up the Village Reawakening Council, which has initiated various productive activities, such as growing bananas and passion fruit as cash and food crops, and set up a cooperative store.

In the community center built during the Shramadana camp, one of the Sarvodaya trainees has helped the mothers organize a community kitchen and day-care center. Here young children are taught about health and hygiene, and are vaccinated by a visiting government health worker (who received part of her training from Sarvodaya). The school-age children's group is responsible for a garden that helps to supply the community kitchen, and for keeping the community center clean. The local Buddhist monk took a four-month course on village development at the special Sarvodaya training school for monks.

As well as extending its coverage, the Movement is improving the follow up to the initial Shramadana workcamp phase, to prevent backsliding. Although the long-term effect of Sarvodaya's work remains to be properly evaluated, most observers have been strongly impressed by the way it has involved people in development. It has attracted widespread international support.

How much has all this cost? The Sarvodaya budget for 1979–80 was $2.3 million, an average of less than $1,000 per village assisted. Voluntary labor and other payments in kind contributed many times that amount. Of the cash budget, some 80 percent came from international assistance (both private and official), 10 percent from Sri Lankan donations and 10 percent from the sale of commodities produced in Sarvodaya's training farms and schools.

As people become more mobile and the cash economy more widespread, the strength of traditional self-help efforts may wane. But instead of providing resources in kind, local communities can raise money (through local taxes or charges) to support their efforts. Like other forms of self-help, this can be stimulated by matching grants from the central government in support of locally initiated and managed activities. In Kenya, for example, the government assists *harambee* (self-help) projects that meet official guidelines. But sluggish administration in central agencies can suffocate local participation and self-help—enthusiasm and initiative may wane if decisions take too long or promised assistance does not arrive on time.

Self-help is not always the right answer. In education, for example, local financing can lead to such an uneven distribution of qualified teachers, books and equipment as to intensify the inequities the country is trying to reduce. Northeastern Brazil and northern Nigeria provide two cases in point. In both regions, low incomes partly explain why the wages and quality of teachers fall below the national average; they also partly explain the low enrollment rates in these regions. If local economic and social progress lags well behind the national average, financial and technical assistance from the central government will be crucial.

Developing administrative strengths

Institutional constraints are in many cases at least as serious a barrier to human development as shortage of funds or lack of political support. Effective administration usually requires more than the efficient working of official bureaucracies; it depends on such factors as the availability of middle-level

manpower, the complementary activities of local governments and voluntary agencies, the receptivity of intended beneficiaries to public services, and the persistence of effort.

Unlike many aspects of agricultural, industrial and infrastructural development, human development programs can rarely be put out to contract. Improvements cannot be effected by changes in policy or legislation alone. Funds, equipment and advanced technologies can seldom substitute for trained field personnel or administrators.

Administration is a vital ingredient in primary health care: without adequate training, supervision and supplies, locally recruited paramedical staff cannot be effective. This is one of the important lessons of Brazil's early experience with rural primary health care in its poor northeast region, one confirmed in countries as diverse as China, Jamaica and Botswana.

In education, too, there are obvious administrative difficulties, because of the number and geographic spread of primary schools. But most countries have wide experience of operating an educational system, although major changes in curricula or teaching methods may be administratively demanding. For nutrition, general food subsidies are simpler to organize than targeted programs—but subsidizing food consumed mainly by poor people (see pages 62–63) is a form of targeting that eases administrative problems.

Improving administration at the periphery is far more complex and difficult than administrative reform at the center, a task that has itself often proved intractable. Many of the poor are hard to reach through conventional public programs, and the end-of-the-line workers may not be motivated to break the social, linguistic and physical barriers that separate them from the poor. Supply lines for textbooks or medicine may be continually breaking down, and the necessary technical support may be lacking. But these and similar difficulties must be overcome to reach the poor; that usually means improving organization at the grass roots.

Strengthening government machinery

No matter how resourceful individuals or local communities may be, sustained progress in human development inevitably requires national governments to mobilize and apply the much greater resources, both domestic and international, at their disposal.

Reviews of World Bank projects reveal a number of common institutional problems—among them, weak planning agencies and an inability (or failure) to relate annual budgets to long-term development priorities. Some of the existing deficiencies are due to inappropriate administrative structures and procedures, which still tend to reflect the metropolitan models on which they were patterned. They place undue emphasis on central control and take inadequate account of prevailing cultural or social attitudes.

Other weaknesses arise because the administration is not properly geared to identifying the people to be served, increasing their access to services, adapting services until they are appropriate, delivering them efficiently and observing (and reacting to) the public's response. This sequence requires people who can learn from the intended beneficiaries and gain their confidence (see box). This is critically important when the poor are cautious (or even hostile)—as they often are in their reactions to preventive medicine, family planning and nutrition education.

Most developing country governments are well aware of the need to improve administrative performance, and have undertaken some form of public sector reorganization. A common objective is to decentralize; planning units are being created at the state or provincial level in the Philippines and Sudan, for example, as a first step toward greater devolution of power (though premature decentralization, as in Tanzania, can complicate program implementation).

With the help of multilateral and bilateral agencies, many countries are trying to improve the performance and skills of public sector employees through training; through better job classification, which facilitates recruitment, training and evaluation; and through changes in civil service regulations—for example, to specify promotion requirements more clearly and to tighten discipline. Thailand is introducing special procurement procedures to prevent slippage in project implementation. Malaysia is implementing a more systematic approach to the preparation and appraisal of agricultural projects. Several Asian and African countries have begun to streamline cumbersome budgetary practices.

These and other efforts to make government machinery more efficient will take many years to produce discernible results. The continuous expansion of public sector activities in most developing countries has produced its own set of constraints: many bureaucracies have become large, powerful and protective of their own interests. Frequent changes of political leadership have insulated some bureaucracies from pressures for reform; in other countries radical attempts to restructure or purge public services have greatly

Rural poverty unperceived

Poor people are often the most difficult to reach. Many live on the edges of villages, far from main roads. They are illiterate, have no radios and know little about events beyond their neighborhood. They rarely go to public meetings and travel little except in search of work. Those whose legal position is weak (such as refugees or squatters) may even try to hide, to be invisible to the official eye. Out of sight, they hope to be out of mind.

As for the professionals who work in rural development programs, many of them are caught in an urban trap. Young, unmarried officials are sent to remote rural areas; but age, marriage and their careers draw them back to the towns and cities. And those who do live in the countryside often direct their attention toward people they have most in common with—the not-so-poor.

What can be done to correct this bias? Changing career patterns and incentives to reward rural work is fundamental; training can also play a role.

Without the need for complicated research, in-service training can help people to understand more about poverty. For example:

- Family case studies: a day in the life of a landless household, or how a poor family survives the hungry season.
- Getting poor people to talk about significant incidents in their life and work, particularly about those they see as being responsible for their poverty.
- Exploring practices and attitudes that affect, for instance, diets and fertility.
- Seeking out those who do not use services or adopt new practices, and trying to understand the reasons for this.

Relatively simple but systematic surveys can sometimes help those who carry them out. To take one example: in a densely populated part of western Kenya, junior agricultural extension staff and home economics workers were each given a random sample of 100 households to survey, in the area where they worked. After the survey, many at first thought that the sample had been biased heavily against the better educated households. One of the agricultural staff complained that only one of his 100 households had an improved breed of cow: he was surprised to learn that he had, without recognizing it, been concentrating on better-off households; in fact the area average was only one of these cows for more than 200 households. A home economics worker was appalled at the poverty she had found. "These people do not come to my meetings," she said. Perceiving reality is the first step to changing it.

reduced the ability of governments to maintain essential human development programs.

Choosing appropriate administrative strategies

To help make programs fully effective, administrators may need to use a variety of institutions—national bureaucracies, public enterprises, private businesses, voluntary agencies, local governments and organizations of intended beneficiaries—and strike the right balance between them.

In family planning, for example, traditional channels of private marketing, which reach even remote villages, have proved effective in many countries (including India, Indonesia, Jamaica and Sri Lanka). These private distributors supplement rather than supplant the services available through health ministries or other official family planning agencies. The cost to users has been kept low by providing the private distributors with free or highly subsidized contraceptives and controlling the retail price. And in Singapore, contraceptive information was at one time distributed with public utility bills.

Organizations of intended beneficiaries are not conventionally regarded as administrative agencies, but they can play a valuable role. Farmers' organizations, rotating credit associations, women's clubs, religious groups and marketing cooperatives are in principle accountable to, and can reflect the interests of, their members. They can involve their members, too, as no bureaucratic agency can. When local health centers in northern Senegal were unable to reach the people directly in a child-feeding program, the religious leaders took over part of the food distribution: recent research indicates that this is an effective way of getting food to poor families. Local groups can also provide reliable feedback on project experiments, and can influence bureaucracies to improve services in ways that unorganized, poor individuals could not.

Research in both developed and developing countries shows that when the beneficiaries are involved through their own organizations, they respond more effectively to services. That has happened, for example, in 4,500 village cooperatives organized by the Indian National Dairy Development Board; in 200 local development associations in the Yemen Arab Republic; in more than 9,000 Mothers' Clubs in South Korea, where family planning and other community functions have been assumed by traditional credit associations (called *kaes*); and in special radio listening and discussion groups in which about 2 million rural Tanzanians participated during the "Man is Health" campaign in Tanzania in 1973.

There is of course a danger that poor people's organizations may come to be dominated by local elites, with an associated risk of corruption. One of the main problems of agricultural cooperatives, for instance, has been to resist this type of domination. Unlike subsidized agricultural credit or fertilizer, however, primary education cannot be stolen, hoarded or resold. And though medicines can be, even the richest person would not want a hundred vaccinations. Another problem is infighting between rival local groups. But the suspicions that established

bureaucracies may have about organized beneficiaries or local governments should not blind them to their potential for effective action.

When administrative abilities are weak, it is sensible to concentrate on projects that do not need much organization. Food fortification (see page 63) involves minimal administrative effort. And in Cameroon a state corporation has effectively distributed low-cost pharmaceuticals through commercial channels. But this approach does not work for every kind of service, and it often fails to reach the most deprived people.

Where countries have a relatively strong administrative system but the poor are badly organized (a fairly common combination), governments can provide services that do not require joint action—such as primary education, basic health services, mass vaccination campaigns and subsidized food. Sri Lanka and the Indian state of Kerala, for example, have managed to achieve striking progress without relying much on local development groups. But even there, programs tend to be more active and effective if the intended beneficiaries are involved through local organizations.

Demand: ensuring that services are used

As has been shown, the poor sometimes fail to take advantage of services even if they are available (see page 52). The reasons for this "reluctant demand" vary across countries and sectors; but the more accurately they can be identified in particular cases, the better they can be tackled. Sometimes this can be done by changing the way a service is provided or reducing the costs of using it. Often it means changing the perceptions of intended beneficiaries. This may be simply a matter of providing information; but it commonly requires changes in long-standing attitudes and habits.

Changing the way services are delivered

A school calendar may compete unnecessarily with the crop cycle, with important exams held at times when students are most needed by their parents in the fields. The staff of a health center may not keep a regular schedule, forcing people who have traveled for several hours to return home without treatment. The local clinic may be short of drugs or so inconveniently located that a patient with a minor complaint may prefer to go straight to an urban hospital—or to the traditional healer, who may live in the village. Often the changes required to make a service more attractive to potential users are self-evident, such as providing them in a language that the beneficiaries understand. This does not mean that they are necessarily easy to implement.

Reducing costs to users

The benefits of services for health, education, nutrition and family planning often may be (or at least appear to people to be) less than their direct and indirect costs (see box). The latter can sometimes be reduced. For example, providing free textbooks (and uniforms, if required) and locating schools within walking distance will reduce the direct costs of school attendance. Providing free transport to health clinics is another possibility.

Providing information

The reason people do not take up a service may simply be that they lack information about it, or they may not know what to do: people may claim to be "aware" that family planning services exist, but have little idea what their use entails. They may assume that a newly established clinic will charge fees or require membership. Education and organization of beneficiaries can help. So can direct information campaigns, making use not only of mass media like radio or billboards, but also entertainers. Research on the diffusion of new ideas suggests that direct contact between people is the most effective form of communication. It has also been found that mass media are more influential if they are heard (or read) in a group. Radio forums, for example, in which a radio program is followed by a discussion, are a promising way of changing social attitudes and behavior. Since it is difficult to form such groups on an *ad hoc* basis, religious and other social groups may be useful.

Overcoming sociocultural obstacles

Deciding to use a service may require a more fundamental change in attitudes and practices. The idea may be controversial; for example, women may have heard unfavorable rumors about modern medicine or family planning methods. The poor may not appreciate the benefits, say, of different hygiene and sanitation arrangements because they do not understand how diseases are caused. Or the lack of demand may have roots deep in traditional taboos, beliefs or preferences. In many countries, men often refuse to allow women and girls to go to male doctors or community health workers. The same beliefs mean that girls are frequently not sent to school—and hence there are few female medical workers. In Africa and Southeast Asia certain types of food rich in vitamin A (such as dark green, leafy vegetables) are cheap and abundant. Yet many cases of blindness among children are caused by vitamin A deficiency—because eating these

Private costs of using public services

Data on the private costs of using public human development services are scarce. A recent study of Peninsular Malaysia, however, estimated them for education, water and health care.

- Education. Malaysian families had to cover—in addition to examination fees and purchases of texts and supplies—the costs of shoes, uniforms, snacks, transport and special fees. In 1974 these averaged $47 a year for a student in primary school, $123 for a student in secondary school.

The table shows that families in the lowest income quintile spent about a fifth of their incomes on out-of-pocket school costs. Even allowing for some bending of the truth by respondents, this is impressive—and it understates the burden. A fifth of the income of a poor family represents a far greater sacrifice than a fifth of the income of a wealthy family. And the cost of forgone earnings —what students could earn by working if they were not in school—is excluded.

- Water. Fewer than a third of the families in the lowest 40 percent of the income distribution bought piped and treated water (nearly all of which is supplied on a metered basis in Peninsular Malaysia). Of these, 14 percent spent more than 5 percent of their incomes on it. The average burden for the poorest quintile was 4.1 percent. There may again be some bending of the truth involved. But the burden of water charges was high enough to deter at least a third of the poorest 40 percent who had ready access to piped water from purchasing it.
- Health care. The Malaysian study showed a strong relation between household income and expenditure on private health care—but almost no relation between income and consumption of public health care. Most patients paid no fees for public inpatient or outpatient treatment. Nor were expenditures on transport to the place of treatment related to income, although there was a weak inverse association between travel time and frequency of treatment. Thus the need for medical care of the poor and most of the rest of the population was met through the public system at little private cost.

Out-of-pocket costs, Peninsular Malaysia, 1974

Family income quintile	*Percentage of households with students*	*Percentage of their income spent on out-of-pocket school costs*	*Percentage of households with piped and treated water*	*Percentage of their income spent on water*
Lowest	73	18	20	4.1
Second	67	10	37	2.6
Third	71	10	43	2.0
Fourth	66	8	62	1.5
Highest	50	6	76	0.8

Source: Jacob Meerman, *Public Expenditure in Malaysia* (Oxford, 1979).

foods is regarded as a sign of low social status.

Higher incomes and better education will clearly help to overcome many of these obstacles. Traditional social and cultural structures can sometimes also be adapted to new uses rather than ignored or swept aside. The Indonesian family planning program has been notably successful in this respect, as well as in decentralizing responsibility for implementation (see box overleaf).

The more that programs require people to change their behavior (the pattern of distributing food within families), threaten established norms (family planning), challenge vested interests (professional associations) or offer few immediately obvious benefits (sanitation), the more patiently they must be introduced. Public education and persuasion are needed, and it will take a long time to reap the economic and political benefits.

Coercion

In attempting to spread human development, many countries have gone beyond information and persuasion to use various forms of coercion. Laws establishing compulsory primary education are perhaps the most widespread example. Using laws is sometimes regarded as more unfairly coercive than, say, manipulating costs, since it allows no parental choice at all. But because children usually suffer more than their parents, such measures as compulsory schooling should be seen more as protecting the rights of children than as restricting those of parents.

Just how much coercion is considered to be acceptable will vary according to a country's culture and political values. In some places, traditional social structures have been enlisted to exert pressure on their members. This has been a characteristic of the Indonesian family planning program. Among the Hausa in northern Nigeria, a program to eradicate sleeping sickness has been successfully sustained through strong leadership. Every year the villagers clear the undergrowth along the banks of rivers and streams. They do not fully understand the reasons, but they are willing to do what their traditional leaders ask. Nevertheless, programs of education, health, nutrition and family planning have more chance of success if the beneficiaries come to see the programs as serving their interests.

Affecting behavior within the family

Especially in poor households, the interests of parents, children and old people can diverge, causing maldistribution of food, education and medical care within the family (see pages 61–62). Raising family incomes can reduce or eliminate the economic reasons for unfair shares; more education of parents, especially of mothers, can mitigate the cultural reasons (see box on page 50). In addition,

The banjars of Bali

Indonesia's family planning program combines central direction with decentralized implementation. The program has strong political support from the president, to whom its chairman reports directly. Family planning is an integral part of national and provincial development plans—ministers and provincial governors are responsible to the president for their execution. And the program maintains a central data system to monitor performance and ensure that no region or even village runs short of contraceptives. But the task of implementing specific goals rests largely with provincial and local staff, and political and community leaders in the villages.

The program offers strong (but nonmonetary) incentives for managers and staff at all levels, because it was designed to give credit for success to local managers. Most of the contact with families is by village volunteers. The program rewards them, too—outer-island midwives can earn trips to Bali for training, while Balinese chiefs whose villages have made the most progress in family planning are taken to see the successful East Java program.

The approach is tailored to specific local needs; it fosters local initiative and experiments with unconventional projects. People at provincial and village levels submit ideas for new campaigns, and funds are quickly provided for the ones approved. The program has also made use of the private sector—traditional traveling herb vendors (called *tukan jamus*) have been enlisted to supply contraceptives to remote villages as well as urban areas.

In the province of Bali, the traditional community council (called *banjar*) has been harnessed to promote family planning. For centuries banjars have been the hub of village life. There are more than 3,700 of them today; adult men in Bali belong to their village banjar and attend monthly meetings. In 1974 the government in Bali started to work through banjar leaders to create an awareness of family planning, to identify people who might be keen on planning their families, and to help them do so. Typically, the monthly banjar meeting now begins with a roll call; each man responds by saying whether he and his wife are using contraceptives. Replies are plotted on a village map—prominently displayed.

The results have been striking. An estimated 49 percent of eligible couples have adopted family planning in Bali, compared with 29 percent for the country as a whole. The World Fertility Survey showed that the average number of children a Balinese woman could expect to have had fallen from 5.8 in mid-1969 to 3.8 in 1976.

improved earning opportunities for educated women, lower infant mortality rates and a rising age at marriage will help parents to provide more for all their children and to have fewer of them.

Without these sorts of change, it is difficult to affect the way food, education and medical care are shared within families. But it is not impossible. Door-to-door inoculation campaigns can reach all children. This has been done recently in Mozambique and Sierra Leone. And the way work is organized will also affect inequalities within families. For example, the Anand Dairy Cooperative in India increased the income received directly by Indian women —since they have traditionally been responsible for looking after cows and goats, selling the milk and controlling the proceeds themselves. By selling cooperatively, the members get higher profits than they otherwise would. Families are fed better. More of the children are now attending school. And as the younger educated women are seen to be taking a greater part in running the cooperative, education for girls is becoming more highly valued. In dairy development projects in three other Indian states—all based on this model—similar results are being obtained.

International assistance

International aid for human development programs has been provided for decades and has contributed to several notable successes. It has played a major role, for instance, in helping to spread education; in eradicating smallpox and sharply reducing several major diseases (including yaws, malaria, leprosy and African sleeping sickness); and, perhaps most significantly, in increasing the production of basic foods.

On the other hand, some aid programs have failed—or have succeeded while indirectly contributing to inappropriate policies. Until the early 1970s, there was an emphasis on showcase universities, large urban hospitals and large-scale agriculture—consistent with development thinking at that time. Not surprisingly, such international assistance involved transferring some technologies or institutions from developed countries without adequate recognition of how the circumstances of developing countries differed.

Since the benefits of human development are received partly by today's children but even more by their children and grandchildren, governments that are hard pressed financially may find it difficult to justify spending as much on human development as is desirable for long-run economic growth, let alone for alleviating poverty. This dilemma—which will be acute during the next few years of financial stringency—is one for which external assistance can be particularly helpful. Many other measures —from small-farmer programs to power generation and industrialization—are also needed to reduce poverty and raise average incomes; these merit strong international support as well.

If donors providing assistance to a country are unwilling to finance human development programs, these programs in most cases will be smaller than they otherwise would have been. Similarly, if donors are willing to finance only "bricks and mortar"

but not teachers or health workers, the net effect will be excessive capital intensity—showing up in overly expensive and underused buildings and insufficient staff. Yet in developing countries a high proportion of spending on primary education and health care, for example, is—and should be—for operating (recurrent) costs. In many countries, such as Tanzania and Upper Volta, money for operating costs is already very short—with the result that schools without books or even paper, health posts without medicines or supervision (due to inadequate travel budgets or gasoline shortages) are increasingly common. These shortages will get worse as growth slows and countries struggle to keep up their physical investment rates.

Most aid agencies have preferred to limit their funding to physical investment, being reluctant to finance operating costs partly because of concern that projects in which a developing country lacked a substantial financial stake might not develop enduring roots, but also from fear of encouraging consumption at the expense of investment. As this *Report* stresses, however, human development increases productivity, reduces fertility and thus promotes long-term growth in average incomes. A significant part of spending—operating as well as capital—on human development therefore *is* investment. This is most evident in primary education, which in many countries has economic returns well above average: the salaries of teachers should no more be regarded as consumption than the wages of workers on irrigation projects. There is a large element of investment in family planning programs as well (indeed the estimated returns often are even higher) and to a lesser extent in health and nutrition programs.

With increasing recognition of the importance of antipoverty programs, and of the investment component of many of these programs, practices have begun to change. Several donors, including the World Bank, have been financing the salaries of agricultural extension workers, and in some cases the operating costs required to carry out education and training projects—teachers' salaries and teaching materials, for example. In May 1979 the OECD's Development Assistance Committee adopted new guidelines on the financing of local and recurrent costs, which recognized that basic human development programs were particularly suitable for these kinds of financing.

Donors should of course be concerned to avoid waste in operating costs, just as in construction costs. And they need to ensure that programs develop adequate financial support for operating costs from national and local governments—lest they wither away when international aid is withdrawn. Thus the share of operating costs covered by external assistance should be reduced gradually, which will encourage steady increases rather than quantum jumps in the amounts to be financed from local funds.

Donors should also consider providing sectoral or subsectoral, as well as project, financing. This enables governments to focus on the institutional, planning and policy issues that have a strong influence on the success of individual projects; it also provides a useful framework for striking the appropriate balance between capital and operating costs. In practice, subsectoral financing—limited by activity or region—is often preferable to sectorwide financing. Through subsectoral financing, donors can assist a continuing series of activities, while ensuring that no one project or program relies for long periods on outside aid and that implementation difficulties in one project or region do not interfere with continued financing for others.

The importance of persistence

Programs that cost the least often require the most organization. Moreover, whether in state bureaucracies at one extreme or among the intended poor beneficiaries at the other, an organization's strength generally depends on the education and resourcefulness of its members. That cannot be developed overnight.

One key lesson from 30 years of development experience is that it takes a long time to build up effective institutions. Neither governments nor donors should expect quick results, or give up too easily. For example, evaluation of family planning programs shows a close relation between their effectiveness and the number of years they have been in existence.

As Chapter 5 explained, and as Figure 6.1 confirms with respect

Figure 6.1 Literacy rates, selected developing countries, 1950 & 1970[a]

(percent)



a. The rates are for the 20–24 age group and determined by data availability. Dates are close to 1950 and 1970.

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to education, the level of human development at one time is strongly influenced by its level decades earlier. Thus, human development is not something that can be deferred: what is done now—or not done—will have an influence for a long time to come. When austerity programs are necessary (as will be the case for a number of countries over the next few years), attention should be given to the need for investment in the human development of the next generation. When economic difficulties originating in the workings of the world economy or economic mismanagement cause cutbacks in human development programs, children pay heavily—in loss of future income or health, and in some cases with their lives.

7 Priorities and progress in regional perspective

The past three chapters have examined the potential role of human development in attacking absolute poverty, and some of the problems and policies in the main human development areas. This chapter addresses some broader human development planning issues—including the tradeoffs between growth and poverty reduction, and the allocation of resources between human development and other activities. After a general review, these and other issues are examined in the context of a regional typology of developing countries. Since the needs and the difficulties are greatest in the two poorest regions—Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia—they receive most attention. The other three regions—the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and East Asia—are discussed collectively in a single section.

Issues for planners

Much absolute poverty, and some of the ways to attack it, are obvious. Yet lack of information about the numbers and characteristics of the poor, and the causes of their poverty, handicaps the design and implementation of effective antipoverty policies. Even in countries where much work has been done—Brazil, India, Indonesia—controversy persists about such basic facts as trends in the incomes of the poor. This is partly for lack of relevant data from household surveys—though informal study and patching together evidence from other sources can help. It is also a matter of analysis—experience has shown how important it is to distinguish household income from income per household member, to find the relevant price index to calculate changes in the real incomes of the poor and to take account of seasonal variations. For example, since the poor spend the bulk of their incomes on the cheapest foods, a price index based on national average consumption patterns may seriously distort what has been happening to absolute poverty.

To be effective, policies must also distinguish the causes of poverty—which vary widely within as well as between countries. There are common elements and important linkages. But different measures will be needed to benefit, say, subsistence farmers on poor soils, landless laborers in fertile but crowded areas, and female-headed households in large cities. Poverty programs have sometimes focused almost exclusively on small farmers even when the majority in absolute poverty were in fact landless laborers.

As important as differentiating the causes of poverty is differentiating its characteristics. Absolute poverty is a bundle of things—low income, malnutrition, ill health, lack of education. Different groups of poor people may initially suffer from some more than others; policies should correspondingly vary in their focus.

Tradeoffs between different objectives

In the past the severity of the tradeoff between poverty reduction and growth has sometimes been exaggerated—especially from a narrowly economic point of view. As the past two *World Development Reports* have emphasized, more support for agriculture, land reform, expansion of industrial employment, and a more even distribution of public services can all help to reduce absolute poverty and accelerate growth. This *Report* similarly stresses not only what greater national income can do for the education, health and nutrition of the poor, but also how human development policies for the poor can contribute to raising national income.

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that there are no tradeoffs. Although it is highly desirable, for example, to help the aged and the incurably sick—among the poorest of the poor in most societies—this will contribute little or nothing to growth. Similarly, in expanding rural primary education, countries will have to choose between the places that are poorest, and those (the rapidly modernizing ones) where more education would have the largest effect on farm output. The severity of tradeoffs, moreover, is (as Chapter 6 has shown)

in most cases amplified by political, fiscal, administrative and even cultural considerations. If, for political reasons, more services for the poor must be matched by more services for the rich, the cost of providing for the poor is multiplied.

But economic factors underlie many tradeoffs, especially since money can sometimes ease even political and administrative problems. A country that is already comparatively wealthy, or whose growth prospects are excellent, generally has more latitude than one that is poor, or whose growth prospects are grim. The severity of tradeoffs is thus also affected by the international environment. Higher oil prices absorb resources that could have been used either for growth or for reducing poverty. So do cuts in aid, obstacles to commercial borrowing, and sluggish exports (and hence imports and production) caused by slow world growth. Agricultural and industrial protection in developed countries undermine the efforts of developing countries to foster agriculture and labor-intensive industrialization. In the next few years, especially, the harshness of the choices that poor countries will have to make can hardly be exaggerated. Nor can the degree to which these could be eased by enlightened policies on the part of other countries.

Balance between human development and other policies

The returns to human development programs can be high in economic terms—both directly (especially for education) and indirectly (especially through reduced population growth). Their impact on the education, health, nutrition and fertility of the poor is also valuable in itself. But human development programs alone cannot reduce poverty and promote growth. A whole range of other policies—for infrastructural investment, agriculture, foreign trade, land reform, credit and research—must do most of the job, even though many of them complement human development in important ways.

Even at the margin, the key question is not whether the returns to human development are high, but whether they are *higher* than returns to alternative uses of the resources concerned. Much will depend on the circumstances of the country concerned, including its past balance between human development and other policies. Some countries have devoted too little of their development budgets to human resources, and too much to physical investment; for them, a switch at the margin toward human development would be the best use of scarce resources. Others, by contrast, may have overinvested in some aspects of human development—as suggested, for example, by the low rates of return to higher education in certain countries. In other cases, human development programs have had low returns simply because they were hard to implement (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Overinvestment and underinvestment, of course, cannot be defined without reference to the objectives of governments—how much weight they attach to growth, redistribution and human development, or to short- versus long-term goals. Much of the payoff from better education and lower fertility, for example, would accrue to this generation's children and grandchildren. But people—especially poor people—legitimately want improvements during their own lifetimes. This and other sources of economic or political pressure to concentrate on the short or medium term are bound to reduce the attractiveness of some—though by no means all—human development programs.

Balance between different human development policies

As the analysis in Chapter 5 bears out, there are also difficult choices to be made within the general area of human development. The difficulty is partly a technical one—more research is needed to quantify the returns to different sorts of programs in varying circumstances. But it is again partly a matter of objectives—the relative weights attached to nutrition and education, for example. And it is agravated by economic constraints: even with identical preferences, a poor country might make a different choice from a richer one when confronted with the option of providing rural primary health care or expanding some form of urban secondary education with a higher economic rate of return. Choices are also affected by the availability of finance (foreign and local, as well as national) for different programs.

The difficulty of the choice is eased somewhat by the fact that the various aspects of human development are causally interrelated (see Chapter 5): an attack on any one front is likely to produce results also on others. These spillovers appear greatest in basic education—which usually also has the biggest payoff in terms of increased income. There is thus a strong case for considering increasing (or in times of stringency, maintaining) expenditure on primary schooling. This should not mean neglecting secondary and higher education, nutrition, health and family planning programs—which in all circumstances are important, and in many may have a better claim on marginal funds than primary education. Nor should governments overlook the practical difficulties of translating higher enrollment targets into adequate education and reduced dropout rates, or the length of

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Figure 7.1 GNP per person, 1960, 1970 and 1980

(1977 dollars)



a. Excludes Afghanistan, Israel and Turkey.
b. Excludes Cuba.
c. Excludes centrally planned economies (China, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea and Vietnam).
d. Excludes South Africa and Nigeria.

time that must elapse before the full benefits of even good primary schooling are felt.

Country circumstances

Appropriate policies in the field of poverty and human development will vary widely according to the circumstances of the country concerned. The rest of the chapter illustrates this point by comparing the different regions of the developing world. Regions, of course, are not decisionmaking units. Nor are they homogeneous. But there are important differences between them (Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 contrast their progress on incomes, literacy and life expectancy); and regional analysis provides a more general, if less concrete, perspective than would a set of country case studies.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Most of the countries in the region became independent in the 1960s. They inherited acute deficiencies in skills, institutions and general education; overcoming these has been a major concern of most of their governments. Progress has been considerable, yet severe shortcomings remain. The region's experience illustrates that human and institutional development are long, slow processes—their neglect today is not easily overcome tomorrow. And while they are costly, so is their neglect: as the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5 would predict, educational and institutional deficiencies coexist with low life expectancy, high fertility, inefficient investment and slow agricultural progress.

Figure 7.2 Literacy, by region, 1945–75

Adult literacy rate (percent)[a]



a. Trends before 1960 are approximate.

Figure 7.3 Life expectancy, 1960 and 1978[a]

Years



a. Weighted by population. Excludes S. Africa, Cambodia and Israel.

Growth

The growth of incomes has been disappointing, both in the middle-income and in the low-income countries (see Table 7.1). The two groups are distinguished mainly by differences in natural resources rather than in economic structure, institutional development or human skills. GNP per person (which, in the absence of reliable information on the large subsistence sector, can be measured only approximately) either fell or grew

Table 7.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: GNP per person

Countries	Average annual percentage growth 1960–70	1970–80	1960–80	Level, 1980[a] (dollars)
Low-income	1.6	0.2	0.9	186
Middle-income	1.7	2.1[b]	1.9	493

Note: Excludes South Africa.
a. 1977 prices.
b. If oil-exporting Nigeria is excluded, this figure falls to 1.5 percent.

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less than 1 percent a year in 11 countries during 1960–78; it rose more than 3 percent a year in four countries. (Some of these meager gains have been wiped out by deteriorating terms of trade.) Agriculture has been almost uniformly sluggish; food output per person appears to have declined in 25 countries (mainly in the Sahel) between 1969–71 and 1976–78.

The constraints that hampered growth in the past have not eased much. The discouraging prospects for growth in both low- and middle-income African countries—and the resulting likelihood of an increase in the proportion of people in absolute poverty—were described in Chapter 2 (page 11).

How the international economy affects African countries will depend on aid levels and on primary commodity prices, but importantly on their own actions as well. The potential gains from processing primary products for export remain largely untapped. Primary products typically account for 80–100 percent of merchandise exports (though not all are suitable for processing; see page 23). In some countries exports have stagnated because of poor domestic agricultural performance; many more have had to increase their food imports. Grain imports into Sub-Saharan Africa rose from about 1.6 to 2.6 million tonnes between 1965 and 1975 (and the US Department of Agriculture projects a rise to 4.5 million tonnes by 1985).

The importance of agriculture goes far beyond its effect on trade. As the region most dependent on agriculture—the main activity of more than 70 percent of its 360 million people—accelerating growth and reducing poverty and malnutrition in Africa depend more than anywhere else on improved agricultural performance. Evidence that farmer literacy affects the adoption of new farming methods (see page 48) has obvious implications for that improvement. But the problem is clearly much wider. Modern agricultural "packages" (of seeds, fertilizers and cultivation techniques) have yet to be developed for many African localities and subsistence crops. Agricultural programs generally have not reflected the considerable role that African women play in agriculture. And there are basic deficiencies in credit, infrastructure, agricultural incentives, extension services and market integration (the *World Development Report, 1978* considered in more detail the requirements for faster growth in Africa).

In large measure these deficiencies reflect institutional weaknesses and the related scarcity of experienced, trained people. Nor are their effects confined to agriculture. In several countries a significant industrial sector is already emerging, but the scarcity and high cost of suitably skilled labor and management remain major impediments to African industrialization.

While administrative weaknesses will take time to overcome, the effectiveness of many programs is also hampered by difficulties in financing operating costs, especially for materials and supplies. Progress could be more rapid if aid donors were to relax their traditional preference for funding capital rather than operating costs.

In addition, there is a serious danger that economic stringency in the next few years will lead to cutbacks in human development programs, despite the importance of their contribution—often exceeding that of additional physical investment—to Africa's long-term development potential. It is essential that aid donors, especially in the first half of the 1980s, should substantially increase their efforts to help African governments avoid such false economies (while maintaining the already very low consumption levels of most of their people).

Poverty

Given the trend in average incomes (particularly in agriculture), the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty has probably increased in many countries since the early 1960s; in 1975 an estimated half of the people in the region were absolutely poor. Most are subsistence and small-scale farmers, but in some countries (such as Somalia) a sizable proportion are nomads. As compared with the low-income countries of Asia, poor agricultural conditions and farming methods are a more important cause of low agricultural incomes than unfavorable land-man ratios.

Human development issues

Despite substantial gains since 1960, life expectancy remains below 50 and adult literacy rates below 25 percent in most countries. Both are generally below expected values for countries at their income levels. For example, the norm for life expectancy (Figure 7.4) is about 50 years for countries with average incomes of about $350; but Senegal, with that income level, has a life expectancy of only 42 years. Africa is the only region where fertility still shows no sign of decline—women surviving to the end of their child-bearing years average 6 to 8 children. And it is the only region where nutrition has steadily worsened.

FERTILITY. The contribution that slower population growth can make to raising incomes is particularly marked in Africa. The region's high infant mortality and low adult literacy are major reasons that population growth remains high.

Figure 7.4 Sub-Saharan Africa: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978



a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person.

Studies in Nigeria and Tanzania found that education among wives reduced fertility and infant mortality—though some studies in Africa have suggested that the initial impact of schooling (by increasing health and fecundity sooner than it reduces desired family size) may be to increase fertility. The contrast between Kenya and Lesotho is also suggestive: among African countries, they both have better-than-average records of literacy, life expectancy and child death rates—yet Kenya has the highest fertility rate in Africa and Lesotho the lowest. Data from the early 1960s show that in Kenya many more men than women were literate, while in Lesotho it was the other way round.

That is unlikely to be the whole explanation, of course; other possible reasons include the migration of men from Lesotho to South Africa, and differences in cultural values—which are strongly pronatal in many parts of Africa, so that (in contrast to other regions) desired family size often exceeds its actual size.

Partly for this reason, and partly because of the virtual absence in most countries of a primary health care network onto which family planning programs could be grafted, such programs in Africa have been few and feeble. Extending and strengthening family planning efforts, however, would cause an earlier and faster decline in fertility.

HEALTH. Primary health care can be provided inexpensively (about $2-3 a person) in some of the low-income countries (and could be financed to some degree by a reallocation of government expenditure away from urban hospitals); but since it is administratively demanding, progress is likely to be slow.

A few countries such as Mali, Kenya and Tanzania have begun to establish the necessary administrative structure. Village health workers can be trained cheaply, as has been demonstrated in Niger, but a study of Mali's health system noted that "at the village level, the most serious manpower constraint is the near total lack of literate people who can be trained as village health workers."

EDUCATION. Typically, education accounts for 15–25 percent of the budget and 3–6 percent of GNP; less than half the total is for primary education. Recent growth in school enrollment has been impressive, particularly in Benin, Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Somalia and Zambia. These countries spend more than 5 percent of their GNP on education and are in the top 25 percent of all developing countries on this count. For them, the key issue is not increasing education's share of the budget but (as in other African countries) using funds more effectively, improving educational quality and tackling serious problems of dropout and wastage.

Costs are a major obstacle to raising enrollment and school quality in Africa: costs per pupil as a percentage of GNP per person are the highest of all regions. Compared with Asia, this ratio in West Africa is more than twice as high for primary, five times for secondary and seven times for tertiary education. The high cost largely reflects the fact that teacher salaries (which typically account for 75 percent of educational costs) are high in relation to average incomes. In Upper Volta (which has the lowest literacy rate in Africa—5 percent) teachers' salaries are 24 times larger than GNP per person, compared with less than four times in Liberia. High salaries for all educated people are partly a colonial legacy; but the main cause has been a shortage of qualified

teachers, which is now starting to ease. Salaries have fallen in real terms in several countries, including Benin, Tanzania and Sierra Leone.

There are various other ways of making education less expensive without making it worse, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In some countries, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone, average class sizes are small enough (about 30 pupils) to be raised without much adverse effect on quality (see box on page 52). In Togo local communities pay part of teachers' salaries; in Somalia and Tanzania they contribute to construction costs.

While school enrollments have risen markedly, few countries have tried to deal with the large backlog of illiterate adults. Literacy campaigns that relied on students, volunteers and government servants were mounted in Somalia and Tanzania, with spectacular success: literacy rates are estimated to have risen from 2 percent and 10 percent to 60 percent and 66 percent, respectively, between 1960 and 1975. Such programs, however, lack the socializing effects of school attendance. There is also a risk that literacy skills may decay if they are acquired in circumstances that do not require their frequent use. This argues for programs that are not too brief and have an emphasis on such practical subjects as numeracy, hygiene, nutrition, family planning and agriculture.

There are politically difficult choices to be made in higher education. Governments often give stipends as well as free education to university (and sometimes even secondary) students. Many governments have also felt obliged to guarantee jobs to all university graduates—in activities whose productivity does not always match their salaries. Secondary and higher education is thus a doubly serious drain on budgets; and its social returns have been pushed well below the private returns to individuals—and below what they might be with better economic policies, since Sub-Saharan Africa badly needs more people with professional, scientific and administrative skills. Their shortage has been one of the biggest brakes on development projects—as reviews of World Bank project experience amply testify. But African countries also need to train them more economically (see page 50) in order both to increase their supply and to release resources for primary schooling and other human development programs.

Despite the conspicuous scarcities, there is concern about incipient unemployment among secondary-school graduates in some countries. This reflects the fact that job requirements and expectations tend to change more slowly than the supply of qualified people (see box on page 51). But as graduates find it harder to get jobs, they will be likelier to respond to the needs of the economy for more people to work in rural areas as extension agents, teachers and administrators.

South Asia

South Asia has much in common with Sub-Saharan Africa—in particular, pervasive poverty and low average incomes. But it has relatively many more highly trained people (there are almost as many university students in India as in the European Community) and greater administrative capacity.

Growth

Economic growth has been generally slow: South Asia's GNP per person grew at an annual rate of 1.6 percent in 1960-70 and 1.1 percent in 1970-80—stagnating in the early 1970s and then accelerating after 1974. South Asia has substantially better growth prospects than Sub-Saharan Africa; but it too will face difficult choices in the adjustment period. Growth will depend heavily on domestic economic management, particularly in agriculture; but exports, migrants' remittances and aid are important international influences (no country borrows much commercial capital). Remittances, mainly from the Middle East, have grown dramatically in recent years; in 1979 they amounted to about $1.4 billion in Pakistan (almost three-quarters the value of its merchandise exports) and roughly $1 billion in India. They are also substantial in Bangladesh.

The region has also had some success in increasing exports to the Middle East—particularly India, which has won major contracts for turnkey plants, construction and consultancy services. Nonetheless, no country has fully exploited its potential for manufactured exports. The large industrial sectors of India and Pakistan can respond strongly to incentives for exports, as Pakistan's did in the 1960s and India's has done more recently. Sri Lanka is launching a major drive for export-led industrialization, which should be helped by its highly educated labor force.

Recent agricultural performance in India augurs well for the 1980s (and is the main reason faster GNP growth is projected). When an identifiable package involving water, fertilizer, high-yielding varieties and credit is readily available, as it is in much of South Asia, the economic returns to more rapid and successful adoption—facilitated by the spread of education—can be high. Given the pressure of population on land, future agricultural expansion will have to rely almost exclusively on increasing cropping-intensity and the spread of high-yielding varieties of crops.

Poverty

About half of the region's people live in absolute poverty, accounting for half of the world's poor. Landlessness is a much more important cause of poverty than in Africa. The landless and those with less than 0.5 hectares make up about 53 percent of the rural households in Bangladesh, 40 percent in India and 37 percent in Pakistan. And those with 0.5 to 1 hectare are still very poor, and must earn much of their income as wage-laborers. Although only about 20 percent of the population lives in cities, South Asia contains much of the world's worst urban poverty.

Life expectancy in South Asia is above the norm for countries with similar average incomes (Figure 7.5); but for literacy the picture is more mixed, with Nepal and Pakistan below the norm. More generally, progress in human development varies widely, both between and within countries. Sri Lanka and the Indian state of Kerala have achieved literacy and life expectancy that are usually reached at incomes per person near the top of the middle-income range. (In 1971 the literacy rate in Kerala was 69 percent; Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra were next in India with 45 percent and Rajasthan was last with 21 percent.) At the other extreme, Nepal's human development indicators are more like those of the typical African country.

Human development issues

The successes of Sri Lanka and Kerala demonstrate the potential as well as the difficulties of human development and poverty reduction in South Asia. They also confirm the potency of an early start: Sri Lanka's literacy rate in 1900 exceeded that of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1975.

In relation to its income, Sri Lanka has extraordinarily high life expectancy and literacy (although

Figure 7.5 South Asia: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978



a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person.

estate laborers remain an underprivileged group), and extraordinarily low population growth. It achieved this primarily through subsidies to food and education, which accounted respectively for 4.5 percent and 3 percent of GNP in the early 1970s (17 percent and 12 percent of the central budget). These were combined with fairly broad-based access to health care and a moderately effective family planning program. Relatively low defense spending—in 1977 Sri Lanka devoted just 0.7 percent of its GNP to defense, compared with the South Asian average of 3.4 percent—made it easier to finance these programs. Good literacy and nutrition contributed to high life expectancy and low infant mortality, fertility and population growth. (The essential ingredients and results were similar in Kerala.) But Sri Lanka's experience also highlights the importance of concentrating spending on those who need it most. The provision of coverage to all income groups and educational levels resulted in a fiscal burden which could not be sustained (page 62). More generally, Sri Lanka's economic performance has not yet matched its progress on human development (see box overleaf).

FERTILITY AND WOMEN. While population growth in South Asia is lower than in Africa, the density of population makes it at least as urgent an issue. The three most populous countries of the region all share the nexus of low female literacy and high child mortality and fertility (female literacy rates are a third to a half of male rates), with Pakistan and Bangladesh the the worst affected. In India higher literacy, lower sex differences in education and a stronger family planning program have been associated with a decline in fertility. As a result, by 2000, the primary-school age group is projected to have increased by about 40 percent in Bangladesh, 60 percent in Pakistan and a more manageable 20 percent in India.

Outside Sri Lanka and Burma, the status of women is a major bar to human development. Malnutrition is considerably higher among females, and newborn girls have a significantly smaller chance of surviving to the age of five (see box on page 91). The school enrollment rate among boys is nearly twice as high as among girls; the gap has closed signicantly, however, even in the Muslim countries where the cultural reasons for low female enrollment are strongest. The eventual impact this could have on population growth is considerable. A study in Bangladesh found that, as in other countries, schooling reduced fertility even in the absence of a strong family planning program. But without a strong program, a large and early decline in fertility is unlikely.

NUTRITION. Food production has roughly kept pace with population growth, but malnutrition remains widespread. It is due more to people not being able to afford food than to any overall shortage: bumper harvests in India in 1976–78 resulted in a large increase in food stocks, but malnutrition (while reduced) remained widespread.

Tradeoffs in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka's record on life expectancy, literacy and fertility (in relation to its low income level) is one of the best in the world. But to achieve this the government has spent on average over the past two decades nearly 10 percent of GNP on education, health and nutrition programs. To what extent, then, were these achievements in human development at the expense of economic growth?

Growth of GDP in the 1960s was 0.7 percentage points above the low-income average, in part reflecting one of the highest growth rates of rice production in the world. In the 1970s, though, slower growth in agriculture and especially manufacturing caused Sri Lanka's GDP growth rate to be somewhat below the low-income average. But because Sri Lanka's population growth rate was well below the low-income average (it fell to 1.7 percent a year in the 1970s), the growth of GNP per person over the period 1960–77, at 2.0 percent, was above the low-income average of 1.4 percent.

Sri Lanka has thus done no worse in terms of growth than other countries at its income level, while greatly out-performing them in human development. But it could have done even better—realizing more of the economic potential of its human resources—had better economic policies been pursued.

In the 1960s Sri Lanka's economic management was better than in the 1970s. But pricing policies discouraged new investment in tea and other export crops. And there was too much emphasis on industrial import substitution and too little on export promotion—in part because of an increasingly overvalued exchange rate. After 1970 the economy was hit by bad weather, which affected agricultural production, and by a steeper fall in the world price of its exports relative to its imports. These problems were aggravated until 1977 by poor economic management—including an unresolved conflict with the private sector (which depressed its investment and expansion), excessive use of public investment for highly inefficient industrial projects, and expansion of the public payroll in an expensive and unsuccessful attempt to curb unemployment.

The tradeoff between expenditures on human development and growth in Sri Lanka has thus not been so sharp as is sometimes suggested. In the 1960s fairly rapid growth permitted expansion of social expenditures. In the 1970s growth deteriorated for reasons generally independent of the human development spending—and indeed caused a decline in real expenditures per person on health and education, as well as in food distribution per person. The election of 1977 led to a change of government and to substantial alterations in policies. From 1977 to 1980 annual GDP growth is estimated to have spurted to 6.5 percent, or about 3 percent per person.

Calorie consumption per person in Sri Lanka has not been higher than in the rest of South Asia, but there has been much less malnutrition simply because food has been relatively evenly distributed. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively spent 0.6 percent, 1.9 percent and 0.1 percent of their GNPs on limited food subsidies in the early 1970s—but with relatively little nutritional effect (outside Kerala), since rural areas and urban squatters were largely bypassed. Greater attention to nutritional considerations in food production and subsidy programs could have a major impact; but sustained nutritional improvement will depend ultimately on raising the incomes of the poor.

EDUCATION AND HEALTH. Spending on education has been relatively low—about 1.5 percent of GNP in Bangladesh, 2.5 to 3 percent in Burma, India and Sri Lanka—mainly because educational costs are the lowest in the world, which in turn reflects the large supply of educated people. Except in Burma and Sri Lanka, however, policies have tended to favor higher education: most poor children still fail to complete primary school.

In health, future gains will depend more on improvements in nutrition, health care and education than on individual disease control programs. While the region's ratio of physicians to population is high by the standards of low-income countries, they tend to be clustered in urban areas.

The relative abundance of highly educated people in South Asia (especially India), and the improved outlook for economic growth, should allow the larger countries in the region to tackle the challenging tasks of (a) increasing the share of spending on primary education and expanding enrollment, especially among girls and the poor; (b) improving the efficiency of the educational system—better quality, fewer dropouts and repeaters; and (c) expanding the network of primary health centers (India is already devoting renewed attention to this).

Primarily middle-income regions

With some injustice to their considerable diversity, the three primarily middle-income regions can be characterized as follows.

- Middle East and North Africa: income growth has been extremely rapid in recent years, reflecting the direct and indirect effects of oil revenues; but human development still lags behind.
- Latin America and the Caribbean: the most urbanized and industrialized region, with high average levels of human development; economic and social progress has been rapid, despite fast population growth; yet one in seven people still live in absolute poverty.
- East Asia and Pacific: best performance on growth of incomes and human development in relation to income; rapid growth has been based on efficient use of labor, capital and technology rather than on natural resources.

Growth

The countries of the Middle East

and North Africa cover the spectrum of average incomes—from Kuwait, among the richest countries in the world, to Afghanistan, one of the poorest. Growth has been rapid even in the non-oil countries, which benefited from the oil boom through migrants' remittances and inflows of official and private capital. (About 10 percent of the people in the region are directly dependent on remittances, which are often large—an average of $4,000 a year per Moroccan migrant, for example.) In the 1970s GNP per person in the region rose 4.9 percent a year; higher real oil prices meant that growth in purchasing power was higher still (see box on page 4). The same factors that spurred growth during the 1970s should ensure fairly rapid expansion in the 1980s.

Growth in East Asia and Latin America has in general been excellent. Strong economic management meant that these were the only regions in which oil importers grew faster in the 1970s than in the 1960s. The adjustment period will see a slowdown in their growth, but by the mid-1980s their prospects look quite good—so long as good management and political stability are maintained, and so long as growth in world trade and capital flows to developing countries also pick up by then.

Growth in both Latin America and East Asia depends heavily on commercial finance. The two regions account for the bulk of commercial borrowing by developing countries, with Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Venezuela alone accounting for 44 percent of the total in 1979. Another crucial international influence on their growth prospects, both directly and through its effect on credit-worthiness, is world demand for their manufactured exports.

The major East Asian exporters alone accounted for more than 40 percent of developing-country manufactured exports in 1977; despite some protectionism in industrial countries, they have sustained rapid export growth by diversifying their product lines. This flexibility allowed them to maintain growth in the 1970s despite slower growth in the world as a whole. It also means they have more freedom than other non-oil developing countries to choose whether to respond to higher oil prices by greater borrowing or by increasing their exports (and intensifying import substitution).

Human development: regional issues

Some countries in East Asia and Latin America have achieved levels of literacy and life expectancy comparable to those in the industrialized countries. In all the three regions absolute poverty has been reduced significantly but remains substantial.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. The rapid economic growth of recent years has probably cut considerably the proportion of absolutely poor people in the region. Nonetheless, there is still serious poverty in the countries not rich in oil, and to a lesser degree also in Iran, Iraq and Algeria.

As in Sub-Saharan Africa, income differences between countries are related more to their natural resources than to institu-

Sex, length of life and development

In developed countries, women live longer than men—on average by more than six years. This is not so in all developing countries, especially the poorest ones (see table). In most of South Asia, women on average die two to three years sooner than men. In low-income Indonesia, though, women live longer than men.

In most middle-income countries, apart from those in the Middle East and North Africa (where incomes have risen considerably since the time of some of these estimates), women live substantially longer than men. In East Asia and Latin America, moreover, this has been so for as long as statistics are available. But the female advantage has increased—for example, in Argentina from around one year in 1900 to more than six years in the 1970s.

In some countries there has been a reversal. In Sri Lanka, for instance, women on average in 1953 lived one year less than men; by 1962 they had pulled level; by the early 1970s they were ahead by a margin of about three years. A similar switch occurred in Turkey between the 1930s and the 1970s.

Economic development thus tends to raise women's life expectancy more than men's. But regional differences in the size and evolution of the gap, and the exceptional cases of Sri Lanka and Turkey (see next page), suggest an association with the extent of education, especially for women.

Excess of female over male life expectancy, selected countries, 1970s

Region and country	*Difference in years*
South Asia	
Bangladesh	−2.0
India	−2.5
Sri Lanka	3.0
East Asia	
Indonesia	2.0
Peninsular Malaysia	4.5
South Korea	6.0
Thailand	6.0
Latin America	
Argentina	6.0
Brazil	3.0
Costa Rica	4.0
Mexico	4.0
Middle East and North Africa	
Algeria[a]	1.0
Iraq	0.5
Iran	−0.5
Tunisia[a]	0.0
Industrialized countries	
Italy	6.0
Norway	6.0
United States	8.0

a. Late 1960s.

tions, human skills or economic structure. In most countries life expectancy is well below what would be expected at their income levels (see Figure 7.6); the same is true of literacy. Birth rates remain very high; of the 11 countries with the highest fertility rates in the world, eight are in the Middle East and North Africa. Death rates have come down very sharply in the recent past, but infant mortality rates remain high—one in four in Afghanistan, for example.

Part of the reason is that the gap between male and female education is larger in this region than in any of the others. But it is closing rapidly: the primary-school enrollment rate for girls rose from 40 percent around 1960 to 60 percent in the mid-1970s; progress was particularly impressive in some countries—up from 58 percent to 90 percent in Turkey, for example, and from 43 percent to 81 percent in Tunisia. It is significant that these two countries have the lowest fertility rates in the region.

The challenge for many countries is to use the rapid increases in income from nonrenewable resources for productive investments and better health, education and nutrition. But this cannot happen overnight. Tremendous amounts of money are indeed being channeled into physical investments and improving social conditions in the oil-producing countries. In most cases, though, the manpower needed to complement this effort is not available domestically; and it takes time and organization to make effective use even of trained people from abroad.

Similarly, even when virtually all school-age children are enrolled at school (as they are in some of these countries), it will take more than three decades—without adult literacy campaigns—to raise the overall literacy rate above 90 percent. It may take even longer before life expectancy approaches the levels of the industrialized countries.

For the richer countries in the region, then, money is not the main obstacle. But for the others, the financial constraint on human development programs is likely to remain serious, especially in Morocco, Afghanistan, the two Yemens and to a lesser extent in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Tunisia. Fairly rapid growth in most of these countries, however, should permit the increases in human development expenditures that are needed to bring social indicators gradually into a more normal relation with income. There is also scope for reallocation of human development expenditures. For example, some of the heavy subsidies on urban food and university education that are common in the region could be diverted to neglected rural areas and other uses.

Figure 7.6 Middle East and North Africa: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978



a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person.

Figure 7.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978



a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person.

Latin America and the Caribbean. The countries of the "southern cone"—Argentina, Chile and Uruguay—as well as Cuba, Panama, Jamaica, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago, have achieved life expectancy (see Figure 7.7) and educational levels approaching those in the developed countries. The southern part of Brazil resembles these countries; but the northeastern part lags behind and accounts for the largest concentration of absolute poverty in the region. The other countries fall into two groups. The first consists of the smaller, poorer countries of Central America and the Caribbean plus Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay; more than half their people live in rural areas where health and education services are usually sparse. The second group—Peru, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela—are larger and more than 65 percent urbanized.

Throughout the region, there is no significant difference in primary-school attendance between boys and girls, but there is between urban and rural areas. Primary enrollment rates tend to be high; but only a small proportion (often less than 10 percent) of children in rural areas complete primary school. In many Latin American countries, higher education has expanded very fast, accounting for the bulk of education budget increases. Spending on primary education could be increased dramatically if higher education were financed to a much larger extent from tuition fees, with assistance for those not able to pay.

The high level of urbanization in the region means that water supply and sanitation systems would do more to improve health than in other regions—water pollution and poor sanitation are more serious in congested cities than in villages. Experience in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico has shown that there is considerable potential for rich users to subsidize the poor in urban water and sewerage systems. But there must be complementary efforts to provide primary health care in both rural areas and urban slums. Some countries, including Mexico, Jamaica and Panama, have begun to include family planning services in primary health care systems; for other countries to do so would be a major advance.

Though average food consumption is adequate in most countries, many poor people are malnourished. In the longer term, measures to increase employment and the incomes of the poor will help overcome this, as will measures to stimulate food production. But recent direct nutrition programs, including subsidies and nutrition education for the poorest groups, appear to have been effective in Chile and Colombia.

Reaching some of the more isolated and ethnically distinct rural poor is more expensive and administratively more demanding than serving urban dwellers. More fundamentally, mustering the financial and administrative resources needed to reduce absolute poverty faster will require a public commitment—thus far lacking in many countries—to the goal of making basic human development services available to all.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC. In most countries of the region, literacy and life expectancy (Figure 7.8) are well above the norm for their income level. With skilled and well-educated populations, relatively equal income distributions and rapid income growth, South Korea and the city states of Hong Kong and Singapore have made tremendous strides in human development and reducing poverty. They have combined extensive human development programs with excellent economic policies. Rapid economic growth has in turn allowed further human development. To a lesser extent this has also been the case in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines; but their records on income distribution and poverty are more mixed.

Though lack of information lends a certain haziness to what is known about China and North Korea, it seems that with a very different development strategy they too have enjoyed considerable success (though there is some controversy over what their growth would be at international prices). North Korea seems to have expanded output rapidly, made extensive improvements in health and education, and as a result lowered fertility. China has probably done even better on human development in relation to its income level—the gross primary-school enrollment rate has risen from about 25 percent in 1949 to well over 100 percent today (reflecting substantial numbers of underage and overage pupils, as well as near-universal enrollment of children in the primary school-age group).

Figure 7.8 East Asia and Pacific: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978



a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person.

The most serious poverty is in Cambodia. Indonesia is a special case; in many respects it is similar to a South Asian country—Java is one of the most densely populated regions of the world, and has serious malnutrition and poverty. At the same time, oil and the (relatively untapped) agricultural resources of the outer islands distinguish it from any of the South Asian economies. Recent economic growth has been rapid, but there has been controversy over the extent to which it has led to less poverty.

One notable feature of East Asia's success has been the willingness of most governments to set initially low standards in order to achieve comprehensive coverage. Another has been the variety of approaches adopted, despite the active involvement of all governments in promoting economic and human development.

- Education. Fee-paying schools have traditionally played a major role in this region, and still do in higher education—for example, in the Philippines and South Korea (page 74). At the primary level, the emphasis has been on achieving universal enrollment. To do so, South Korea has accepted class sizes that are large by international standards (averaging about 60 but rising to more than 80 in many metropolitan schools).
- Health. The world's best examples of universal primary health care at low cost are in China (see box on page 74) and the northern provinces of Viet Nam. Other countries have also emphasized primary health care—though there are important exceptions to the rule. For example, medical care in South Korea has depended mainly

on doctors in private practice. Partly as a result, maternal and child health care is often inadequate, and life expectancy is not as high, relative to income, as literacy.

- Nutrition. Substantial increases in the incomes of the poor have allowed them to buy more food; good agricultural performance has ensured that supplies are adequate. In the centrally planned economies, there has been greater resort to rationing and subsidies. While average nutrition levels in the region are satisfactory, serious malnutrition still exists in lower-income groups in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines as well as in Cambodia.

Lessons for planning

One familiar conclusion from this review of regional issues is that there are no simple lessons, no easy prescriptions. There are always enough desirable uses of money to exhaust the national income twice over. There are always acute choices between the well-being of the current generation and of its heirs; and between the well-being of the poor and of the less poor. It is very hard to forecast the consequences of particular policies, or to choose the best mix of policies to achieve particular objectives. The nature of the best strategy also varies between (and within) countries, not simply because of broad differences in their economic and social structures and prospects, but also because of differences in the feasibility and likely outcome of specific policies and programs.

It would be a serious mistake, though, to suppose that there are no lessons at all. Effective planning is largely a matter of identifying the important issues and linkages, and of bringing the light of evidence and experience to bear on them. This regional review and the chapters that preceded it have thus focused on a particular set of questions of interest to planners, and on the principles and information needed to answer them.

- From the point of view of accelerating growth and reducing absolute poverty (in both its income and its nonincome aspects), is the right balance being struck between physical investment and human development?
- In human development, is the right balance being struck between education, health, nutrition and family planning?
- Within each of these areas, is the right balance being struck between basic and more advanced programs? Would different programs be more effective or more economical?

In addressing all these questions, it is necessary to remember that there are no laws, only circumstances—but also that applying general principles to specific circumstances is the springboard of successful action.

Chapter 8 Summary and conclusions

Impaled on the trident of inflation and recession in the developed countries and much more expensive oil, world growth prospects have deteriorated in the past year. Higher oil prices have improved the outlook for the fifth of the developing world's population that lives in oil-exporting countries; their average GNP per person could grow at around 3.0 to 3.5 percent a year in the first half of the 1980s. But for the four-fifths that live in oil-importing countries, the first half of the decade will involve slower growth. For developing countries as a whole, growth will be substantially below that forecast in last year's *Report*.

Governments of oil-importing developing countries must take steps to reduce current account deficits and adapt to more expensive energy—and at a time when demand for their exports from industrialized countries has slowed, not just because of the rise in energy prices, but because of cyclical and structural problems as well. The GNP growth of oil-importing developing countries could thus fall to about 1.8 percent per person a year (the Low case). Prospects for the low-income oil importers would be particularly bleak in this scenario: income per person in low-income Sub-Saharan Africa would decline; and the number of people in absolute poverty in the developing world as a whole would increase.

This Low case (or an even worse outcome) could come about—but it need not. In the High case the oil-importing developing countries would grow at about 2.4 percent per person a year in 1980–85, and by 1990 there would be 80 million fewer people in absolute poverty than in the Low case. This would require that developing countries adjust successfully—cutting their external deficits by raising exports rather than lowering imports, while increasing both investment and efficiency in resource use. What the industrialized countries and capital-surplus oil exporters do is also vital—in stimulating demand for developing-country exports, in recycling oil surpluses and in providing aid. But even in the High case, the growth of income per person in the developing countries will not match that in the industrialized countries. Taking the steps needed not just to attain, but to exceed, the High case is thus the major development challenge of the next five years.

The success of the adjustment by developing and other countries to the economic circumstances of the early 1980s will not only largely determine their growth during that period but will also affect the chances of an acceleration of growth in the second half of the decade. With recovery in the industrialized countries and in world trade and with continued sound domestic economic policies, the oil-importing countries could grow almost as rapidly (3.2 percent) as the oil exporters (3.4 percent) and faster than in the 1970s. Without it, the growth of the oil exporters would be almost half a percentage point lower, and that of the oil-importing countries a full percentage point lower. Much of the first part of this *Report* has been about the policy decisions that will determine the actual outcomes, in both the near term and the longer term.

External factors

- Trade. The ability of developing countries to afford the imports they need for growth depends crucially on their exports to the industrialized countries, which currently constitute two-thirds of their market. The industrialized countries, even those determined to combat inflation by restraining growth, must minimize the effects their deceleration will have on the developing world. This means expanding the volume of imports, maintaining the relatively free trading opportunities that now exist for most products, and starting to lower the barriers against other goods of particular importance to developing countries, such as textiles, clothing, leather goods, electronics, steel and some agricultural commodities. To do so would increase the localized pains of structural change in the developed countries. But there are internal remedies for these pains, and liberalization of trade will pay off in faster productivity growth and lower inflation. The oil-

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exporting nations can also help by rapidly expanding their imports from developing countries.

• Energy. The developing countries that import oil have been hard hit by the price explosion of the past 12 months and can expect their energy costs to rise further in real terms. At the same time, modernization of their economies will spur demand for energy; so they face a continuing need to adapt to the rising cost of imported oil. They will find this easier if oil-exporting countries can avoid supply disruptions and sharp price changes. More generally, the world economy will perform better if oil prices follow a smooth path; violent fluctuations play havoc with internal resource allocation and the external payments system. Reliable supplies and smooth price changes will be more likely if developed countries improve their energy conservation and develop alternative sources.

• Capital flows. Current account imbalances will be large in the next few years, again requiring special efforts to recycle finance to oil-importing countries, especially in the developing world. There is a serious risk that reluctance or inability to finance large external deficits will lead to levels of trade, investment and economic efficiency—hence, of growth—lower than anyone would wish. Even in the later years of the 1980s, when the severity of payments imbalances is expected to diminish, the growth of developing countries will continue to depend on inflows of foreign capital.

For the low-income countries, which can borrow little commercially, this means more aid. There is a real danger that the modest aid increases projected in this *Report* will not be achieved. In their own long-term interests, as well as those of the developing countries, both OECD and OPEC donors should make every effort to expand their aid relative to GNP, even in periods of domestic stringency. And they should concentrate their aid even more on low-income countries.

Commercial capital, mainly from banks but also from the bond market, private direct investment and official sources, will be available to help the middle-income countries. But not all countries will be well placed to borrow much more from private commercial sources; without additional financial assistance from other sources, their growth will slow down. In particular, there is not enough long-term program (non-project) finance to support the structural changes required in many countries. Some will benefit from the structural adjustment lending of the World Bank and assistance from the IMF; enlarged official flows of this sort, particularly from multilateral agencies, could and should play a larger role.

Internal factors

While powerfully influenced by the international environment, the progress of developing countries depends even more on their own policies and initiatives.

• Trade, energy and capital flows. In trade, the developing countries can use pricing and other policies to stimulate production of internationally traded goods—both exports and import substitutes; but they should avoid bias toward import substitution, since this reduces efficiency and discourages exports. With regard to energy, they, like the industrialized countries, can minimize the loss of real income caused by higher oil prices through conservation and greater domestic energy production. As to capital flows, they can take full advantage of their opportunities for prudent borrowing from commercial and bilateral lenders and multilateral institutions.

• Investment and production efficiency. In attracting (especially commercial) finance, and in speeding development more generally, trade and energy strategies play an important role. So do other policies that increase investment, improve administration, raise agricultural productivity and make better use of capital, labor, natural resources and imports.

• Human development. The internal factor on which this *Report* has focused is the human one: the role not only of education and training, but also of health and nutrition. In addition to the important direct benefits that programs in these areas confer, the *Report* stresses another aspect, long-standing but often neglected—the role of human development as investment, contributing to growth. The importance of technical, professional and managerial skills is well known. Less well known but firmly established by research is the importance of primary education, which affects the knowledge and attitudes of farmers and other workers.

Investment in human resources, like other kinds of investment, can be ineffectual unless complemented by other productive inputs and by policies to ensure that resources are efficiently used. Human development programs must also be carefully chosen and efficiently carried out. Despite these qualifications, there is strong evidence to support the commonsense proposition that human development can make a valuable contribution to growth.

Studies at the firm, farm and project level have shown that better education, health and nutrition can raise incomes and productivity, and that the economic rate of return to investment in schooling

is high, frequently well above that of physical investment. For primary schooling, the rates of return in a large group of countries average more than 20 percent. At the aggregate level, cross-country comparisons show that developing nations with higher literacy rates have grown faster, even when allowances are made for other influences on growth and for reverse causation—the effect of growth on literacy. This finding is reinforced by case studies and historical evidence.

• Population. One important way in which human development contributes to raising average incomes, as well as to other social goals, is by reducing population growth. Reducing fertility is not an end in itself; but lower population growth in most developing countries tends to result in greater investment per person in physical capital and human skills —and thus in faster growth. Better nutrition and health, by lowering infant mortality, are essential ingredients of fertility decline. So is education, especially of women, since it delays marriage, alters attitudes about family size and makes modern contraception more acceptable. Increases in income themselves are a cause, as well as a consequence, of reduced fertility: people who are less poor have good reasons for wanting fewer children (including less need for their labor and for support in old age). And research has confirmed that family planning programs also are important in bringing about slower population growth.

Human development and poverty

Human development can thus assist growth. But the *Report* has stressed even more its potential contribution to reducing absolute poverty.

• Growth and poverty reduction. Growth is vital to reducing all aspects of absolute poverty—malnutrition, ill health and illiteracy, as well as low income—especially in the poorest countries. But growth unaccompanied by other measures may neither boost the incomes of the poor much, nor lead to much progress on nonincome aspects of poverty. On both counts, human development programs have a part to play.

• Raising the incomes of the poor. The *Report* has discussed a wide range of policies, many of which positively reinforce growth, that can help raise the incomes of the poor. Support of agriculture, land and tenure reform, policies to raise the demand for labor and various kinds of research are four important areas considered. Human development is an essential complement. It accelerates the spread of new techniques to small farms and increases the opportunities of the poor for employment in the modern sector. And because fertility and family size are reduced, the earnings of adults do not have to be spread so thinly among children and other dependents.

• Nonincome aspects of poverty. The worst aspects of absolute poverty include not only low income, but also malnutrition, frequent child death, disease and ignorance. All can be helped by human development programs. Less obviously, there is a complex interdependence between the different facets of human development—as there is between human development and increases in income. Health, nutrition, education and fertility all affect each other. Most striking, partly because least expected, are the powerful effects that education, especially female education, has on fertility, child health and nutrition. As this suggests, human development is a circular process, one that can be vicious or virtuous, according to circumstances and policies. And it has its own momentum: what is done (or not done) today powerfully influences what can be done a decade or more ahead.

• Practical aspects of human development. Human development is easier said than done. But much has been learned about the comparative efficacy of different policies and programs. In nutrition, for example, there is growing agreement that the central issue is not improving the balance between calories and protein but increasing the amount of staple foods the poor can afford; this involves raising their incomes, stimulating production of these foods and, in some cases, targeted subsidies. In health the vital role of primary care, together with education and control of mass diseases, is now generally acknowledged. In fertility there is better understanding both of how to implement family planning programs and of how such programs interact with socioeconomic and cultural conditions. In education more importance is now attached to its behavioral effects; and in raising educational standards, the significance of class size has been shown to be much less, and that of teaching materials much more, than was formerly believed.

Hard experience has also shown the difficulties of implementing human development and how to tackle them. Political obstacles such as urban bias, competition for resources, and the weak position of the poor often have to be overcome; but efforts to improve basic education, nutrition and health have a universal political appeal. The financial constraint on programs often appears binding; but frequently there are unexploited ways of cutting costs and harnessing additional resources. Human development programs can also

encounter serious administrative constraints; here it is important not only to improve administration but also to choose the most manageable mix of programs and to encourage local participation. More paradoxical, but equally vexing, is the gap between need and demand that can sometimes lead to underused schools and clinics or the underrepresentation of girls and women in human development programs. Experience suggests ways in which this gap can be narrowed, and in some cases bridged.

- Tradeoffs and choices. Planners have to choose at the margin between human development and other activities, and between different human development activities. The choices are not easy, nor should they be the same in all countries.

The economic payoff to human development eases the tradeoffs between growth and poverty reduction. But it does not eliminate them, which means that policy decisions will be affected by the relative emphasis attached to increasing growth, raising the incomes of the poor and attacking the nonincome aspects of poverty. And whatever the balance of objectives, the difficulty of quantifying costs and benefits often compounds the problems of deciding how large the human development budget should be, and how it should be divided among education, health, nutrition and family planning, as well as within each of these areas.

The way in which these dilemmas are resolved must vary according to the circumstances of each country. Political and social priorities are important. So are income levels and growth prospects, and past progress in human development. In considering human development and other steps to reduce poverty, the low-income countries of Africa and Asia, for example, must perforce put strong emphasis on economic returns.

Nothing can make widespread absolute poverty melt away overnight. And human development at best can do only part of the job. Without effective policies on other fronts, and without active and enlightened support from the rest of the world, progress will be agonizingly slow. But these other policies will not be sufficient. The most valuable resource any country has is its people, the means and the end of economic advance.

Statistical appendix to Part I

Table SA.1 Growth of population, GNP and GNP per person, 1960–90
(average annual percentage growth rate)

Country group	Population				GNP[a]				GNP per person[a]			
	1960–70	1970–80	1980–85	1985–90	1960–70	1970–80	1980–85	1985–90	1960–70	1970–80	1980–85	1985–90
Low-income countries	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	4.2	4.0	4.5	4.7	1.8	1.7	2.1	2.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.8	3.0	2.7	4.2	3.0	3.1	3.8	1.7	0.2	0.1	1.1
Asia	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.1	4.2	4.2	4.7	4.9	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.7
Middle-income countries	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.3	6.0	5.6	5.2	5.8	3.5	3.1	2.7	3.4
East Asia and Pacific	2.8	2.3	2.1	2.0	7.7	8.0	7.0	7.3	4.9	5.7	4.8	5.2
Latin America and Caribbean	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.4	5.7	5.8	5.5	6.3	2.9	3.2	2.9	3.8
Middle East and North Africa	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.5	3.6	6.4	5.1	5.3	1.1	3.8	2.4	2.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.9	3.2	2.8	4.8	4.5	4.9	4.3	2.3	1.6	1.7	1.4
Southern Europe	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	7.0	4.6	3.8	3.7	5.6	3.2	2.5	3.4
Oil-importing developing countries	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	5.6	5.1	4.7	5.5	3.1	2.7	2.4	3.2
Low-income countries	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	4.1	3.3	4.1	4.6	1.6	0.9	1.7	2.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.8	3.0	2.7	4.2	3.0	3.1	3.8	1.6	0.2	0.1	1.1
Asia	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.1	4.1	3.4	4.3	4.8	1.6	1.1	2.0	2.6
Middle-income countries	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.1	6.1	5.5	4.9	5.7	3.6	3.1	2.6	3.5
East Asia and Pacific	2.8	2.3	2.1	2.0	7.8	8.0	6.9	7.3	4.9	5.6	4.7	5.2
Latin America and Caribbean	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.3	5.4	6.0	5.0	6.2	2.7	3.5	2.6	3.8
Middle East and North Africa	2.4	2.6	3.1	3.1	2.3	3.0	3.7	3.9	–0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.7	4.9	3.9	4.6	4.2	2.4	0.9	1.6	1.4
Southern Europe	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	7.0	4.6	3.8	4.7	5.4	3.2	2.5	3.4
Oil-exporting developing countries[b]	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.5	5.5	6.1	6.3	5.9	2.8	3.5	3.5	3.4
All developing countries	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.6	3.1	2.8	2.6	3.3
Industrialized countries	1.0	0.7	0.5	0.4	5.0	3.1	3.3	4.0	3.9	2.4	2.9	3.5
Capital-surplus oil exporters	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.0	10.5	8.4	5.3	5.8	7.3	5.0	2.8	2.8
Centrally planned economies	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.1	..	5.2	4.6	4.5	..	3.8	3.4	3.3

Sources: World Bank estimates; High-case projections of *World Development Report, 1980.*
a. 1977 prices.
b. Estimates for oil-exporting developing countries are based on analysis of 11 major oil exporters.

Table SA.2 Commercial primary energy production and consumption, by country group, 1977–90
(million barrels of oil equivalent per day)

Country group	1977		1980		1985		1990	
	Production	Consumption	Production	Consumption	Production	Consumption	Production	Consumption
Industrialized countries	47.5	70.6	50.1	70.1	60.0	80.7	72.5	92.5
Centrally planned economies	42.6	40.3	44.8	42.5	54.0	51.8	65.0	64.3
Capital-surplus oil exporters	25.2	1.6	21.4	1.9	23.2	2.7	26.1	3.9
Developing countries	18.9	17.1	21.5	18.7	28.8	25.0	37.9	34.3
Net oil exporters	11.9	3.9	13.0	4.6	16.1	6.0	19.4	8.3
Net oil importers	7.0	13.2	8.5	14.1	12.7	19.0	18.5	26.0
Bunkers and other	n.a.	4.6	n.a.	4.6	n.a.	5.8	n.a.	6.5
Total	134.2	134.2	137.8	137.8	166.0	166.0	201.5	201.5

Sources: UN, *World Energy Supplies 1973–78* (Series J, no. 22); World Bank estimates; High-case projections of *World Development Report, 1980.*
a. Includes nonenergy uses.

Table SA.3 Composition of world commercial primary energy supply, 1970–2020
(percent)

Energy source	1970	1980	1990	2000	2020
Petroleum	47.6	45.8	38	30	17
(OPEC)	(23.0)	(20.4)	(16)	(12)	(6)
Coal	32.3	30.0	31	31	32
Nuclear	0.1	1.0	2	7	16
Hydro	2.0	2.7	4	5	5
Gas and other	18.0	20.5	25	27	30
Total	100.0	100.0	100	100	100
Memo item					
Total world primary commercial energy supply[a]	100.9	137.8	201.5	270	390

Sources: UN, *World Energy Supplies 1973–78* (Series J, no. 22); World Bank projections.
a. Million barrels per day of oil equivalent.

Table SA. 4 Growth of merchandise exports, by product category and country group, 1960–77 and 1977–90
(average annual percentage growth rates, 1977 prices)

Product category	1960–77			1977–90[a]		
	World	Industrialized countries	Developing countries	World	Industrialized countries	Developing countries
Fuels and energy	6.4	4.4	6.6	1.8	3.3	3.0
Other primary products	4.5	5.6	3.3	3.8	4.0	3.6
Food and beverages	4.6	6.3	2.8	4.1	4.3	3.9
Nonfood agricultural products	4.7	6.0	3.2	2.8	2.9	2.2
Minerals and nonferrous metals	4.1	3.6	5.2	4.1	4.0	3.8
Manufactures	8.9	8.8	12.3	6.8	6.5	9.7
Machinery and transport equipment	9.6	9.6	16.8	7.2	6.8	14.2
Other manufactures	8.3	8.0	11.3	6.5	6.2	7.7
Total merchandise[b]	7.2	7.7	6.0	5.4	5.9	6.0

Sources: World Bank; UN, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, various issues; UNCTAD, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics*, various issues.
a. High-case projections.
b. Excludes gold.

Table SA.5 Direction of merchandise trade, 1970 and 1977

Origin	Destination										
	Oil-exporting developing countries	Oil-importing developing countries			All developing countries	Industrialized countries	Capital-surplus oil exporters	Centrally planned economies	Unallocated	World	World (millions of current dollars)
		Total	Low-income	Middle-income							
Percentage composition, 1970[a]											
Oil-exporting developing countries	3.9	21.8	1.0	20.8	25.7	66.6	0.5	6.1	1.1	100.0	12,961
Oil-importing developing countries	3.5	17.4	2.5	14.9	20.9	69.0	1.5	7.5	1.1	100.0	39,122
Low-income	4.6	21.7	8.2	13.5	26.3	53.7	4.3	14.6	1.1	100.0	5,779
Middle-income	3.4	16.6	1.5	15.1	20.0	71.7	1.0	6.2	1.1	100.0	33,343
All developing countries	3.6	18.5	2.1	16.5	22.1	68.4	1.2	7.1	1.1	100.0	52,083
Industrialized countries	4.7	18.2	2.1	16.1	22.9	71.0	1.5	3.5	1.1	100.0	215,896
Capital-surplus oil exporters	1.7	20.2	2.9	17.4	21.9	74.4	0.8	1.3	1.5	100.0	11,151
Centrally planned economies	1.7	14.5	1.7	12.9	16.2	21.3	1.0	60.4	1.1	100.0	32,940
World	4.1	18.0	2.1	15.8	22.0	65.4	1.3	10.1	1.1	100.0	312,070
World (millions of current dollars)	12,710	56,019	6,604	49,415	68,729	204,160	4,211	31,400	3,570	312,070	312,070
Percentage composition, 1977[a]											
Oil-exporting developing countries	2.2	21.5	1.1	20.4	23.7	72.6	0.8	2.8	0.1	100.0	58,391
Oil-importing developing countries	8.4	20.5	2.5	18.1	28.9	61.8	3.1	6.1	0.1	100.0	149,854
Low-income	5.4	21.9	9.4	12.4	27.3	53.6	7.7	11.5	(.)	100.0	13,495
Middle-income	8.7	20.4	1.8	18.6	29.1	62.6	2.7	5.6	0.1	100.0	136,359
All developing countries	6.6	20.8	2.1	18.7	27.4	64.8	2.5	5.2	0.1	100.0	208,245
Industrialized countries	6.7	16.4	1.4	15.0	23.1	65.7	5.6	5.2	0.5	100.0	697,568
Capital-surplus oil exporters	4.3	20.6	1.5	19.1	24.9	69.6	1.2	2.9	1.5	100.0	110,289
Centrally planned economies	2.9	8.8	1.0	7.8	11.7	27.2	3.2	54.5	3.4	100.0	107,523
World	6.1	16.9	1.5	15.4	23.0	62.2	4.3	9.7	0.8	100.0	1,123,625
World (millions of current dollars)	68,149	189,918	16,578	173,340	258,067	699,036	48,665	108,930	8,927	1,123,625	1,123,625

Sources: UN, *International Statistical Yearbook*, various issues; UNCTAD, *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics*, 1979; GATT, trade system data file; World Bank.
a. Totals may not reconcile because of rounding.

Table SA.6 Capital flows and debt of the developing countries: oil importers and oil exporters, 1975–90
(billions of current dollars)

Item	Oil importers					Oil exporters				
	1975	1977	1980	1985	1990	1975	1977	1980	1985	1990
Current account deficit before interest payments[a]	32.9	16.8	42.7	43.4	42.2	6.8	7.8	−11.1	4.0	30.2
Interest payments	6.7	8.1	18.3	35.0	62.0	2.0	4.1	8.8	11.8	17.5
Changes in reserves and short-term debt	−9.1	9.9	−4.4	6.8	23.5	6.2	5.8	20.2	8.4	2.6
Total to be financed	30.6	34.8	56.6	85.2	127.7	15.0	17.7	18.0	24.2	50.2
Financed by medium- and long-term capital										
From public sources	12.5	13.2	21.7	41.1	66.6	5.4	6.0	7.3	11.2	16.6
From private sources	18.1	21.7	34.9	44.0	61.2	9.6	11.7	10.7	13.0	33.6
Private direct investment	4.2	3.9	6.5	9.6	16.4	2.7	2.1	3.5	5.8	8.2
Private loans	13.9	17.7	28.4	34.4	44.7	6.9	9.6	7.2	7.2	25.4
Total net capital flows										
Current dollars	30.6	34.8	56.6	85.2	127.7	15.0	17.7	18.0	24.2	50.2
Constant 1977 dollars	34.2	34.8	40.0	42.1	47.2	16.8	17.7	12.7	12.0	18.5
Outstanding medium- and long-term debt										
Public sources	57.7	77.5	100.4	212.9	397.1	16.2	24.3	48.8	79.6	130.0
Private sources	72.6	108.9	187.1	343.4	558.5	24.7	43.9	66.5	97.5	175.4
Total debt										
Current dollars	130.3	186.4	287.5	556.3	955.6	40.9	68.2	115.3	177.1	305.4
Constant 1977 dollars	146.4	186.4	203.5	275.0	352.9	46.0	68.2	81.6	87.5	112.8
Debt service										
Interest payments	6.7	8.1	18.3	35.0	62.0	2.0	4.1	8.8	11.8	17.5
Debt amortization	12.7	18.9	28.6	65.0	114.2	3.6	6.5	12.2	23.6	40.1
Interest payments as percentage of GNP	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.6	2.7	1.3	1.1
Price deflator	89.3	100.0	141.3	202.3	270.8	89.3	100.0	141.3	202.3	270.8

Source: High-case projections of *World Development Report.*
a. Excludes official transfers.

Table SA.7 Capital flows and debt of the oil-importing developing countries: low-income and middle-income, 1975–90
(billions of current dollars)

Item	Low-income					Middle-income				
	1975	1977	1980	1985	1990	1975	1977	1980	1985	1990
Current account deficit before interest payments[a]	4.8	1.4	8.8	16.0	26.8	28.1	15.3	33.9	27.4	25.5
Interest payments	0.6	0.7	1.2	2.6	5.3	6.1	7.4	17.1	32.3	56.7
Changes in reserves and short-term debt	0.4	3.0	−0.9	0.7	1.0	−9.5	7.0	−3.5	6.1	22.5
Total to be financed	5.9	5.1	9.1	19.4	33.0	24.7	29.7	47.4	65.8	94.7
Financed by medium- and long-term capital										
From public sources	5.4	4.7	8.3	18.5	31.4	7.1	8.5	13.4	22.6	35.2
From private sources	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.7	17.6	21.2	34.0	43.2	59.5
Private direct investment	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.0	4.0	3.7	6.2	9.0	15.4
Private loans	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.7	13.6	17.5	27.9	34.2	44.1
Total net capital flows										
Current dollars	5.9	5.1	9.1	19.4	33.0	24.7	29.7	47.4	65.8	94.7
Constant 1977 dollars	6.6	5.1	6.5	9.6	12.2	27.7	29.7	33.6	32.5	35.0
Outstanding medium- and long-term debt										
Public sources	24.4	32.0	44.8	89.4	172.2	33.3	45.5	55.6	123.5	224.9
Private sources	3.1	3.3	0.8	3.6	9.3	69.5	105.6	186.3	339.8	549.2
Total debt										
Current dollars	27.5	35.3	45.6	93.0	181.5	102.8	151.1	241.9	463.3	774.1
Constant 1977 dollars	30.9	35.3	32.3	46.0	67.0	115.5	151.1	171.2	229.0	285.9
Debt service										
Interest payments	0.6	0.7	1.2	2.6	5.3	6.1	7.4	17.1	32.3	56.7
Debt amortization	1.2	1.3	2.2	3.7	6.0	11.5	17.6	26.4	61.3	108.3
Interest payments as percentage of GNP	1.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.4
Price deflator	89.3	100.0	141.3	202.3	270.8	89.3	100.0	141.3	202.3	270.8

Source: High-case projections of *World Development Report, 1980.*
a. Excludes official transfers.

Bibliographical note

This *Report* has drawn on a wide range of World Bank work, as well as on external research. Selected sources used in each chapter are briefly annotated below, and then listed alphabetically. The World Bank sources include sector policy papers, ongoing economic analysis and research, and project, sector and economic work on individual countries. In addition, a set of background papers is commissioned for each *Report;* their primary purpose is to synthesize the relevant literature and Bank work. (Thus the sources cited in these papers are not listed separately.) Many of the background papers are issued as World Bank Staff Working Papers, which are available at no charge from the Bank's Publications Unit. The views they express are not, however, necessarily those of the World Bank or of this *Report.*

Selected sources, by chapter

Chapters 2 and 3. The global model used in the projections is described in Cheetham, Gupta and Schwartz. The data base for the global model and for country projections is continually updated, by drawing on published sources and other data collected by the World Bank; some of these data are presented in the World Development Indicators (and in the *World Bank Atlas,* published annually, as well as the *World Tables,* published occasionally). Energy prospects of developing countries are reviewed in Hughart, and their energy policy issues are reviewed in Fallen-Bailey and Byer. In the area of international trade, Keesing considers a wide range of trade issues for developing countries; Balassa analyzes trends in trade in manufactured goods; Morawetz provides a country case study of the effects of developing-country policies on growth in manufactured exports; Woll analyzes the adjustment by industrialized countries to imports from developing countries; Sapir and Lutz survey trends and issues relating to trade in nonfactor services; Kemper assesses the likely impact of the "Tokyo Round"; and Frank analyzes the "graduation" issues in trade policy. On export credit finance, see Cizauskas. The method for deriving estimates of the number of people in absolute poverty is presented in Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery.

Chapter 4. On absolute poverty and policies to overcome it, see Chenery and others, Sen, and Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery. On urban poverty and rural-urban migration, see Nelson. The literature on the contribution of human resources to growth is surveyed in Bowman, and its main conclusions are summarized in Schultz. The recent cross-country analyses referred to in the box on human resources and growth (page 38) are presented in Wheeler and in Hicks. Parts of this chapter (and Chapter 5) also draw on the World Bank's work on basic needs, which is summarized in Haq and Burki.

Chapter 5. The evidence on education and farmer productivity is surveyed in Lockheed, Jamison and Lau; that on the rates of return to schooling in Psacharopoulos. (Psacharopoulos, along with Berry and with Bowman, also discusses the debate on methodological issues in applying rate-of-return analysis.) The connections between education, poverty and income distribution are further analyzed in Berry and in Fields. On practical issues of educational reform, see Haddad and others; on cross-country comparisons of educational quality, see Inkeles. The evidence on the effects of education on health and nutrition is surveyed in Cochrane, O'Hara and Leslie. Health problems and policies in developing countries are reviewed in Golladay and Liese and in Golladay; nutrition issues in Berg and in Reutlinger; fertility and other population issues in Birdsall. For a quantitative analysis of the determinants of fertility and its effects on income growth, see Wheeler. The connection between education and fertility is discussed in Cochrane, O'Hara and Leslie. Kanagaratnam and Pierce examine trends in population policy and in the implementation of family planning programs.

Chapter 6. Factors affecting political support for and obstacles to human development programs are discussed in Uphoff. Sources of financing and means of reducing costs for these programs are discussed in Meerman. Esman and

Montgomery survey administrative aspects of implementing the programs. A range of factors that result in misperception of the problems of poverty is considered in Chambers. Social and cultural aspects of human development are surveyed in Rogers, Coletta and Mbindyo. And the role of the family, including the particular problems faced by women and young children, is considered in Safilios-Rothschild and in the World Bank's publication, *Recognizing the "Invisible" Woman in Development.*

Chapter 7. This chapter draws heavily on the World Bank's country economic work, as well as on many of the sources listed for preceding chapters. In addition, various aspects of human development and its role in poverty reduction for different regions are discussed in Bussink (East Asia), Davies (Sub-Saharan Africa), Grawe (South Asia), Kavalsky (Middle East and North Africa) and Pfeffermann (Latin America). For a wide-ranging discussion of development issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Acharya and Johnston. See Selowsky on antipoverty policies in Latin America, and Singh on assisting small farmers and the landless in South Asia. Detailed country case studies of human development issues include Knight (Brazil) and Isenman (Sri Lanka).

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Figures in the colored bands are summary measures for groups of countries. The letter *w* after a summary measure indicates that it is a weighted average; the letter *m*, that it is a median value; the letter *t*, that it is a total.

.. Not available.
(.) Less than half the unit shown.
All growth rates are in real terms.
Figures in italics are for years or periods other than those specified.

Afghanistan	26	Hong Kong	86	Peru	56
Albania	116	Hungary	121	Philippines	49
Algeria	72	India	15	Poland	122
Angola	33	Indonesia	38	Portugal	82
Argentina	81	Iran	110	Romania	119
Australia	98	Iraq	109	Rwanda	17
Austria	96	Ireland	91	Saudi Arabia	112
Bangladesh	2	Israel	90	Senegal	37
Belgium	101	Italy	92	Sierra Leone	20
Benin	23	Ivory Coast	57	Singapore	88
Bhutan	4	Jamaica	68	Somalia	8
Bolivia	48	Japan	97	South Africa	77
Brazil	79	Jordan	66	Spain	89
Bulgaria	120	Kampuchea, Democratic	1	Sri Lanka	18
Burma	12	Kenya	36	Sudan	34
Burundi	9	Korea, Republic of	70	Sweden	107
Cameroon	42	Korea, Democratic Republic of	115	Switzerland	108
Canada	102	Kuwait	113	Syrian Arab Republic	64
Central African Republic	27	Lao People's Democratic Republic	3	Taiwan[1]	75
Chad	10	Lebanon	69	Tanzania	25
Chile	76	Lesotho	31	Thailand	47
China	114	Liberia	43	Togo	35
Colombia	59	Libya	111	Trinidad and Tobago	84
Congo, People's Republic of	51	Madagascar	28	Tunisia	65
Costa Rica	78	Malawi	16	Turkey	71
Cuba	117	Malaysia	67	Uganda	32
Czechoslovakia	124	Mali	6	United Kingdom	94
Denmark	106	Mauritania	30	United States	105
Dominican Republic	62	Mexico	73	Upper Volta	13
Ecuador	61	Mongolia	118	Uruguay	80
Egypt, Arab Republic of	39	Morocco	55	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	123
El Salvador	54	Mozambique	11	Venezuela	85
Ethiopia	5	Nepal	7	Viet Nam, Socialist Republic of	14
Finland	95	Netherlands	100		
France	99	New Zealand	93		
German Democratic Republic	125	Nicaragua	58	Yemen Arab Republic	50
Germany, Federal Republic of	104	Niger	22	Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of	41
Ghana	40	Nigeria	52	Yugoslavia	83
Greece	87	Norway	103	Zaire	21
Guatemala	63	Pakistan	24	Zambia	45
Guinea	19	Panama	74	Zimbabwe	46
Haiti	29	Papua New Guinea	53		
Honduras	44	Paraguay	60		

1. The references to Taiwan in these tables should not be interpreted as having any significance as to its legal status.

Introduction

The World Development Indicators are designed to provide information about the main features of social and economic development. The format this year generally follows that of previous years. The indicators in Table 1 give a summary profile of countries. The data in other tables fall into the following broad areas: national accounts, industrialization, energy, external accounts, aid flows, demography, labor force, urbanization, social indicators and income distribution. Most of the information was drawn from the data files and publications of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

For ease of reference, ratios and rates of growth are shown; absolute values are reported only in a few instances. Most growth rates were calculated for two periods: 1960–70 and 1970–78, or 1970–77 if data for 1978 were not available. All growth rates are in real terms and were computed, unless noted otherwise, by using the least-squares method. Because this method takes all observations within a period into account, the resulting growth rates reflect general trends that are not unduly influenced by exceptional values for a particular year. Table entries in italics indicate that they are for years or periods other than those specified. All dollar figures are US dollars.

Some of the differences between figures shown this year and last year reflect revisions to historical series by the reporting countries. They also reflect revisions to the estimates of population on the basis of new information from surveys and censuses.

The country groups used in the tables are: 38 low-income developing countries with a per capita income of $360 or less in 1978; 52 middle-income developing countries with a per capita income of more than $360; 18 industrialized countries; 5 capital-surplus oil-exporting countries; and 12 centrally planned economies. As in previous years, Democratic Kampuchea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, and Yugoslavia are grouped with developing countries. Iran and Iraq are now grouped with capital-surplus oil-exporting countries.

Within each group, countries are listed in ascending order of income per capita, and that order is used in all tables. The alphabetical list on the opposite page shows the reference number of each country. Countries with populations of less than a million are not reported in the tables, largely for lack of comprehensive data. The technical notes for Table 1 show some basic indicators for 29 small countries that are members of the United Nations, the World Bank, or both.

Summary measures—weighted averages, median values, or totals—were calculated for the country groups only if data were adequate and meaningful statistics could be obtained. The weights used in computing the measures are described in the technical notes relating to an indicator. The letter *w* after a summary measure indicates that it is a weighted average; the letter *m*, that it is a median value; the letter *t*, that it is a total. The median is the middle value of a set arranged in order of magnitude. Because the coverage of countries is not uniform for all indicators and because the variation around central tendencies can be large, readers should exercise caution in comparing the summary measures for different indicators, country groups and years or periods.

Readers should also exercise caution in comparing indicators across countries. Although the statistics presented are drawn from sources generally considered the most authoritative and reliable, some of them, particularly those describing social features and income distribution, are subject to considerable margins of error. In addition, variations in national practices mean that the data in certain instances are not strictly comparable. The data should thus be construed only as indicating trends and characterizing major differences between countries.

The technical notes should be referred to in any use of the data. These notes outline the concepts, definitions, methods and data sources. The bibliography gives details of the data sources, which contain comprehensive definitions and descriptions of concepts used.

The World Development Indicators are prepared under the direction of Ramesh Chander.

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Table 1. Basic Indicators

	Population (millions) Mid-1978[a]	Area (thousands of square kilometers)	GNP per capita: Dollars 1978[a]	GNP per capita: Average annual growth (percent) 1960–78[b]	Average annual rate of inflation (percent): 1960–70[c]	Average annual rate of inflation (percent): 1970–78[d]	Adult literacy rate (percent) 1975[e]	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1978	Average index of food production per capita (1969–71 = 100) 1976–78
Low-income countries	**1,288.9** *f*	**28,313** *t*	**200** *w*	**1.8** *w*	**4.0** *m*	**10.6** *m*	**38** *w*	**50** *w*	**97** *w*
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	*8.4*	181	..	..	3.8	..	..	..	57
2 Bangladesh	84.7	144	90	–0.4	3.7	17.9	26	47	90
3 Lao PDR	3.3	237	90	..	..	..	..	42	96
4 Bhutan	1.2	47	100	–0.3	..	..	..	41	100
5 Ethiopia	31.0	1,222	120	1.5	2.1	4.0	*10*	39	84
6 Mali	6.3	1,240	120	1.0	5.0	7.8	10	42	90
7 Nepal	13.6	141	120	0.8	7.7	9.1	19	43	92
8 Somalia	3.7	638	130	–0.5	4.5	10.7	60	43	87
9 Burundi	4.5	28	140	2.2	2.8	10.1	25	45	107
10 Chad	4.3	1,284	140	–1.0	4.6	7.4	15	43	89
11 Mozambique	9.9	783	140	0.4	2.8	10.9	..	46	81
12 Burma	32.2	677	150	1.0	2.7	13.7	67	53	96
13 Upper Volta	5.6	274	160	1.3	1.3	9.6	*5*	42	95
14 Viet Nam	51.7	330	170	..	..	..	87	62	102
15 India	643.9	3,288	180	1.4	7.1	8.2	36	51	100
16 Malawi	5.7	118	180	2.9	2.4	9.1	*25*	46	99
17 Rwanda	4.5	26	180	1.4	13.1	14.7	*23*	46	103
18 Sri Lanka	14.3	66	190	2.0	1.8	11.8	*78*	69	114
19 Guinea	5.1	246	210	0.6	1.7	*6.4*	..	43	86
20 Sierra Leone	3.3	72	210	0.5	2.9	10.8	15	46	93
21 Zaire	26.8	2,345	210	1.1	29.9	26.2	15	46	94
22 Niger	5.0	1,267	220	–1.4	2.1	10.7	8	42	87
23 Benin	3.3	113	230	0.4	1.9	7.4	*11*	46	92
24 Pakistan	77.3	804	230	2.8	3.3	14.6	21	52	101
25 Tanzania	16.9	945	230	2.7	1.8	*12.3*	*66*	51	93
26 Afghanistan	14.6	647	240	0.4	11.9	4.4	12	42	100
27 Central African Rep.	1.9	623	250	0.7	4.1	9.0	..	46	102
28 Madagascar	8.3	587	250	–0.3	3.2	9.6	*50*	46	95
29 Haiti	4.8	28	260	0.2	4.1	12.2	23	51	91
30 Mauritania	1.5	1,031	270	3.6	1.6	10.4	*17*	42	71
31 Lesotho	1.3	30	280	5.9	2.5	11.2	*55*	50	90
32 Uganda	12.4	236	280	0.7	3.0	27.3	..	53	90
33 Angola	6.7	1,247	300	1.2	3.3	22.0	..	41	88
34 Sudan	17.4	2,506	320	0.1	3.7	7.4	*20*	46	108
35 Togo	2.4	56	320	5.0	1.7	7.4	18	46	80
36 Kenya	14.7	583	330	2.2	1.5	12.0	*40*	53	91
37 Senegal	5.4	196	340	–0.4	1.7	8.0	*10*	42	96
38 Indonesia	136.0	2,027	360	4.1	..	20.0	62	47	100
Middle-income countries	**672.8** *f*	**32,886** *t*	**1,330** *w*	**3.7** *w*	**3.1** *m*	**11.1** *m*	**71** *w*	**61** *w*	**106** *w*
39 Egypt	39.9	1,001	390	3.3	2.7	7.0	*44*	54	93
40 Ghana	11.0	239	390	–0.5	7.6	35.0	30	48	79
41 Yemen, PDR	1.8	333	420	..	..	..	*27*	44	108
42 Cameroon	8.1	475	460	2.9	3.7	*9.8*	..	46	112
43 Liberia	1.7	111	460	2.0	1.9	9.7	*30*	48	96
44 Honduras	3.4	112	480	1.1	3.0	8.0	57	57	84
45 Zambia	5.3	753	480	1.2	7.6	5.7	*39*	48	109
46 Zimbabwe	6.9	391	480	1.2	1.3	7.6	..	54	102
47 Thailand	44.5	514	490	4.6	1.9	9.1	84	61	122
48 Bolivia	5.3	1,099	510	2.2	3.5	22.7	*63*	52	111
49 Philippines	45.6	300	510	2.6	5.8	13.4	*87*	60	115
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	5.6	195	520	..	..	..	*13*	39	98
51 Congo, People's Rep.	1.5	342	540	1.0	5.4	10.6	50	46	82
52 Nigeria	80.6	924	560	3.6	2.6	18.2	..	48	89
53 Papua New Guinea	2.9	462	560	3.6	3.6	8.8	32	50	106
54 El Salvador	4.3	21	660	1.8	0.5	10.3	*62*	63	111
55 Morocco	18.9	447	670	2.5	2.0	7.1	*28*	55	80
56 Peru	16.8	1,285	740	2.0	9.9	22.2	72	56	90
57 Ivory Coast	7.8	322	840	2.5	2.8	13.9	20	46	104
58 Nicaragua	2.5	130	840	2.3	1.9	*11.0*	57	55	102
59 Colombia	25.6	1,139	850	3.0	11.9	21.7	*81*	62	114
60 Paraguay	2.9	407	850	2.6	3.0	12.3	81	63	103
61 Ecuador	7.8	284	880	4.3	..	14.8	74	60	103
62 Dominican Rep.	5.1	49	910	3.5	2.1	8.6	67	60	93
63 Guatemala	6.6	109	910	2.9	0.1	10.8	47	57	108
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	8.1	185	930	3.8	1.9	12.7	53	57	150
65 Tunisia	6.0	164	950	4.8	*3.7*	7.1	55	57	128
66 Jordan	3.0	98	1,050	..	..	..	70	56	77

	Population (millions) Mid-1978[a]	Area (thousands of square kilometers)	GNP per capita Dollars 1978[a]	GNP per capita Average annual growth (percent) 1960–78[b]	Average annual rate of inflation (percent) 1960–70[c]	Average annual rate of inflation (percent) 1970–78[d]	Adult literacy rate (percent) 1975[e]	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1978	Average index of food production per capita (1969–71 = 100) 1976–78
67 Malaysia	13.3	330	1,090	3.9	—0.3	7.2	*60*	67	110
68 Jamaica	2.1	11	1,110	2.0	3.8	16.9	86	70	98
69 Lebanon	3.0	10	..	..	1.4	..	..	65	85
70 Korea, Rep. of	36.6	99	1,160	6.9	17.5	19.3	93	63	116
71 Turkey	43.1	781	1,200	4.0	5.6	21.5	60	61	110
72 Algeria	17.6	2,382	1,260	2.3	2.3	13.4	37	56	82
73 Mexico	65.4	1,973	1,290	2.7	3.5	17.5	76	65	99
74 Panama	1.8	76	1,290	2.9	1.6	7.5	78	70	103
75 Taiwan	17.1	36	1,400	6.6	4.1	10.3	*82*	72	105
76 Chile	10.7	757	1,410	1.0	32.9	242.6	88	67	94
77 South Africa	27.7	1,221	1,480	2.5	3.0	11.7	..	60	100
78 Costa Rica	2.1	51	1,540	3.3	1.9	15.7	90	70	114
79 Brazil	119.5	8,512	1,570	4.9	46.1	30.3	*76*	62	117
80 Uruguay	2.9	176	1,610	0.7	51.1	65.6	94	71	105
81 Argentina	26.4	2,767	1,910	2.6	21.8	120.4	94	71	114
82 Portugal	9.8	92	1,990	5.9	3.0	15.2	70	69	82
83 Yugoslavia	22.0	256	2,380	5.4	12.6	17.3	85	69	117
84 Trinidad and Tobago	1.1	5	2,910	2.2	3.2	21.3	*95*	70	94
85 Venezuela	14.0	912	2,910	2.7	1.3	11.1	*82*	66	97
86 Hong Kong	4.6	1	3,040	6.5	2.3	7.7	90	72	30
87 Greece	9.4	132	3,250	6.0	3.2	13.8	..	73	120
88 Singapore	2.3	1	3,290	7.4	1.1	6.1	*75*	70	112
89 Spain	37.1	505	3,470	5.0	6.3	15.0	..	73	122
90 Israel	3.7	21	3,500	4.2	6.2	31.0	88	72	113
Industrialized countries	**657.8 f**	**30,488 f**	**8,670 w**	**3.7 w**	**4.2 w**	**8.4 w**	**99 w**	**74 w**	**108 w**
91 Ireland	3.2	70	3,470	3.3	5.2	14.7	*98*	73	128
92 Italy	56.7	301	3,850	3.6	4.4	14.0	98	73	100
93 New Zealand	3.2	269	4,790	1.7	3.3	11.0	*99*	73	107
94 United Kingdom	55.8	244	5,030	2.1	4.1	14.1	99	73	111
95 Finland	4.8	337	6,820	4.1	5.6	13.2	100	72	107
96 Austria	7.5	84	7,030	4.2	3.6	7.6	99	72	109
97 Japan	114.9	372	7,260	7.6	4.8	9.6	99	76	97
98 Australia	14.2	7,687	7,990	2.9	3.1	12.8	100	73	121
99 France	53.3	547	8,260	4.0	4.1	9.3	99	73	106
100 Netherlands	13.9	41	8,410	3.4	5.3	8.8	99	74	118
101 Belgium	9.8	31	9,090	4.1	3.6	8.6	99	72	105
102 Canada	23.5	9,976	9,180	3.5	3.1	9.4	98	74	112
103 Norway	4.1	324	9,510	4.0	4.2	8.6	*99*	75	108
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	61.3	249	9,580	3.3	3.2	5.9	99	72	104
105 United States	221.9	9,363	9,590	2.4	2.8	6.8	*99*	73	114
106 Denmark	5.1	43	9,920	3.2	6.0	9.8	99	74	102
107 Sweden	8.3	450	10,210	2.5	4.3	9.3	*99*	75	113
108 Switzerland	6.3	41	12,100	2.2	4.6	6.6	99	74	113
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**89.1 f**	**6,611 f**	**5,340 w**	**7.1 w**	**1.2 w**	**12.2 w**	**50 w**	**56 w**	**111 w**
109 Iraq	12.2	435	1,860	4.1	1.7	..	..	55	84
110 Iran	35.8	1,648	*2,160*	*7.9*	—0.5	*23.7*	*50*	52	113
111 Libya	2.7	1,760	6,910	6.2	5.2	20.7	50	55	123
112 Saudi Arabia	8.2	2,150	7,690	9.7	..	28.4	..	53	135
113 Kuwait	1.2	18	14,890	—2.3	0.6	19.8	60	69	..
Centrally planned economies	**1,268.4 f**	**24,695 f**	**1,199 w**	**4.8 w**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**70 w**	**112 w**
114 China	952.2	9,597	230[f]	3.7	..	..	..	70	111
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	17.1	121	730	4.5	..	..	..	63	130
116 Albania	2.6	29	740	4.1	..	..	..	69	107
117 Cuba	9.7	115	810	—1.2	..	..	*96*	72	96
118 Mongolia	1.6	1,565	940	1.5	..	..	..	63	94
119 Romania	21.9	238	1,750	8.6	..	..	98	70	148
120 Bulgaria	8.8	111	3,230	5.7	..	..	..	72	113
121 Hungary	10.7	93	3,450	5.0	..	..	98	70	122
122 Poland	35.0	313	3,670	5.9	..	..	98	71	104
123 USSR	261.0	22,402	3,700	4.3	..	..	99	70	111
124 Czechoslovakia	15.1	128	4,720	4.3	..	..	..	70	118
125 German Dem. Rep.	16.7	108	5,710	4.8	..	..	..	72	127

a. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.
b. Figures in italics are for 1960–77, not 1960–78.
c. Figures in italics are for 1961–70, not 1960–70.
d. Figures in italics are for 1970–77, not 1970–78.
e. Figures in italics are for years other than 1975. See the technical notes.
f. Preliminary estimate based on partial official information. See the technical notes.

Table 2. Growth of Production

	Average annual growth rate (percent)									
	GDP		Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing		Services	
	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]
Low-income countries	**3.9 w**	**5.6 w**	**2.5 w**	**2.0 w**	**6.1 w**	**4.5 w**	**6.8 w**	**4.2 w**	**4.4 w**	**4.8 w**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	3.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	3.6	2.9	2.7	1.6	7.9	5.9	6.6	5.3	3.8	4.7
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	*4.4*	1.8	*2.2*	0.5	*7.4*	0.4	*8.0*	1.3	*7.8*	4.5
6 Mali	3.3	4.6	..	2.0	..	9.2	..	..	..	5.2
7 Nepal	2.5	2.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
8 Somalia	1.0	3.1	–1.5	2.7	3.3	–2.6	14.3	..	2.5	6.8
9 Burundi	4.4	2.9	..	1.7	..	7.6	..	5.3	..	4.0
10 Chad	0.5	*1.7*	..	*–0.1*	..	*8.5*	..	*5.7*	..	*2.6*
11 Mozambique	4.6	–3.2	2.1	–1.8	9.5	–5.1	6.6	–6.1	6.4	–3.7
12 Burma	2.6	4.0	4.1	3.6	2.8	4.5	3.3	4.2	1.5	4.2
13 Upper Volta	3.0	–0.2	..	–3.6	..	1.4	..	1.6	..	2.7
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	3.6	3.7	1.9	2.6	5.5	4.5	4.8	4.6	5.2	4.6
16 Malawi	4.9	6.5	..	4.2	..	6.8	..	6.7	..	9.6
17 Rwanda	2.7	*4.8*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
18 Sri Lanka	4.6	3.4	3.0	2.3	6.6	3.0	6.3	1.2	4.6	4.3
19 Guinea	3.2	*5.4*	2.1	*3.0*	2.3	*14.1*	..	*9.4*	7.2	*0.7*
20 Sierra Leone	4.2	1.3	..	2.8	..	–3.5	..	4.6	..	3.6
21 Zaire	3.6	*1.3*	..	*1.9*	..	*0.7*	..	*–0.6*	..	*1.6*
22 Niger	2.9	2.4	3.3	–0.2	13.9	8.6	..	..	(.)	4.2
23 Benin	2.6	3.8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
24 Pakistan	6.7	4.4	4.9	1.9	10.0	4.8	9.4	3.5	7.0	6.2
25 Tanzania	6.0	5.0	..	4.5	..	2.3	..	4.5	..	6.4
26 Afghanistan	2.0	*4.6*	..	*3.5*	..	*5.3*	..	*4.0*	..	*6.1*
27 Central African Rep.	1.9	3.2	0.8	2.3	5.4	5.2	..	..	1.8	3.1
28 Madagascar	2.9	*–0.7*	..	*–0.3*	..	*(.)*	..	*–0.4*	..	*–1.4*
29 Haiti	0.1	3.9	0.6	2.6	0.4	8.0	–0.1	6.6	0.9	3.3
30 Mauritania	8.1	*2.3*	2.4	*–2.3*	12.8	*2.1*	18.0	*2.9*	17.0	*7.6*
31 Lesotho	4.6	*6.5*	..	*0.3*	..	*3.8*	..	*8.7*	..	*15.7*
32 Uganda	5.9	–0.2	..	1.1	..	–7.8	..	–5.0	..	0.2
33 Angola	4.8	–10.0	4.0	–11.0	11.0	–4.1	7.2	–12.8	4.2	–11.8
34 Sudan	1.3	*2.7*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
35 Togo	8.5	4.2	..	1.7	..	7.4	..	..	..	4.6
36 Kenya	6.0	6.7	..	5.5	..	10.4	..	11.7	..	6.0
37 Senegal	2.5	2.2	2.9	3.3	4.4	3.9	6.2	4.1	1.7	1.0
38 Indonesia	3.5	7.8	2.5	4.0	5.0	11.2	3.3	12.4	8.0	8.7
Middle-income countries	**6.0 w**	**5.7 w**	**3.4 m**	**3.1 m**	**7.8 m**	**7.1 m**	**7.8 m**	**6.8 m**	**5.7 m**	**5.8 m**
39 Egypt	4.5	7.8	2.9	3.1	5.4	7.2	4.7	7.6	5.1	12.0
40 Ghana	2.1	0.4	..	–1.2	..	–2.3	..	–6.0	..	3.5
41 Yemen, PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon	4.7	5.1	..	3.3	..	6.2	..	5.2	..	6.0
43 Liberia	5.1	1.5	..	5.3	..	–1.2	..	8.7	..	1.5
44 Honduras	5.1	3.3	5.7	0.8	5.2	5.9	4.0	5.8	4.5	3.9
45 Zambia	5.0	2.3	..	3.1	..	4.3	..	0.6	..	1.4
46 Zimbabwe	4.2	*3.4*	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	8.2	7.6	5.5	5.6	11.6	10.2	11.0	11.5	9.0	7.4
48 Bolivia	5.2	5.6	3.0	3.6	6.2	5.1	5.4	6.8	5.5	6.5
49 Philippines	5.1	6.3	4.3	4.9	6.0	8.6	6.7	6.8	5.2	5.4
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	*7.9*	..	*5.1*	..	*11.7*	..	*12.2*	..	*9.8*
51 Congo, People's Rep.	2.7	3.5	1.0	(.)	7.0	11.4	6.8	2.3	2.1	0.7
52 Nigeria	3.1	*6.2*	–0.4	*–1.5*	16.0	*10.3*	9.3	*13.4*	0.2	*8.6*
53 Papua New Guinea	6.5	2.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
54 El Salvador	5.9	5.2	3.0	2.7	8.5	7.0	8.8	6.1	6.5	5.5
55 Morocco	4.2	6.4	4.7	0.1	4.0	7.9	3.8	6.6	4.0	7.6
56 Peru	5.4	3.1	1.9	0.7	5.5	4.3	7.2	4.3	6.8	3.2
57 Ivory Coast	8.0	6.8	4.2	3.9	11.5	10.0	11.6	7.5	9.7	7.2
58 Nicaragua	7.2	*5.8*	6.7	*5.4*	11.0	*7.3*	11.1	*6.3*	5.7	*5.0*
59 Colombia	5.1	6.0	3.5	4.9	6.0	5.1	5.7	6.7	5.7	7.0
60 Paraguay	4.3	7.5	..	6.2	..	9.5	..	6.8	..	7.4
61 Ecuador	..	9.1	..	4.6	..	14.4	..	10.0	..	7.8
62 Dominican Rep.	4.5	7.4	2.1	3.3	6.0	10.1	5.0	7.4	5.0	7.5
63 Guatemala	5.6	6.0	4.3	5.3	7.8	7.6	8.2	6.1	5.5	5.8
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	5.7	9.6	4.4	7.2	6.3	11.6	5.6	13.6	6.2	9.5
65 Tunisia	*4.6*	7.9	*2.0*	5.6	*8.7*	8.1	*7.6*	11.0	*4.2*	8.7
66 Jordan	..	7.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

	Average annual growth rate (percent)									
	GDP		Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing		Services	
	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]
67 Malaysia	6.5	7.8	..	5.0	..	9.6	..	12.3	..	8.4
68 Jamaica	4.6	–0.8	1.5	1.4	5.6	–2.7	5.6	–0.9	4.3	0.3
69 Lebanon	4.9	..	6.3	..	4.5	..	5.0	..	4.8	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	8.5	9.7	4.5	4.0	17.2	16.5	17.2	18.3	8.4	8.7
71 Turkey	6.0	7.1	2.5	3.9	9.6	8.8	10.9	8.7	6.9	7.9
72 Algeria	4.6	*5.3*	0.4	*0.2*	12.9	*5.9*	7.7	*6.9*	–3.0	*5.5*
73 Mexico	7.2	5.0	3.8	2.1	9.1	6.2	9.4	6.2	7.0	4.8
74 Panama	7.8	3.4	5.7	2.4	10.1	0.7	10.5	–0.5	7.6	4.8
75 Taiwan	9.2	8.0	3.4	1.6	16.4	12.9	17.3	13.2	7.8	4.1
76 Chile	4.5	0.8	2.6	2.7	5.0	–0.8	5.5	–2.4	4.5	1.7
77 South Africa	6.4	3.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
78 Costa Rica	6.5	*6.0*	5.7	*2.5*	9.4	*9.1*	10.6	*8.8*	5.7	*5.7*
79 Brazil	5.3	9.2	..	5.3	..	10.1	..	9.5	..	9.2
80 Uruguay	1.2	1.9	1.9	0.1	1.1	3.5	1.5	3.2	1.0	1.5
81 Argentina	4.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	6.0	2.2	5.7	2.0	3.3	2.5
82 Portugal	6.2	4.8	1.3	–1.9	8.8	4.6	8.9	4.6	5.9	7.1
83 Yugoslavia	5.8	*5.6*	3.3	*3.3*	6.3	*8.0*	5.7	*9.3*	6.9	*4.0*
84 Trinidad and Tobago	3.9	*3.4*	..	*–0.1*	..	*2.8*	..	*–1.1*	..	*4.0*
85 Venezuela	5.9	*5.6*	5.7	*3.5*	4.5	*2.7*	6.2	*6.4*	7.2	*7.9*
86 Hong Kong	10.0	*8.2*	..	*–0.2*	..	*6.2*	..	*5.6*	..	*10.1*
87 Greece	6.9	5.0	3.5	1.9	9.4	5.3	10.2	6.6	7.1	5.7
88 Singapore	8.8	8.5	5.0	1.5	12.5	8.5	13.0	9.2	7.7	8.6
89 Spain	7.3	4.4	2.5	1.9	9.4	4.9	9.7	7.8	7.2	4.6
90 Israel	8.1	4.5	..	*6.6*	..	*5.3*	..	6.1	..	5.4
Industrialized countries	**5.1 w**	**2.2 w**	**1.2 w**	**1.0 w**	**5.1 w**	**2.4 w**	**5.2 w**	**2.5 w**	**4.8 w**	**2.7 w**
91 Ireland	4.2	*3.4*	0.9	..	6.1	..	..	..	4.3	..
92 Italy	5.3	2.8	2.8	0.5	6.2	2.7	7.2	3.3	5.1	3.3
93 New Zealand	3.9	2.2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
94 United Kingdom	2.9	2.1	2.3	0.8	3.1	1.3	3.4	0.6	2.7	2.4
95 Finland	4.6	2.8	0.6	–1.9	6.3	3.2	6.2	2.8	5.3	3.9
96 Austria	4.5	3.8	1.2	2.1	4.9	3.4	4.8	3.6	4.5	4.3
97 Japan	10.5	5.0	4.0	1.1	10.9	6.0	11.0	6.2	11.7	5.1
98 Australia	4.1	*3.8*	2.7	*1.7*	4.6	*3.9*	5.6	*3.9*	4.0	*3.9*
99 France	5.7	3.7	1.8	–0.4	6.4	3.5	6.6	3.9	5.7	4.3
100 Netherlands	5.5	3.2	2.9	3.6	6.8	3.3	6.6	3.6	5.1	3.3
101 Belgium	4.8	3.3	–0.5	–1.1	6.0	3.4	6.2	3.3	4.6	3.3
102 Canada	5.6	4.4	*2.5*	2.7	*6.8*	3.7	*6.7*	3.8	*5.5*	4.8
103 Norway	4.9	4.7	0.1	2.3	5.5	5.2	5.3	1.9	5.0	4.7
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	4.4	2.4	1.5	1.6	5.2	2.1	5.4	2.0	4.2	1.7
105 United States	4.3	3.0	0.3	0.9	5.2	2.7	5.3	2.9	4.3	3.4
106 Denmark	4.7	2.7	0.2	..	5.5	..	5.4	..	4.9	..
107 Sweden	4.4	1.6	0.6	–1.6	6.2	1.0	6.2	0.8	3.9	2.3
108 Switzerland	4.3	0.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**10.0 w**	**5.0 w**	**..**	**5.2 w**	**..**	**4.0 w**	**..**	**15.1 w**	**..**	**15.1 w**
109 Iraq	6.2	..	5.7	..	4.7	..	5.9	..	8.3	..
110 Iran	11.3	*7.4*	4.4	*5.2*	13.4	*4.0*	12.0	*16.1*	10.0	*16.1*
111 Libya	24.4	0.9	..	12.7	..	–2.7	..	18.4	..	16.7
112 Saudi Arabia	..	11.5	..	4.0	..	12.0	..	5.4	..	11.6
113 Kuwait	5.7	0.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Centrally planned economies	**4.9 w**	**5.8 w**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**
114 China	5.0	6.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	7.8	7.2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	7.3	6.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	1.1	0.4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	2.8	4.5	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	9.0	10.6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	5.9	6.3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
121 Hungary	3.8	5.4	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
122 Poland	4.3	7.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
123 USSR	5.2	5.3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia	3.1	4.9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	3.1	4.7	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1961–70, not 1960–70. b. Figures in italics are for 1970–77, not 1970–78.

Table 3. Structure of Production

	Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)							
	Agriculture		Industry		(Manufacturing[a])		Services	
	1960[b]	1978[c]	1960[b]	1978[c]	(1960[b]	1978[c])	1960[b]	1978[c]
Low-income countries	**50 w**	**35 w**	**17 w**	**34 w**	**11 w**	**13 w**	**33 w**	**36 w**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	61	57	8	13	6	8	31	30
3 Lao PDR	..	*60*	..	*14*	..	*4*	..	*26*
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	65	54	12	13	6	9	23	33
6 Mali	55	37	10	18	5	12	35	45
7 Nepal	..	*62*	..	*12*	..	*10*	..	*26*
8 Somalia	67	60	13	11	3	7	20	29
9 Burundi	..	56	..	15	..	9	..	29
10 Chad	55	*52*	12	*13*	5	*8*	33	*35*
11 Mozambique	55	45	9	16	8	9	36	39
12 Burma	33	46	12	13	8	10	55	41
13 Upper Volta	62	38	14	20	8	13	24	42
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	50	40	20	26	14	17	30	34
16 Malawi	58	43	11	19	6	12	31	38
17 Rwanda	81	*46*	7	*22*	1	*15*	12	*32*
18 Sri Lanka	34	35	22	31	17	23	44	34
19 Guinea	56	*32*	36	*41*	..	*4*	8	*27*
20 Sierra Leone	..	39	..	22	..	6	..	39
21 Zaire	30	27	27	20	13	7	43	53
22 Niger	69	43	9	27	4	10	22	30
23 Benin	55	31	8	13	3	9	37	56
24 Pakistan	46	32	16	24	12	16	38	44
25 Tanzania	57	51	11	13	5	9	32	36
26 Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
27 Central African Rep.	51	36	10	18	4	9	39	46
28 Madagascar	37	*38*	10	*19*	4	*14*	53	*43*
29 Haiti	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
30 Mauritania	59	*26*	24	*37*	3	*11*	17	*37*
31 Lesotho	..	*36*	..	*15*	..	*2*	..	*49*
32 Uganda	52	57	13	7	9	6	35	36
33 Angola	50	50	8	21	4	3	42	29
34 Sudan	58	*43*	15	*12*	5	*6*	27	*45*
35 Togo	55	26	16	20	8	9	29	54
36 Kenya	38	*41*	18	*19*	9	*12*	44	*40*
37 Senegal	24	26	17	25	12	19	59	49
38 Indonesia	54	31	14	33	8	9	32	36
Middle-income countries	**22 w**	**18 w**	**31 w**	**34 w**	**22 w**	**25 w**	**47 w**	**50 w**
39 Egypt	30	29	24	30	20	25	46	41
40 Ghana	41	38	19	18	10	9	40	44
41 Yemen, PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon	..	32	..	16	..	9	..	52
43 Liberia	40	35	37	28	..	6	23	37
44 Honduras	37	32	19	26	13	17	44	42
45 Zambia	11	17	63	39	4	17	26	44
46 Zimbabwe	18	*20*	35	*35*	17	*20*	47	*45*
47 Thailand	40	27	19	27	13	18	41	46
48 Bolivia	26	17	25	28	15	13	49	55
49 Philippines	26	27	28	35	20	25	46	38
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	*35*	..	*14*	..	*6*	..	*51*
51 Congo, People's Rep.	23	13	17	33	10	16	60	54
52 Nigeria	63	*34*	11	*43*	5	*9*	26	*23*
53 Papua New Guinea	*49*	*33*	*13*	*26*	*3*	*8*	*38*	*41*
54 El Salvador	32	29	19	21	15	15	49	50
55 Morocco	23	18	27	32	16	17	50	50
56 Peru	26	*14*	29	*36*	17	..	45	*50*
57 Ivory Coast	43	21	14	23	7	13	43	56
58 Nicaragua	24	*23*	21	*26*	16	*20*	55	*51*
59 Colombia	34	31	26	27	17	20	40	42
60 Paraguay	36	32	20	24	17	17	44	44
61 Ecuador	33	21	19	35	14	17	48	44
62 Dominican Rep.	27	*21*	23	*29*	17	*19*	50	*50*
63 Guatemala	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	..	20	..	28	..	21	..	52
65 Tunisia	*24*	18	*18*	30	*8*	12	*58*	52
66 Jordan	..	11	..	29	..	16	..	60

	Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)							
	Agriculture		Industry		(Manufacturing[a])		Services	
	1960[b]	1978[c]	1960[b]	1978[c]	(1960[b]	1978[c])	1960[b]	1978[c]
67 Malaysia	37	25	18	32	9	17	45	43
68 Jamaica	10	9	36	32	15	17	54	59
69 Lebanon	12	..	20	..	13	..	68	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	40	24	19	36	12	24	41	40
71 Turkey	41	27	21	28	13	18	38	45
72 Algeria	21	8	33	56	10	12	46	36
73 Mexico	16	11	29	37	23	28	55	52
74 Panama	23	..	21	..	13	..	56	..
75 Taiwan	28	10	29	48	22	38	43	42
76 Chile	11	*10*	38	*29*	23	*20*	51	*61*
77 South Africa	12	8	40	45	21	22	48	47
78 Costa Rica	26	*22*	20	*27*	14	*20*	54	*51*
79 Brazil	16	11	35	37	26	28	49	52
80 Uruguay	19	14	28	32	21	26	53	54
81 Argentina	17	*13*	38	*45*	31	*37*	45	*42*
82 Portugal	25	13	36	46	29	36	39	41
83 Yugoslavia	24	16	45	45	36	..	31	39
84 Trinidad and Tobago	8	3	46	62	24	14	46	35
85 Venezuela	6	*6*	22	*46*	..	*16*	72	*48*
86 Hong Kong	4	*2*	34	*31*	25	*25*	62	*67*
87 Greece	23	17	26	31	16	19	51	52
88 Singapore	4	2	18	35	12	26	78	63
89 Spain	21	*9*	39	*38*	27	*30*	40	*53*
90 Israel	11	*7*	32	*37*	23	*26*	57	*56*
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
91 Ireland	22	..	26	..	..	..	52	..
92 Italy	13	7	41	42	31	..	46	51
93 New Zealand	..	*10*	..	*31*	..	*21*	..	*59*
94 United Kingdom	4	2	43	36	32	25	53	62
95 Finland	18	8	35	35	24	25	47	57
96 Austria	11	5	49	42	38	29	40	53
97 Japan	13	5	45	40	34	29	42	55
98 Australia	12	5	37	32	26	19	51	63
99 France	10	5	38	37	29	27	52	58
100 Netherlands	9	*4*	46	*34*	34	..	45	*62*
101 Belgium	6	2	41	37	30	26	53	61
102 Canada	6	4	34	31	23	19	60	65
103 Norway	9	5	33	36	21	17	58	59
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	6	3	53	48	40	38	41	49
105 United States	4	3	38	34	29	24	58	63
106 Denmark	11	..	32	..	22	..	57	..
107 Sweden	7	4	40	33	27	24	53	63
108 Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
109 Iraq	17	..	52	..	10	..	31	..
110 Iran	29	*9*	33	*54*	11	*12*	38	*37*
111 Libya	..	2	..	71	..	3	..	27
112 Saudi Arabia	..	1	..	76	..	5	..	23
113 Kuwait	..	(.)	..	72	..	7	..	28
[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	32	18	53	64	46	..	15	18
121 Hungary	24	15	69	59	59	..	7	26
122 Poland	26	16	57	64	47	..	17	20
123 USSR	21	17	62	62	52	..	17	21
124 Czechoslovakia	16	9	73	72	63	..	11	19
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	10	..	69	..	..	..	21

a. Manufacturing is a part of the industrial sector, but its share in GDP is shown separately because it typically is the most dynamic part of the industrial sector.

b. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960.
c. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.

Table 4. Growth of Consumption and Investment

	Average annual growth rate (percent)					
	Public consumption		Private consumption		Gross domestic investment	
	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]
Low-income countries	**4.5 *m***	**3.7 *m***	**3.9 *m***	**3.1 *m***	**4.6 *m***	**3.6 *m***
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	2.6	..	3.2	..	0.3	..
2 Bangladesh	[c]	[c]	3.4	3.1	11.1	—1.4
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	4.7	*3.7*	4.7	*3.7*	5.7	*—1.6*
6 Mali	6.2	3.6	2.8	6.0	3.5	1.8
7 Nepal	..	..	..	..	..	..
8 Somalia	3.7	11.7	—0.5	0.1	4.3	8.5
9 Burundi	19.2	5.1	3.2	3.1	4.3	16.9
10 Chad	4.4	*0.1*	—0.7	*1.8*	2.3	*3.1*
11 Mozambique	6.8	—4.6	4.4	—2.7	8.3	—9.6
12 Burma	[c]	[c]	2.8	3.7	3.6	4.2
13 Upper Volta	..	3.8	..	0.8	..	1.8
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	—1.7	4.2	4.2	3.0	5.6	6.1
16 Malawi	4.6	1.5	4.1	6.4	15.4	1.1
17 Rwanda	1.1	2.8	4.2	3.9	3.5	17.1
18 Sri Lanka	[c]	[c]	1.9	2.5	6.6	3.6
19 Guinea	..	*1.7*	..	*2.9*	..	*2.0*
20 Sierra Leone	..	13.4	..	0.5	..	5.6
21 Zaire	8.5	*—0.2*	3.9	*—0.7*	9.6	*0.6*
22 Niger	2.0	4.2	3.9	1.6	3.0	5.2
23 Benin	1.7	0.6	4.9	3.9	4.2	8.4
24 Pakistan	7.3	3.9	7.1	3.8	6.9	4.8
25 Tanzania	[c]	[c]	5.2	5.8	9.8	1.9
26 Afghanistan	[c]	9.8	2.5	3.8	—1.0	12.4
27 Central African Rep.	2.2	0.7	3.0	4.3	1.3	0.7
28 Madagascar	..	*—1.4*	..	*—2.2*	..	*—2.5*
29 Haiti	[c]	*—0.1*	1.0	*4.5*	1.7	*11.9*
30 Mauritania	1.0	*17.7*	17.2	*4.4*	—2.1	*5.1*
31 Lesotho	0.3	*13.9*	6.0	*12.7*	18.5	*29.3*
32 Uganda	5.9	1.6	5.6	1.6	9.8	—13.8
33 Angola	9.1	2.9	4.0	—8.8	9.7	—10.9
34 Sudan	12.1	[c]	—1.2	*4.3*	—1.3	*9.8*
35 Togo	6.7	14.6	7.6	1.9	11.1	16.0
36 Kenya	10.0	8.7	4.6	6.2	7.0	2.3
37 Senegal	—0.2	2.3	3.2	2.1	1.1	2.5
38 Indonesia	1.0	10.9	3.4	7.6	4.8	15.3
Middle-income countries	**6.4 *m***	**7.4 *m***	**5.3 *m***	**4.9 *m***	**7.6 *m***	**7.2 *m***
39 Egypt	10.3	5.0	5.4	6.1	3.1	23.3
40 Ghana	6.1	—0.3	2.0	1.7	—3.2	—8.3
41 Yemen, PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon	8.9	5.8	3.4	4.8	8.4	7.0
43 Liberia	5.6	8.3	1.8	3.3	—4.6	6.1
44 Honduras	4.6	8.1	4.6	4.2	11.0	4.9
45 Zambia	11.0	2.3	6.9	—2.7	10.6	—2.9
46 Zimbabwe	..	*2.9*	..	*3.5*	..	*—0.8*
47 Thailand	9.6	8.3	7.0	6.7	15.4	7.8
48 Bolivia	8.9	8.5	4.1	7.4	9.6	6.4
49 Philippines	5.0	9.4	4.7	4.3	8.2	11.1
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.	5.4	7.0	—0.3	4.3	2.9	—0.1
52 Nigeria	10.0	*26.9*	(.)	*4.0*	7.4	*23.3*
53 Papua New Guinea	*6.5*	—1.1	*6.9*	2.0	*21.2*	—10.4
54 El Salvador	6.4	6.9	6.1	5.7	3.5	11.1
55 Morocco	4.5	13.8	4.0	4.4	8.0	17.4
56 Peru	8.8	5.8	6.7	4.1	2.4	4.2
57 Ivory Coast	11.8	7.5	8.0	8.2	12.7	14.0
58 Nicaragua	3.6	*12.7*	6.8	*4.9*	10.7	*8.6*
59 Colombia	5.5	4.8	5.5	5.9	4.5	6.3
60 Paraguay	6.9	3.8	4.5	6.9	5.8	20.6
61 Ecuador	..	12.4	..	8.4	..	10.2
62 Dominican Rep.	1.9	*—0.9*	6.3	*7.6*	11.4	*13.2*
63 Guatemala	4.7	5.2	4.7	5.4	7.9	11.3
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	..	13.0	..	10.4	..	18.2
65 Tunisia	*5.5*	8.8	*3.0*	8.8	*4.5*	11.9
66 Jordan	..	..	..	..	..	..

	Average annual growth rate (percent)					
	Public consumption		Private consumption		Gross domestic investment	
	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]	1960–70[a]	1970–78[b]
67 Malaysia	7.4	9.6	4.2	6.4	7.2	10.2
68 Jamaica	8.6	6.0	3.2	0.5	7.8	–10.4
69 Lebanon	5.9	..	4.4	..	6.2	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	5.5	8.7	7.0	7.5	23.6	13.7
71 Turkey	6.7	8.8	5.1	6.6	8.8	10.2
72 Algeria	1.7	*8.2*	4.6	*11.3*	1.9	*11.7*
73 Mexico	9.4	10.2	6.6	3.8	9.6	7.1
74 Panama	7.8	6.9	6.7	1.4	12.4	0.9
75 Taiwan	4.5	5.4	8.3	6.8	16.2	8.2
76 Chile	4.7	2.9	4.8	–0.4	3.7	–2.7
77 South Africa	7.1	..	6.2	..	9.5	..
78 Costa Rica	8.0	7.4	6.0	4.9	7.1	9.3
79 Brazil	3.5	8.6	5.1	9.0	7.0	10.7
80 Uruguay	4.4	3.2	0.7	–1.2	–1.8	4.8
81 Argentina	1.0	–3.1	4.1	2.4	4.1	1.2
82 Portugal	7.7	9.0	5.5	4.8	7.7	0.7
83 Yugoslavia	0.6	4.5	9.5	6.1	4.7	7.2
84 Trinidad and Tobago	6.2	*10.4*	4.3	*–0.3*	–2.8	*5.3*
85 Venezuela	6.3	*9.1*	4.9	*7.1*	7.3	*11.8*
86 Hong Kong	8.7	9.2	8.9	8.8	7.4	10.2
87 Greece	6.6	7.7	7.1	4.6	10.4	1.9
88 Singapore	12.6	6.4	5.4	7.1	20.5	5.5
89 Spain	5.5	6.2	7.0	4.2	10.5	3.0
90 Israel	13.8	5.3	7.4	5.7	5.7	0.7
Industrialized countries	**4.8 *m***	**3.8 *m***	**4.3 *m***	**3.5 *m***	**5.6 *m***	**1.5 *m***
91 Ireland	3.9	*6.3*	3.7	*2.7*	8.8	*1.7*
92 Italy	3.9	[c]	6.1	2.7	3.8	–0.4
93 New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..
94 United Kingdom	2.2	2.9	2.3	1.3	5.0	1.5
95 Finland	5.7	5.9	4.3	2.9	4.3	–1.5
96 Austria	2.9	4.0	4.4	4.2	5.6	4.1
97 Japan	6.4	5.0	9.0	5.3	14.0	2.5
98 Australia	6.8	5.8	2.7	3.8	6.2	0.7
99 France	3.4	3.4	5.5	4.5	7.3	1.7
100 Netherlands	3.1	2.7	6.1	3.8	6.8	–0.1
101 Belgium	5.7	4.7	3.8	4.0	6.0	1.9
102 Canada	6.2	3.3	4.9	5.6	5.8	4.7
103 Norway	6.4	5.6	4.1	4.0	5.1	4.1
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	4.1	3.9	4.6	2.9	4.1	–0.2
105 United States	4.1	1.7	4.4	3.5	4.8	1.6
106 Denmark	6.0	3.6	4.3	3.0	6.7	0.2
107 Sweden	5.4	3.1	3.8	2.0	5.0	–1.3
108 Switzerland	4.8	2.0	4.3	1.4	4.1	–4.6
Capital-surplus oil exporters	..	..	..	..	..	..
109 Iraq	8.1	..	4.9	..	3.0	..
110 Iran	16.0	*20.4*	10.0	*10.0*	12.2	*22.0*
111 Libya	..	22.6	..	21.2	..	10.9
112 Saudi Arabia	..	[c]	..	*16.5*	..	*51.0*
113 Kuwait	..	..	..	..	..	..
Centrally planned economies	..	..	..	..	..	..
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	..	..	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..
121 Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..
122 Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..
123 USSR	..	..	..	..	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia	..	..	..	..	..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1961–70, not 1960–70.
b. Figures in italics are for 1970–77, not 1970–78.
c. Separate figures are not available for public consumption, which is therefore included in private consumption.

Table 5. Structure of Demand

	Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)											
	Public consumption		Private consumption		Gross domestic investment		Gross domestic saving		Exports of goods and nonfactor services		Resource balance	
	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]
Low-income countries	**8 w**	**12 w**	**80 w**	**73 w**	**14 w**	**21 w**	**11 w**	**15 w**	**10 w**	**12 w**	**−3 w**	**−6 w**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	19	..	69	..	20	..	12	..	14	..	−8	..
2 Bangladesh	6	c	86	100	7	12	8	(.)	10	8	1	−12
3 Lao PDR	..	21	..	58	..	40	..	21	..	2	..	−19
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	8	*13*	81	*81*	12	*9*	11	*6*	9	*12*	−1	*−3*
6 Mali	12	19	79	76	14	17	9	5	12	21	−5	−12
7 Nepal	..	c	..	98	..	9	..	2	..	5	..	−7
8 Somalia	8	19	89	79	10	16	3	2	11	12	−7	−14
9 Burundi	3	14	92	81	6	14	5	5	13	11	−1	−9
10 Chad	13	*18*	82	*89*	11	*17*	5	*−7*	23	*27*	*−6*	*−24*
11 Mozambique	11	15	81	86	10	10	8	−1	14	13	−2	−11
12 Burma	c	c	89	87	12	20	11	13	20	7	−1	−7
13 Upper Volta	10	13	94	90	10	25	−4	−3	9	15	−14	−28
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	7	10	79	70	17	24	14	20	5	..	−3	−4
16 Malawi	16	13	88	71	10	32	−4	16	21	21	−14	−16
17 Rwanda	10	9	82	87	6	10	8	4	12	20	2	−6
18 Sri Lanka	13	10	76	73	15	22	11	17	46	38	−4	−5
19 Guinea	14	16	80	68	5	15	6	16	23	28	1	1
20 Sierra Leone	..	19	..	72	..	17	..	9	..	22	..	−8
21 Zaire	18	*21*	61	*67*	12	*19*	21	*12*	55	*26*	9	*−7*
22 Niger	9	11	79	77	13	19	12	12	9	23	−1	−7
23 Benin	16	14	75	91	15	22	9	−5	12	22	−6	−27
24 Pakistan	11	11	84	82	12	18	5	7	8	10	−7	−11
25 Tanzania	9	14	72	79	14	20	19	7	31	15	5	−13
26 Afghanistan	c	c	87	90	16	13	13	10	4	10	−3	−3
27 Central African Rep.	19	20	72	72	20	20	9	8	23	18	−11	−12
28 Madagascar	20	16	75	63	11	16	5	21	12	..	−6	5
29 Haiti	c	*8*	93	*83*	9	*18*	7	*9*	20	*22*	−2	*−9*
30 Mauritania	24	*38*	79	*55*	37	*52*	−3	*7*	18	*41*	−40	*−45*
31 Lesotho	17	*17*	108	*154*	2	*30*	−25	*−71*	12	*22*	−27	*−101*
32 Uganda	9	c	75	98	11	4	16	2	26	4	5	−2
33 Angola	9	26	77	56	12	9	14	18	20	41	2	9
34 Sudan	6	14	85	84	9	16	9	2	12	15	(.)	−14
35 Togo	8	13	88	73	11	37	4	14	19	34	−7	−23
36 Kenya	11	19	72	63	20	28	17	18	31	27	−3	−10
37 Senegal	17	17	68	72	16	23	15	11	40	32	−1	−12
38 Indonesia	12	11	80	67	8	20	8	22	13	21	(.)	2
Middle-income countries	**11 w**	**13 w**	**66 w**	**65 w**	**21 w**	**25 w**	**20 w**	**22 w**	**13 w**	**21 w**	**−1 w**	**−3 w**
39 Egypt	17	21	71	65	13	28	12	14	20	21	−1	−14
40 Ghana	10	13	73	81	24	5	17	6	28	10	−7	1
41 Yemen, PDR	..	*29*	..	*80*	..	*47*	..	*−9*	..	..	..	*−56*
42 Cameroon	14	10	72	69	11	24	14	21	29	26	3	−3
43 Liberia	7	15	58	67	28	22	35	18	39	55	7	−4
44 Honduras	11	13	77	67	14	27	12	20	22	38	−2	−7
45 Zambia	11	25	48	44	25	31	41	31	56	32	16	(.)
46 Zimbabwe	11	*13*	67	*63*	23	*19*	22	*24*	..	..	−1	*5*
47 Thailand	10	11	76	67	16	27	14	22	17	21	−2	−5
48 Bolivia	7	13	86	74	14	21	7	13	13	17	−7	−8
49 Philippines	8	10	76	66	16	30	16	24	11	19	(.)	−6
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	*12*	..	*96*	..	*35*	..	*−8*	..	*3*	..	*−43*
51 Congo, People's Rep.	23	31	98	61	45	20	−21	8	21	..	−66	−12
52 Nigeria	6	*15*	87	*57*	13	*30*	7	*28*	15	*31*	−6	*−2*
53 Papua New Guinea	*28*	28	*70*	56	*13*	19	*2*	16	*17*	45	*−11*	−3
54 El Salvador	10	13	79	75	16	20	11	12	20	30	−5	−8
55 Morocco	12	21	77	68	10	24	11	11	24	18	1	−13
56 Peru	8	13	68	70	22	15	24	17	24	22	2	2
57 Ivory Coast	10	14	73	56	15	31	17	30	37	38	2	−1
58 Nicaragua	9	*8*	79	*73*	15	*25*	12	*19*	24	*33*	−3	*−6*
59 Colombia	6	7	73	68	21	24	21	25	16	16	(.)	1
60 Paraguay	8	7	76	73	17	27	16	20	18	13	−1	−7
61 Ecuador	10	14	74	60	14	26	16	26	17	24	2	(.)
62 Dominican Rep.	13	*5*	68	*77*	12	*23*	19	*18*	24	*21*	7	*−5*
63 Guatemala	8	7	84	76	10	22	8	17	13	22	−2	−5
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	..	21	..	65	..	32	..	14	..	18	..	−18
65 Tunisia	*17*	16	*76*	64	*17*	30	*7*	20	*20*	31	*−10*	−10
66 Jordan	..	32	..	87	..	40	..	−19	..	47	..	−59

	Distribution of gross domestic product (percent)											
	Public consumption		Private consumption		Gross domestic investment		Gross domestic saving		Exports of goods and nonfactor services		Resource balance	
	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]	1960[a]	1978[b]
67 Malaysia	11	16	62	53	14	25	27	31	54	51	13	6
68 Jamaica	7	20	67	64	30	15	26	16	34	40	—4	1
69 Lebanon	10	..	85	..	16	..	5	..	27	..	—11	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	15	12	84	60	11	32	1	28	3	34	—10	—4
71 Turkey	11	13	76	70	16	21	13	17	3	6	—3	—4
72 Algeria	16	15	50	48	42	51	34	37	28	27	—8	—14
73 Mexico	6	11	76	64	20	25	18	25	10	11	—2	(.)
74 Panama	11	18	78	60	16	28	11	22	31	40	—5	—6
75 Taiwan	19	17	68	50	20	26	13	33	11	59	—7	7
76 Chile	11	12	75	81	17	11	14	7	14	21	—3	—4
77 South Africa	9	14	64	56	22	24	27	30	30	33	5	6
78 Costa Rica	10	[c]	77	85	18	25	13	15	21	29	—5	—10
79 Brazil	12	10	67	69	22	23	21	21	5	7	—1	—2
80 Uruguay	9	3	79	73	18	14	12	14	14	20	—6	(.)
81 Argentina	9	29	71	41	22	25	20	30	10	14	—2	5
82 Portugal	11	14	77	74	19	23	12	12	17	20	—7	—11
83 Yugoslavia	19	*17*	49	*55*	37	*33*	32	*28*	14	*17*	—5	—5
84 Trinidad and Tobago	9	*14*	61	*53*	28	*26*	30	*33*	37	*47*	2	7
85 Venezuela	14	15	53	31	21	40	33	34	32	29	12	—6
86 Hong Kong	7	7	92	78	19	26	1	15	79	98	—18	—11
87 Greece	12	16	77	64	19	27	11	20	9	17	—8	—7
88 Singapore	8	11	89	62	11	36	3	27	163	164	—8	—9
89 Spain	7	11	70	68	21	20	23	21	10	16	2	1
90 Israel	18	36	78	58	27	24	14	6	14	44	—13	—18
[redacted]	[redacted]											
91 Ireland	12	19	77	64	16	27	11	17	31	54	—5	—10
92 Italy	12	16	64	63	24	20	24	21	15	25	(.)	1
93 New Zealand	13	16	65	61	24	22	22	23	23	27	—2	1
94 United Kingdom	17	20	66	59	19	19	17	21	21	30	—2	2
95 Finland	13	19	58	56	30	21	29	25	23	31	—1	4
96 Austria	13	18	59	55	28	28	28	27	24	35	(.)	—1
97 Japan	9	10	57	58	34	31	34	32	11	11	(.)	1
98 Australia	10	16	65	60	29	23	25	24	15	16	—4	1
99 France	13	15	61	61	24	23	26	24	15	21	2	1
100 Netherlands	14	18	57	59	27	22	29	23	50	47	2	1
101 Belgium	13	18	69	62	19	21	18	20	33	51	—1	—1
102 Canada	14	20	65	57	23	23	21	23	18	26	—2	(.)
103 Norway	14	18	58	54	30	29	28	28	41	42	—2	—1
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	14	20	57	55	27	22	29	25	19	25	2	3
105 United States	17	18	64	64	18	19	19	18	5	8	1	—1
106 Denmark	12	24	66	55	23	23	22	21	34	28	—1	—2
107 Sweden	16	29	60	53	25	18	24	18	23	29	—1	(.)
108 Switzerland	9	13	62	63	29	22	29	24	29	35	(.)	2
[redacted]	[redacted]											
109 Iraq	18	..	48	..	20	..	34	..	42	..	14	..
110 Iran	10	*20*	69	*41*	17	*33*	21	*39*	19	*34*	4	*6*
111 Libya	..	27	..	28	..	25	..	45	..	56	..	20
112 Saudi Arabia	..	21	..	23	..	30	..	56	..	62	..	26
113 Kuwait	..	21	..	24	..	18	..	55	..	71	..	37
[redacted]	[redacted]											
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
121 Hungary	7	8	72	64	24	37	21	28	..	..	—3	—9
122 Poland	8	12	68	59	24	32	24	29	..	..	(.)	—3
123 USSR	2	[c]	70	73	26	26	28	27	..	..	2	1
124 Czechoslovakia	6	7	75	68	17	25	19	25	..	..	2	(.)
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960.
b. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.
c. Separate figures are not available for public consumption which is therefore included in private consumption.

Table 6. Industrialization

	Distribution of value added (percent)					Value added in manufacturing (millions of 1970 dollars)		Gross manufacturing output per capita (1970 dollars)	
	Food and agriculture 1976[a]	Textiles and clothing 1976[a]	Machinery and transport equipment 1976[a]	Chemicals 1976[a]	Other manufacturing 1976[a]	1970	1976[a]	1970	1976[a]
Low-income countries									
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	..	..	..	..	..	324	320	11	13
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	..	..	..	..	..	149	171	12	13
6 Mali	..	..	..	..	..	26	..	..	..
7 Nepal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
8 Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	11	17	6	12
9 Burundi	..	..	..	..	..	19	*24*	..	..
10 Chad	..	..	..	..	..	18	27	..	..
11 Mozambique	*68*	*13*	..	*4*	*15*	104	82	28	..
12 Burma	40	20	..	..	40	225	271	..	..
13 Upper Volta	..	..	..	..	..	31	37	..	..
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	15	29	13	12	31	7,093	8,973	51	62
16 Malawi	77	7	..	..	16	38	53	29	*50*
17 Rwanda	..	..	..	..	..	6	3	4	..
18 Sri Lanka	*17*	*23*	..	*9*	*51*	321	346	..	..
19 Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	12	18	..	..
20 Sierra Leone	..	..	..	..	..	22	27	..	..
21 Zaire	*59*	*10*	*5*	*4*	*22*	155	170	..	..
22 Niger	..	..	..	..	..	40	..	..	..
23 Benin	*44*	*38*	..	..	*18*	19	*45*	..	..
24 Pakistan	46	35	..	9	10	1,462	1,757	..	..
25 Tanzania	..	..	..	..	..	116	156	27	..
26 Afghanistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
27 Central African Rep.	*31*	..	..	..	*69*	14	9	..	11
28 Madagascar	95	..	..	..	5	118	112	40	*44*
29 Haiti	65	15	..	1	19	..	..	..	..
30 Mauritania	..	..	..	..	..	18	228	..	..
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	2	2	..	..
32 Uganda	*53*	..	..	..	*47*	109	86	..	..
33 Angola	*67*	..	..	..	*33*	80	38	..	..
34 Sudan	*41*	*36*	*3*	*11*	*9*	252	368	51	..
35 Togo	..	..	..	..	..	24	..	28	..
36 Kenya	*18*	*13*	*19*	*8*	*42*	174	357	55	116
37 Senegal	58	15	..	13	14	141	190	..	*98*
38 Indonesia	41	16	..	..	43	854	1,671	28	40
Middle-income countries									
39 Egypt	*17*	*34*	*11*	*13*	*25*	1,326	1,882	146	..
40 Ghana	*75*	..	..	..	*25*	253	186	58	..
41 Yemen, PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon	65	..	..	..	35	119	170	..	..
43 Liberia	..	..	..	..	..	15	27	..	..
44 Honduras	51	16	1	3	29	91	126	..	130
45 Zambia	55	9	6	5	25	181	213	107	..
46 Zimbabwe	26	14	11	11	38	297	..	142	..
47 Thailand	*45*	*17*	*8*	*15*	*15*	1,048	2,101	134	..
48 Bolivia	*35*	*22*	*5*	*4*	*34*	151	222	94	134
49 Philippines	44	13	6	13	24	1,579	2,334	108	..
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	12	23	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.	*68*	..	..	..	*32*	32	40	60	..
52 Nigeria	92	..	..	..	8	529	1,122	17	*42*
53 Papua New Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
54 El Salvador	45	31	..	10	14	194	280	..	*155*
55 Morocco	41	14	6	7	32	599	879	..	..
56 Peru	31	10	12	16	31	982	1,448	177	198
57 Ivory Coast	..	..	..	..	..	200	292	..	140
58 Nicaragua	61	29	..	..	10	159	226	..	..
59 Colombia	*33*	*18*	*10*	*12*	*27*	1,143	1,746	127	*172*
60 Paraguay	48	16	4	4	28	99	136	..	..
61 Ecuador	33	16	9	4	38	271	452	119	*176*
62 Dominican Rep.	*68*	*5*	*(.)*	*4*	*23*	275	455	133	*192*
63 Guatemala	*50*	*37*	..	*4*	*9*	..	..	..	..
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	50	33	..	3	14	238	458	117	*100*
65 Tunisia	*65*	*10*	..	*22*	*3*	115	234	90	163
66 Jordan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

	Distribution of value added (percent)					Value added in manufacturing (millions of 1970 dollars)		Gross manufacturing output per capita (1970 dollars)	
	Food and agriculture 1976[a]	Textiles and clothing 1976[a]	Machinery and transport equipment 1976[a]	Chemicals 1976[a]	Other manufacturing 1976[a]	1970	1976[a]	1970	1976[a]
67 Malaysia	35	8	11	12	34	543	1,10[illegible]	178	..
68 Jamaica	87	..	..	..	13	221	23[illegible]	348	..
69 Lebanon	..	..	..	..	..	202	..	..	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	15	25	24	8	28	1,431	3,934	111	320
71 Turkey	55	23	..	..	22	1,930	3,294	106	217
72 Algeria	*29*	*18*	*11*	*6*	*36*	735	1,117	..	..
73 Mexico	21	13	19	14	33	8,636	12,174	..	..
74 Panama	44	7	3	3	43	166	186	276	386
75 Taiwan	..	..	..	..	..	1,873	4,278	..	..
76 Chile	18	8	7	4	63	2,175	1,828	388	293
77 South Africa	17	13	16	12	42	3,959	..	432	..
78 Costa Rica	*42*	*12*	*6*	*10*	*30*	180	292	..	..
79 Brazil	15	10	30	12	33	9,972	19,147	229	..
80 Uruguay	42	19	4	9	26	515	578	..	489
81 Argentina	17	13	24	13	33	6,777	8,248	..	..
82 Portugal	17	19	23	9	32	1,847	2,481	..	721
83 Yugoslavia	9	14	24	10	43	3,235	5,423	411	846
84 Trinidad and Tobago	54	..	..	3	43	184	169	..	*218*
85 Venezuela	*29*	*12*	*11*	*6*	*42*	1,827	2,719	..	*423*
86 Hong Kong	..	98	..	..	2	899	1,314	..	844
87 Greece	16	29	10	7	38	1,642	2,601	498	832
88 Singapore	7	5	49	7	32	388	707	764	1,247
89 Spain	27	10	20	11	32	9,339	15,739	868	1,523
90 Israel	11	17	26	7	39	1,101	..	833	..
[illegible]									
91 Ireland	31	16	12	11	30	1,186	..	..	..
92 Italy	13	14	27	11	35	29,059	35,586	1,251	1,578
93 New Zealand	*26*	*15*	*12*	*5*	*42*	..	..	..	..
94 United Kingdom	14	9	30	12	35	34,317	35,381	1,493	1,640
95 Finland	13	10	25	6	46	2,788	3,467	1,731	2,039
96 Austria	15	12	22	8	43	4,873	6,188	1,706	2,339
97 Japan	8	7	36	11	38	73,167	103,478	1,816	2,561
98 Australia	17	8	24	9	42	8,498	..	1,712	..
99 France	13	6	35	8	38	40,510	53,113	..	2,429
100 Netherlands	20	6	22	19	33	9,192	11,708	2,137	*2,391*
101 Belgium	18	10	29	9	34	8,226	10,636	..	..
102 Canada	14	8	26	8	44	16,802	21,341	1,947	2,496
103 Norway	14	5	25	6	50	2,442	2,882	1,606	2,312
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	9	7	33	11	40	75,765	85,732	2,184	2,636
105 United States	12	8	31	12	37	252,100	292,900	2,586	3,126
106 Denmark	23	8	26	7	36	3,100	..	1,485	*2,149*
107 Sweden	9	5	33	6	47	8,516	9,530	2,319	2,538
108 Switzerland	11	8	38	15	28	..	..	..	..
[illegible]									
109 Iraq	37	23	..	2	38	325	652	77	*144*
110 Iran	14	34	34	5	13	1,501	3,720	140	..
111 Libya	..	..	..	..	..	82	198	88	*142*
112 Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	..	..	372	486	..	..
113 Kuwait	..	..	..	..	..	106	..	199	..
[illegible]									
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	*72*	..	..	..	*28*	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	*15*	*18*	*32*	*9*	*26*	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	25	15	27	5	28	..	..	..	..
121 Hungary	12	11	32	5	40	..	..	..	..
122 Poland	17	15	27	10	31	..	..	..	..
123 USSR	10	6	..	7	77	..	..	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia	7	11	37	7	38	..	..	..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	11	12	36	11	30	..	..	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1975, not 1976.

Table 7. Energy

	Average annual growth rate (percent)				Energy consumption per capita (kilograms of coal equivalent)		Energy consumption per dollar of GDP (kilograms of coal equivalent)		Energy imports as percentage of merchandise exports	
	Energy production		Energy consumption							
	1960–74[a]	1974–78	1960–74	1974–78	1960	1978	1960	1978[b]	1960[c]	1977[d]
Low-income countries	**[illegible] w**	**[illegible] w**	**[illegible] w**	**[illegible] w**	**[illegible] w**	**161 w**	**0.8 w**	**1.0 w**	**9 w**	**16 w**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	–0.1	5.9	31	4	..	..	9	..
2 Bangladesh	..	12.8	..	16.5	..	43	..	0.3	..	48
3 Lao PDR	..	–0.6	13.4	1.5	18	60	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	14.1	1.8	14.7	–7.8	8	20	0.1	0.2	11	*27*
6 Mali	..	10.8	5.5	5.9	15	30	0.2	0.3	13	*25*
7 Nepal	27.2	4.3	12.3	0.9	5	11	(.)	0.1	..	..
8 Somalia	..	..	7.4	27.4	19	55	0.2	0.6	4	*13*
9 Burundi	..	23.4	..	3.1	..	12	..	0.1	..	7
10 Chad	..	..	7.2	5.0	10	22	0.1	0.2	23	*27*
11 Mozambique	3.2	29.9	5.7	4.4	114	151	0.4	0.5	11	*28*
12 Burma	4.8	11.2	3.6	4.9	55	64	0.5	0.5	4	*12*
13 Upper Volta	..	..	6.5	10.9	5	25	0.1	0.3	38	*19*
14 Viet Nam	..	12.3	..	–9.0	..	125	..	..	..	..
15 India	4.4	5.5	4.9	5.1	108	176	1.0	1.2	11	26
16 Malawi	..	9.4	..	2.8	..	52	..	0.3	..	15
17 Rwanda	..	2.8	..	11.2	..	17	..	0.1	..	*11*
18 Sri Lanka	10.4	3.5	6.2	0.8	107	109	0.7	0.5	8	22
19 Guinea	*16.1*	(.)	3.2	1.8	65	91	0.3	*0.4*	7	..
20 Sierra Leone	..	..	10.3	–0.6	31	100	0.3	0.5	11	*10*
21 Zaire	3.0	53.5	4.3	2.0	87	69	0.9	1.0	3	*16*
22 Niger	..	..	14.3	7.5	5	38	(.)	0.2	*6*	..
23 Benin	..	..	8.8	–4.5	39	56	0.2	0.3	16	*43*
24 Pakistan	10.0	2.4	5.9	1.0	61	172	1.3	1.0	*17*	33
25 Tanzania	10.6	13.4	10.4	0.5	41	65	0.3	0.4	..	*22*
26 Afghanistan	39.7	–4.2	9.4	1.3	15	47	0.2	0.4	12	12
27 Central African Rep.	14.2	4.7	7.4	8.7	37	44	0.1	0.2	12	1
28 Madagascar	6.8	3.5	8.9	2.3	38	78	0.2	0.4	9	*22*
29 Haiti	..	17.4	2.8	11.1	36	57	0.2	0.3	..	17
30 Mauritania	..	..	16.8	4.3	18	203	0.1	0.7	39	*6*
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda	5.2	–4.1	9.5	–0.3	30	48	0.1	0.2	5	*4*
33 Angola	35.8	0.2	8.8	1.9	86	192	0.2	0.5	6	2
34 Sudan	..	16.8	13.2	1.4	52	172	0.2	0.7	8	*26*
35 Togo	..	..	12.5	12.3	23	96	0.1	0.3	10	1
36 Kenya	9.3	10.5	4.2	–0.6	143	139	0.8	0.5	18	24
37 Senegal	..	..	4.6	4.7	121	181	0.3	0.5	8	*15*
38 Indonesia	8.5	11.3	4.2	21.4	129	278	0.8	1.1	3	7
Middle-income countries	**8.0 w**	**1.7 w**	**7.8 w**	**6.2 w**	**[illegible] w**	**[illegible] w**	**0.7 w**	**1.1 w**	**11 w**	**[illegible] w**
39 Egypt	9.8	31.6	2.7	11.7	298	463	1.7	1.4	12	6
40 Ghana	..	2.7	6.6	0.6	106	165	0.2	0.4	7	*18*
41 Yemen, PDR	..	..	–13.6	11.2	299	523	..	*2.6*	..	..
42 Cameroon	1.1	3.1	4.0	10.2	55	119	0.2	*0.3*	7	10
43 Liberia	31.8	–1.3	19.3	–0.6	86	395	0.2	0.9	3	*12*
44 Honduras	29.5	5.6	8.9	8.9	155	284	0.5	0.7	10	14
45 Zambia	..	4.4	..	1.8	..	474	..	1.2	..	5
46 Zimbabwe	1.9	–3.9	..	(.)	..	579	..	1.2	..	..
47 Thailand	28.0	11.4	16.9	7.6	64	327	0.3	0.8	12	29
48 Bolivia	17.2	–2.0	7.0	11.3	147	368	0.5	0.8	4	*1*
49 Philippines	5.6	12.4	9.6	6.3	147	339	0.6	0.8	9	33
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	..	12.7	20.1	7	53	..	0.3	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.	15.7	–9.3	5.2	–0.7	119	175	0.3	0.3	25	2
52 Nigeria	37.4	–2.9	10.2	8.1	34	106	0.1	0.2	7	2
53 Papua New Guinea	..	16.2	..	3.0	51	292	0.2	0.6	7	*13*
54 El Salvador	5.1	20.9	7.7	6.3	127	265	0.4	0.6	6	*10*
55 Morocco	1.9	4.4	7.7	6.6	148	285	0.4	0.5	9	28
56 Peru	3.5	13.4	6.2	2.4	445	649	0.8	0.8	4	23
57 Ivory Coast	9.7	–3.8	15.5	7.3	76	357	0.2	0.4	5	9
58 Nicaragua	26.6	–9.5	10.0	8.5	174	517	0.4	*0.7*	12	17
59 Colombia	3.4	–1.8	6.3	4.3	491	700	1.3	1.2	3	6
60 Paraguay	..	7.0	8.5	8.8	87	200	0.2	0.3	..	*30*
61 Ecuador	19.0	3.1	8.3	10.2	201	505	..	0.8	2	1
62 Dominican Rep.	4.4	8.4	14.6	–7.0	157	464	0.3	0.6	..	22
63 Guatemala	9.9	20.9	6.1	4.9	174	260	0.4	0.4	12	*15*
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	86.2	11.8	9.0	18.3	321	968	0.7	1.2	16	42
65 Tunisia	73.4	0.1	9.5	8.7	190	543	..	0.6	15	22
66 Jordan	..	..	6.5	15.2	197	535	0.7	1.3	79	53

	Average annual growth rate (percent)				Energy consumption per capita (kilograms of coal equivalent)		Energy consumption per dollar of GDP (kilograms of coal equivalent)		Energy imports as percentage of merchandise exports	
	Energy production		Energy consumption							
	1960–74[a]	1974–78	1960–74	1974–78	1960	1978	1960	1978[b]	1960[c]	1977[d]
67 Malaysia	37.4	27.1	11.1	4.7	242	716	0.6	0.8	2	10
68 Jamaica	–0.7	–2.8	11.2	0.3	426	1,823	0.2	1.5	11	32
69 Lebanon	12.7	–0.6	6.3	–3.4	548	936	..	..	68	*4*
70 Korea, Rep. of	6.3	3.2	13.2	9.6	258	1,359	1.2	1.8	70	22
71 Turkey	7.6	–0.8	9.9	9.4	245	793	0.5	0.8	16	79
72 Algeria	11.7	6.7	12.2	13.7	252	687	0.3	0.7	14	2
73 Mexico	6.0	12.6	7.7	6.7	770	1,384	0.9	1.0	3	4
74 Panama	14.8	4.4	10.5	7.1	448	991	0.7	0.9	..	..
75 Taiwan	2.3	1.4	8.6	14.5	583	2,202	1.5	1.9	..	*15*
76 Chile	4.0	–1.5	6.1	–0.8	845	997	1.2	1.1	10	*25*
77 South Africa	3.8	8.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	1
78 Costa Rica	9.5	4.7	10.4	5.6	233	564	0.4	0.5	7	13
79 Brazil	8.1	5.6	8.6	7.0	332	794	0.6	0.6	21	37
80 Uruguay	3.7	7.3	3.1	1.9	825	1,054	0.7	0.8	35	27
81 Argentina	6.5	2.2	5.7	2.2	1,129	1,873	0.9	1.4	14	12
82 Portugal	4.4	–5.9	8.3	2.3	382	1,030	0.5	0.6	17	36
83 Yugoslavia	4.7	3.2	7.1	4.8	872	2,035	1.3	1.2	8	23
84 Trinidad and Tobago	2.8	5.9	4.8	5.5	1,775	4,965	1.0	1.9	35	39
85 Venezuela	1.2	–6.3	6.6	5.3	1,694	2,989	1.1	1.2	1	..
86 Hong Kong	..	..	6.8	12.2	468	1,657	0.7	0.7	5	7
87 Greece	14.3	10.8	13.2	4.1	460	1,925	0.5	0.7	26	38
88 Singapore	..	..	16.8	9.3	372	2,461	0.4	0.8	17	32
89 Spain	2.5	4.3	8.5	3.9	756	2,405	0.6	0.8	22	49
90 Israel	41.9	–71.2	9.6	2.8	1,270	2,362	0.7	0.6	17	25
[illegible]	[illegible]									
91 Ireland	0.1	3.8	4.7	2.6	1,838	3,292	1.2	1.1	17	15
92 Italy	2.2	–1.6	8.3	1.8	1,086	3,230	0.6	0.9	18	27
93 New Zealand	5.2	11.4	5.7	3.8	2,277	3,790	0.7	0.9	7	16
94 United Kingdom	–1.2	13.5	1.7	0.3	4,861	5,212	1.6	1.2	14	16
95 Finland	3.3	9.0	9.1	2.7	1,529	5,205	0.5	0.9	11	23
96 Austria	1.5	–1.5	5.1	1.1	2,129	4,048	0.8	0.7	12	15
97 Japan	–1.7	–0.8	10.7	1.5	1,171	3,825	0.8	0.7	18	39
98 Australia	11.1	5.3	5.6	3.6	3,857	6,622	0.8	0.7	12	9
99 France	–1.3	0.6	5.8	1.6	2,474	4,368	0.7	0.6	16	24
100 Netherlands	16.2	–1.6	8.7	–1.5	2,504	5,327	0.7	0.8	15	19
101 Belgium	–7.2	(.)	4.9	0.2	3,851	6,078	1.1	0.9	11	15
102 Canada	8.9	–1.3	6.0	1.7	5,750	9,930	1.3	1.3	9	9
103 Norway	6.8	37.5	5.9	4.0	2,702	5,571	0.7	0.7	15	16
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	–0.7	–0.7	4.5	1.5	3,695	6,015	0.9	0.8	7	15
105 United States	3.5	–0.5	4.1	1.6	8,172	11,374	1.6	1.4	8	37
106 Denmark	–20.1	49.9	5.5	3.7	2,830	5,423	0.6	0.7	15	22
107 Sweden	3.6	4.6	4.9	2.5	3,572	5,954	0.7	0.7	16	19
108 Switzerland	4.2	4.0	5.9	1.4	1,873	3,690	0.3	0.4	10	10
[illegible]	[illegible]								..	(.)
109 Iraq	4.9	6.9	5.9	1.0	487	633	0.7	*0.5*	(.)	(.)
110 Iran	14.5	–1.5	15.6	11.9	270	1,808	0.4	*0.9*	1	(.)
111 Libya	29.1	8.9	17.9	21.8	251	1,889	0.1	0.3	83	(.)
112 Saudi Arabia	14.1	2.3	14.4	16.1	267	1,306	..	0.2	..	(.)
113 Kuwait	4.6	–4.2	6.7	12.2	10,396	6,771	0.4	0.6	..	(.)
[illegible]	[illegible]								..	..
114 China	4.5	9.1	3.6	9.0	637	805	..	4.2	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	9.1	4.3	9.1	4.3	989	2,702	3.8	4.4	..	..
116 Albania	10.1	6.3	12.5	12.8	30[illegible]	998	1.1	1.7	..	..
117 Cuba	20.6	–19.4	4.4	2.7	[illegible]12	1,168	1.0	1.8	..	*39*
118 Mongolia	10.4	9.3	7.3	8.1	540	1,240	0.8	1.6	..	..
119 Romania	5.8	1.6	8.0	4.5	1,342	4,042	3.8	2.7	..	..
120 Bulgaria	3.3	0.8	9.8	3.6	1,303	5,020	1.2	1.9	7	..
121 Hungary	1.8	2.0	3.9	3.0	2,072	3,451	1.5	1.2	13	14
122 Poland	3.9	4.2	4.1	5.8	3,107	5,596	2.1	1.8	..	..
123 USSR	5.6	5.5	5.3	4.2	2,839	5,500	1.9	1.8	4	*4*
124 Czechoslovakia	1.3	2.6	3.1	4.0	4,741	7,531	1.9	1.9	..	*15*
125 German Dem. Rep.	0.5	1.2	2.1	2.1	4,950	7,121	1.8	1.5	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1961–74, not 1960–74.
b. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.
c. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960.
d. Figures in italics are for 1976, not 1977.

Table 8. Growth of Merchandise Trade

	Merchandise trade (millions of dollars)		Average annual growth rate[a] (percent)				Terms of trade (1979 = 100)	
			Exports		Imports			
	Exports 1978[b]	Imports 1978[b]	1960–70	1970–78	1960–70	1970–78	1960	1978
Low-income countries	**28,749 t**	**32,073 t**	**5.0 m**	**–0.8 m**	**5.0 m**	**3.2 m**	**98 m**	**98 m**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	–3.3	..	–3.0	..	102	136
2 Bangladesh	576	1,294	6.6	–4.7	7.0	–2.9	155	74
3 Lao PDR	*9*	*54*	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	310	522	3.7	–5.4	6.2	–0.2	75	126
6 Mali	107	219	3.1	7.7	–0.4	5.0	91	93
7 Nepal	87	227	..	..	..	..	..	..
8 Somalia	107	241	2.3	7.8	2.6	13.7	107	72
9 Burundi	67	98	..	..	..	..	..	..
10 Chad	102	192	5.9	–3.0	5.0	1.7	106	122
11 Mozambique	*129*	*278*	6.0	–15.9	7.8	–13.4	103	96
12 Burma	243	309	–11.6	0.5	–5.7	–4.6	101	83
13 Upper Volta	57	210	14.4	8.5	7.8	9.4	75	89
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	6,614	7,954	3.1	6.0	–0.9	3.2	104	80
16 Malawi	187	339	11.6	2.4	7.7	4.2	116	112
17 Rwanda	70	179	15.7	3.6	8.0	11.7	89	123
18 Sri Lanka	846	939	4.6	–3.8	–0.3	–2.7	175	124
19 Guinea	*314*	273	..	..	..	..	..	..
20 Sierra Leone	161	278	0.3	–3.1	1.9	–4.0	89	77
21 Zaire	925	589	–1.8	–4.1	5.5	–10.4	61	61
22 Niger	158	346	6.0	13.2	11.9	5.5	90	78
23 Benin	26	267	5.0	–13.6	7.5	6.8	89	79
24 Pakistan	1,471	3,275	8.2	–1.3	4.2	5.9	93	82
25 Tanzania	457	1,117	3.5	–6.0	6.0	–1.0	96	104
26 Afghanistan	322	681	2.4	2.4	0.8	8.1	99	133
27 Central African Rep.	72	57	8.1	1.8	4.5	–0.9	93	103
28 Madagascar	387	443	5.4	–0.9	4.0	–4.0	116	87
29 Haiti	152	140	..	..	..	..	..	..
30 Mauritania	119	181	55.2	–0.8	4.6	6.3	112	68
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda	350	255	5.0	–5.3	6.2	–7.6	95	106
33 Angola	*500*	*340*	9.0	–8.9	11.6	–4.7	89	145
34 Sudan	533	1,198	2.1	–3.2	1.1	6.4	100	92
35 Togo	235	381	10.5	0.3	8.4	12.4	95	105
36 Kenya	1,022	1,709	7.2	0.8	6.3	(.)	112	104
37 Senegal	391	788	1.2	4.4	2.7	4.7	91	100
38 Indonesia	11,643	6,690	3.5	7.2	1.9	15.8	138	225
Middle-income countries	**176,936 t**	**201,663 t**	**5.5 m**	**5.2 m**	**6.8 m**	**5.8 m**	**93 m**	**90 m**
39 Egypt	1,901	6,480	3.2	–2.3	–0.9	16.6	104	92
40 Ghana	1,304	1,266	0.1	–0.1	–1.6	2.7	92	80
41 Yemen, PDR	105	590	..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon	803	1,057	6.9	2.4	9.3	6.7	90	97
43 Liberia	486	481	18.3	1.5	2.8	2.0	194	85
44 Honduras	596	693	11.1	2.9	11.7	2.6	91	77
45 Zambia	832	611	2.2	–4.7	9.8	–6.9	50	56
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	4,085	5,256	5.2	12.2	11.2	5.6	118	82
48 Bolivia	627	768	9.7	1.7	8.1	12.2	69	130
49 Philippines	3,425	5,143	2.2	5.4	7.2	4.7	73	69
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	34	1,043	..	..	..	..	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.	138	334	4.9	14.7	–1.0	6.7	98	114
52 Nigeria	9,483	12,857	6.1	0.5	1.7	25.0	97	290
53 Papua New Guinea	780	676	..	..	..	..	..	..
54 El Salvador	629	1,025	5.6	0.6	6.4	8.4	94	106
55 Morocco	1,511	2,970	2.5	2.6	3.3	13.7	103	86
56 Peru	1,949	1,960	1.9	–3.8	3.6	3.1	63	77
57 Ivory Coast	2,322	2,325	8.8	8.5	9.7	10.6	89	94
58 Nicaragua	594	646	9.7	5.6	10.3	4.2	88	90
59 Colombia	3,018	3,060	2.2	1.2	2.4	–0.7	90	107
60 Paraguay	257	319	5.4	7.6	7.5	8.0	92	107
61 Ecuador	1,494	1,627	3.7	9.5	11.6	12.7	110	129
62 Dominican Rep.	604	860	–2.3	6.7	10.0	4.5	77	62
63 Guatemala	1,090	1,286	9.0	3.4	7.1	7.1	97	100
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	1,053	2,437	3.2	7.1	4.2	15.5	94	139
65 Tunisia	1,126	2,162	4.1	21.1	2.2	30.3	104	133
66 Jordan	297	1,499	10.1	21.5	3.6	16.3	99	84

	Merchandise trade (millions of dollars)		Average annual growth rate[a] (percent)				Terms of trade (1970 = 100)	
			Exports		Imports			
	Exports 1978[b]	Imports 1978[b]	1960–70	1970–78	1960–70	1970–78	1960	1978
67 Malaysia	7,413	5,929	6.1	5.2	2.7	6.8	139	119
68 Jamaica	710	872	4.7	–2.7	8.2	–5.9	100	90
69 Lebanon	625	1,696	14.1	5.7	5.1	(.)	78	87
70 Korea, Rep. of	12,711	14,972	35.2	28.8	20.1	13.5	78	81
71 Turkey	2,288	4,597	1.6	2.5	5.5	8.1	..	71
72 Algeria	5,866	8,531	4.1	–0.8	–1.0	16.6	115	281
73 Mexico	5,739	7,744	3.3	5.2	6.4	4.0	87	108
74 Panama	244	942	10.4	2.2	10.4	–3.4	89	61
75 Taiwan	12,682	11,033	23.7	9.3	17.9	9.1	79	75
76 Chile	2,481	2,595	0.6	6.5	4.7	–0.9	53	50
77 South Africa	7,182	7,193	5.5	6.7	8.2	–1.8	100	75
78 Costa Rica	816	1,184	9.4	5.9	10.0	4.7	103	81
79 Brazil	12,527	14,538	5.0	6.0	4.9	6.6	88	90
80 Uruguay	686	774	2.1	–5.0	–2.8	2.3	99	82
81 Argentina	6,400	3,834	3.5	6.8	0.3	–0.1	101	95
82 Portugal	2,393	4,791	9.6	–5.9	14.1	4.7	83	86
83 Yugoslavia	5,659	9,987	7.8	4.8	9.0	4.9	96	98
84 Trinidad and Tobago	2,039	1,967	5.0	–1.3	3.2	–4.4	115	109
85 Venezuela	9,126	10,614	2.0	–10.1	4.3	14.9	112	292
86 Hong Kong	11,499	13,452	12.7	4.8	9.2	3.2	..	97
87 Greece	3,341	7,648	10.7	13.1	10.9	5.9	92	93
88 Singapore	10,134	13,049	4.2	9.8	5.9	8.1	..	..
89 Spain	13,115	18,708	11.6	11.0	18.4	3.3	93	68
90 Israel	3,716	5,582	10.9	10.6	8.7	4.5	91	83
Industrialized countries	*537,596 t*	*[illegible]*	*8.7 m*	*5.7 m*	*9.4 m*	*5.1 m*	*99 m*	*95 m*
91 Ireland	5,678	7,097	7.2	8.4	8.2	6.3	94	108
92 Italy	56,047	56,446	13.5	7.2	9.7	2.7	104	80
93 New Zealand	3,752	3,500	4.6	2.4	3.0	3.3	115	94
94 United Kingdom	71,691	78,557	4.8	5.5	5.0	4.6	95	94
95 Finland	8,618	7,864	6.7	3.0	7.1	1.6	98	97
96 Austria	12,205	16,013	9.6	6.8	9.7	7.2	100	97
97 Japan	97,501	78,731	17.5	9.7	13.7	5.0	102	68
98 Australia	14,127	13,885	6.5	4.0	7.2	5.1	116	98
99 France	76,609	81,805	8.3	7.3	10.9	6.7	93	96
100 Netherlands	50,188	53,082	9.9	5.7	9.4	4.4	100	92
101 Belgium	44,853	48,376	10.8	5.7	10.3	6.0	110	92
102 Canada	46,065	43,434	9.9	4.3	9.3	7.1	98	102
103 Norway	10,011	11,473	9.1	6.3	9.5	5.1	91	102
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	142,090	120,668	10.2	6.9	10.0	6.3	90	104
105 United States	141,154	182,787	6.0	6.5	9.8	5.4	93	77
106 Denmark	11,886	14,810	7.1	4.2	8.1	3.4	108	94
107 Sweden	21,560	20,123	7.7	2.3	7.3	2.3	109	94
108 Switzerland	23,561	23,804	9.0	5.1	8.5	2.3	91	112
Capital-surplus oil exporters	*94,107 t*	*[illegible]*	*9.8 m*	*–1.2 m*	*11.1 m*	*[illegible] m*	*107 m*	*[illegible] m*
109 Iraq	11,006	4,213	7.3	0.6	1.3	21.1	112	403
110 Iran	22,430	16,019	12.7	–1.2	11.3	22.9	108	373
111 Libya	9,503	4,603	61.0	–7.0	15.4	18.7	98	280
112 Saudi Arabia	40,716	20,424	9.5	6.2	11.1	41.5	107	396
113 Kuwait	10,450	4,607	6.9	–9.7	10.4	19.2	105	393
Centrally planned economies	*[illegible] t*	*[illegible] t*	..	..	..	..	..	..
114 China	10,680	11,950	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	950	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	4,456	4,687	3.9	13.5	5.5	4.5	112	66
118 Mongolia	281	417	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	8,237	9,087	9.9	..	10.5	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	7,478	7,651	14.5	10.7	12.8	10.8	..	..
121 Hungary	6,345	7,902	9.7	13.0	9.1	12.2	..	83
122 Poland	14,114	16,089	10.0	9.3	8.9	11.4	..	103
123 USSR	52,216	50,550	..	7.8	..	10.2	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia	11,747	12,565	6.6	6.0	6.9	6.5	..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	13,267	14,572	8.3	7.9	8.6	8.0	..	..

a. See the technical notes.
b. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.

Table 9. Structure of Merchandise Exports

	Percentage share of merchandise exports									
	Fuels, minerals and metals		Other primary commodities		Textiles and clothing		Machinery and transport equipment		Other manufactures	
	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977
Low-income countries	**13 w**	**37 w**	**70 w**	**44 w**	**12 w**	**7 w**	**(.) w**	**2 w**	**5 w**	**10 w**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	0	0	100	80	0	6	0	(.)	0	14
2 Bangladesh	..	2	..	42	..	45	..	1	..	10
3 Lao PDR	..	20	..	65	..	1	..	0	..	14
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	0	0	100	97	0	(.)	1	1	0	2
6 Mali	*0*	(.)	*96*	98	*1*	(.)	*1*	1	*2*	1
7 Nepal	..	(.)	..	82	..	1	..	1	..	16
8 Somalia	*0*	0	*88*	97	*0*	0	*8*	3	*4*	0
9 Burundi	..	8	..	91	..	0	..	0	..	1
10 Chad	65	0	32	96	0	1	0	0	3	3
11 Mozambique	0	11	100	86	0	2	0	0	0	1
12 Burma	4	6	95	88	0	0	0	1	1	5
13 Upper Volta	0	(.)	100	95	0	(.)	0	1	(.)	4
14 Viet Nam	..	12	..	32	..	33	..	(.)	..	23
15 India	10	9	45	35	35	20	1	6	9	30
16 Malawi	..	(.)	..	96	..	2	..	(.)	..	2
17 Rwanda	..	10	..	90	..	0	..	0	..	(.)
18 Sri Lanka	(.)	6	99	82	0	2	0	(.)	1	10
19 Guinea	..	65	..	15	..	0	..	(.)	..	20
20 Sierra Leone	15	8	20	48	0	0	0	0	65	44
21 Zaire	42	71	57	21	0	0	0	1	1	7
22 Niger	..	31	100	35	0	1	0	0	0	33
23 Benin	0	6	100	85	0	2	(.)	0	0	7
24 Pakistan	0	5	73	36	23	44	1	2	3	13
25 Tanzania	(.)	4	87	90	0	1	0	(.)	13	5
26 Afghanistan	(.)	13	82	74	14	12	3	0	1	1
27 Central African Rep.	12	(.)	86	76	(.)	(.)	1	(.)	1	24
28 Madagascar	4	14	90	78	1	4	1	0	4	4
29 Haiti	0	12	100	53	0	7	0	3	0	25
30 Mauritania	*4*	87	*69*	9	*1*	(.)	*20*	(.)	*6*	4
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda	*8*	1	*92*	99	*0*	(.)	*0*	(.)	(.)	(.)
33 Angola	..	64	..	28	..	0	..	1	..	7
34 Sudan	0	5	100	95	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
35 Togo	0	49	96	45	0	3	0	2	4	1
36 Kenya	*1*	18	*87*	72	*0*	(.)	*0*	1	*12*	9
37 Senegal	3	13	94	80	1	1	1	(.)	1	6
38 Indonesia	33	71	67	27	0	(.)	(.)	1	(.)	1
Middle-income countries	**25 w**	**33 w**	**61 w**	**30 w**	**4 w**	**10 w**	**2 w**	**9 w**	**8 w**	**18 w**
39 Egypt	4	26	84	49	9	18	(.)	(.)	3	7
40 Ghana	7	16	83	80	0	0	0	0	10	4
41 Yemen, PDR	..	82	..	17	..	(.)	..	(.)	..	1
42 Cameroon	19	5	77	91	0	1	2	1	2	2
43 Liberia	45	64	55	34	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	2
44 Honduras	5	6	93	84	0	2	0	0	2	8
45 Zambia	..	94	..	2	..	0	..	(.)	..	4
46 Zimbabwe	71	..	25	..	1	..	(.)	..	3	..
47 Thailand	7	9	91	72	0	8	0	2	2	9
48 Bolivia	..	79	..	17	..	1	..	(.)	..	3
49 Philippines	10	17	86	58	1	5	0	2	3	18
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	(.)	..	90	..	3	..	1	..	6
51 Congo, People's Rep.	7	60	84	24	(.)	0	5	2	4	14
52 Nigeria	8	93	89	6	0	0	0	(.)	3	1
53 Papua New Guinea	0	35	92	63	0	0	0	0	8	2
54 El Salvador	0	2	94	78	3	7	(.)	2	3	11
55 Morocco	38	46	54	33	1	10	1	1	6	10
56 Peru	49	47	50	45	0	2	0	1	1	5
57 Ivory Coast	1	4	98	89	0	2	(.)	2	1	3
58 Nicaragua	3	1	95	82	0	3	0	1	2	13
59 Colombia	19	4	79	77	0	5	(.)	3	2	11
60 Paraguay	0	0	100	91	0	0	0	0	0	9
61 Ecuador	0	50	99	48	0	1	0	(.)	1	1
62 Dominican Rep.	6	3	92	79	0	(.)	0	1	2	17
63 Guatemala	2	1	95	82	1	4	0	1	2	12
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	0	62	81	28	2	4	0	3	17	3
65 Tunisia	24	49	66	17	1	19	1	1	8	14
66 Jordan	0	31	96	38	0	4	0	1	4	26

	Percentage share of merchandise exports									
	Fuels, minerals and metals		Other primary commodities		Textiles and clothing		Machinery and transport equipment		Other manufactures	
	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977	1960[a]	1977
67 Malaysia	20	27	74	56	(.)	2	(.)	7	6	8
68 Jamaica	50	24	45	21	2	1	0	0	3	54
69 Lebanon	..	3	..	27	..	11	..	26	..	33
70 Korea, Rep. of	30	2	56	13	8	32	(.)	17	6	36
71 Turkey	8	8	89	67	0	18	0	1	3	6
72 Algeria	12	97	81	2	0	(.)	1	(.)	6	1
73 Mexico	24	32	64	39	4	4	1	6	7	19
74 Panama	..	28	..	63	..	3	..	1	..	5
75 Taiwan	..	14	..	37	..	23	..	3	..	23
76 Chile	92	83	4	10	0	(.)	0	(.)	4	7
77 South Africa	29	29	42	29	2	1	4	6	23	35
78 Costa Rica	0	(.)	95	76	0	3	0	3	5	18
79 Brazil	8	10	89	64	0	4	(.)	11	3	11
80 Uruguay	..	1	..	60	..	18	..	2	..	19
81 Argentina	1	1	95	75	0	2	(.)	9	4	13
82 Portugal	8	4	37	26	18	26	3	15	34	29
83 Yugoslavia	18	11	45	20	4	8	15	32	18	29
84 Trinidad and Tobago	82	92	14	3	0	(.)	0	1	4	4
85 Venezuela	74	97	26	1	0	(.)	0	(.)	(.)	2
86 Hong Kong	5	1	15	3	45	46	4	16	31	34
87 Greece	9	14	81	36	1	18	1	5	8	27
88 Singapore	1	32	73	24	5	5	7	24	14	15
89 Spain	21	6	57	23	7	6	2	26	13	39
90 Israel	4	1	35	19	8	7	2	10	51	63
Industrialized countries	**11 w**	**9 w**	**23 w**	**15 w**	**7 w**	**5 w**	**30 w**	**39 w**	**29 w**	**32 w**
91 Ireland	5	3	67	42	6	9	4	15	18	31
92 Italy	8	7	19	10	17	11	29	34	27	38
93 New Zealand	(.)	6	97	77	0	3	(.)	3	3	11
94 United Kingdom	7	10	9	9	8	5	44	37	32	39
95 Finland	3	6	50	20	1	6	13	26	33	42
96 Austria	26	5	22	11	10	10	16	28	26	46
97 Japan	11	1	10	2	28	5	23	56	28	36
98 Australia	13	34	79	45	(.)	(.)	3	4	5	17
99 France	9	6	18	17	10	6	25	38	38	33
100 Netherlands	15	22	34	25	8	5	18	19	25	29
101 Belgium	15	11	9	12	12	8	13	24	51	45
102 Canada	33	26	37	23	1	1	8	33	21	17
103 Norway	22	32	34	15	2	1	10	29	32	23
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	9	5	4	6	4	5	44	48	39	36
105 United States	10	6	27	24	3	2	35	43	25	25
106 Denmark	2	5	63	39	3	5	19	27	13	24
107 Sweden	10	6	29	14	1	2	31	44	29	34
108 Switzerland	2	3	8	5	12	7	30	33	48	52
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**96 w**	**96 w**	**4 w**	**(.) w**	**0 w**	**(.) w**	**0 w**	**(.) w**	**1 w**	**1 w**
109 Iraq	97	99	3	1	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
110 Iran	88	99	9	1	0	(.)	0	(.)	3	(.)
111 Libya	100	100	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)	0	(.)
112 Saudi Arabia	6	100	84	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
113 Kuwait	..	88	..	1	..	1	..	3	..	7
Centrally planned economies	**..**	**24 w**	**..**	**18 w**	**..**	**4 w**	**..**	**31 w**	**..**	**23 w**
114 China	..	14	..	37	..	23	..	3	..	23
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	51	..	31	..	6	..	1	..	11
116 Albania	..	33	..	26	..	6	..	4	..	31
117 Cuba	..	7	..	80	..	8	..	(.)	..	5
118 Mongolia	2	7	93	93	1	0	(.)	(.)	4	(.)
119 Romania	..	12	..	20	..	9	..	24	..	35
120 Bulgaria	3	2	75	34	12	5	6	39	4	20
121 Hungary	6	7	28	25	7	8	38	33	21	27
122 Poland	24	43	28	11	1	(.)	21	19	26	27
123 USSR	..	21	..	11	..	7	..	39	..	22
124 Czechoslovakia	20	7	11	6	(.)	6	45	51	24	30
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	3	..	3	..	5	..	57	..	32

a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960.

Table 10. Structure of Merchandise Imports

	Percentage share of merchandise imports									
	Food		Fuels		Other primary commodities		Machinery and transport equipment		Other manufactures	
	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]
Low-income countries	**22** w	**18** w	**7** w	**18** w	**16** w	**8** w	**25** w	**26** w	**30** w	**30** w
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	..	18	..	24	..	6	..	13	..	39
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	..	*6*	..	*15*	..	*3*	..	*34*	..	*42*
6 Mali	*20*	*19*	*5*	*14*	*4*	*2*	*18*	*30*	*53*	*35*
7 Nepal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
8 Somalia	*27*	..	*4*	..	*0*	..	*18*	..	*51*	..
9 Burundi	..	23	..	11	..	8	..	27	..	31
10 Chad	19	..	12	..	4	..	19	..	46	..
11 Mozambique	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
12 Burma	14	..	4	..	9	..	17	..	56	..
13 Upper Volta	*21*	..	*4*	..	*1*	..	*24*	..	*50*	..
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	21	16	6	26	28	15	30	19	15	24
16 Malawi	..	8	..	13	..	2	..	30	..	47
17 Rwanda	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
18 Sri Lanka	39	40	7	24	5	3	15	12	34	21
19 Guinea	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
20 Sierra Leone	23	*23*	12	*7*	5	*1*	15	*19*	45	*50*
21 Zaire	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
22 Niger	*24*	..	*5*	..	*4*	..	*18*	..	*49*	..
23 Benin	17	*17*	10	*8*	1	*0*	18	*30*	54	*45*
24 Pakistan	*22*	17	*10*	16	*2*	7	*27*	28	*39*	32
25 Tanzania	..	*10*	..	*18*	..	*5*	..	*35*	..	*32*
26 Afghanistan	14	14	7	8	4	0	14	7	61	71
27 Central African Rep.	15	16	9	1	2	2	26	36	48	45
28 Madagascar	17	..	6	..	3	..	23	..	51	..
29 Haiti	..	28	..	11	..	4	..	20	..	37
30 Mauritania	*5*	..	*3*	..	*3*	..	*39*	..	*50*	..
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda	*6*	*11*	*8*	*1*	*8*	*3*	*25*	*44*	*53*	*41*
33 Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
34 Sudan	17	..	8	..	3	..	14	..	58	..
35 Togo	16	19	6	7	3	1	32	31	43	42
36 Kenya	*12*	6	*11*	22	*8*	4	*27*	34	*42*	34
37 Senegal	30	..	5	..	2	..	19	..	44	..
38 Indonesia	23	16	5	12	10	5	17	37	45	30
Middle-income countries	**15** w	**12** w	**9** w	**17** w	**14** w	**8** w	**29** w	**32** w	**33** w	**31** w
39 Egypt	23	23	11	2	16	10	25	35	25	30
40 Ghana	19	*14*	5	*15*	4	*4*	26	*27*	46	*40*
41 Yemen, PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon	20	12	8	9	3	1	17	38	52	40
43 Liberia	16	..	4	..	7	..	34	..	39	..
44 Honduras	13	9	9	12	3	2	24	31	51	46
45 Zambia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	10	5	11	22	11	10	25	30	43	33
48 Bolivia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
49 Philippines	15	10	10	24	5	7	36	26	34	33
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	*41*	..	*3*	..	*1*	..	*26*	..	*29*
51 Congo, People's Rep.	18	21	6	5	1	1	31	35	44	38
52 Nigeria	14	13	5	2	6	2	24	47	51	36
53 Papua New Guinea	30	*23*	5	*14*	4	*1*	23	*32*	38	30
54 El Salvador	17	..	6	..	6	..	26	..	45	..
55 Morocco	27	17	8	12	7	7	19	38	39	26
56 Peru	16	14	5	19	5	4	37	35	37	28
57 Ivory Coast	18	14	6	11	2	2	27	38	47	35
58 Nicaragua	9	8	10	14	5	2	22	31	54	45
59 Colombia	8	12	3	7	15	7	43	38	31	36
60 Paraguay	..	*15*	..	*25*	..	*1*	..	*34*	..	*25*
61 Ecuador	13	7	3	1	9	3	33	50	42	39
62 Dominican Rep.	..	17	..	21	..	4	..	25	..	33
63 Guatemala	12	..	10	..	7	..	26	..	45	..
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	24	12	8	17	5	5	15	34	48	32
65 Tunisia	20	13	9	11	4	7	23	34	44	35
66 Jordan	..	18	..	9	..	3	..	35	..	35

	Percentage share of merchandise imports									
	Food		Fuels		Other primary commodities		Machinery and transport equipment		Other manufactures	
	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]	1960[a]	1977[b]
67 Malaysia	29	17	16	13	13	7	14	33	28	30
68 Jamaica	22	20	8	29	9	6	24	12	37	33
69 Lebanon	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	10	8	7	20	25	19	12	27	46	26
71 Turkey	7	1	11	26	16	6	42	34	24	33
72 Algeria	26	17	4	1	2	4	14	46	54	32
73 Mexico	4	13	2	3	10	8	52	45	32	31
74 Panama	15	10	10	33	1	1	22	19	52	37
75 Taiwan	..	11	..	19	..	14	..	27	..	29
76 Chile	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
77 South Africa	6	6	7	1	9	7	37	52	41	34
78 Costa Rica	13	8	6	10	6	3	26	50	49	49
79 Brazil	14	7	19	34	13	7	36	26	18	26
80 Uruguay	..	7	..	25	..	11	..	29	..	28
81 Argentina	3	5	13	16	11	10	44	36	29	33
82 Portugal	15	18	10	15	28	13	26	26	21	28
83 Yugoslavia	11	9	5	13	25	12	37	35	22	31
84 Trinidad and Tobago	16	10	34	48	7	2	18	18	25	22
85 Venezuela	18	*12*	1	*1*	10	*4*	36	*50*	35	*33*
86 Hong Kong	27	17	3	6	16	8	10	19	44	50
87 Greece	11	8	8	15	16	8	44	46	21	23
88 Singapore	21	12	15	26	38	9	7	26	19	27
89 Spain	16	15	22	29	25	13	22	20	15	23
90 Israel	20	13	7	15	18	6	28	21	27	45
Industrialized countries	**22 w**	**13 w**	**11 w**	**22 w**	**24 w**	**10 w**	**18 w**	**24 w**	**27 w**	**31 w**
91 Ireland	18	13	12	13	11	5	21	27	38	42
92 Italy	20	17	14	26	31	14	13	19	22	24
93 New Zealand	8	7	8	15	16	6	29	32	39	40
94 United Kingdom	36	18	11	14	27	11	8	23	18	34
95 Finland	13	9	10	24	20	7	33	30	24	30
96 Austria	16	8	10	10	20	9	29	34	25	39
97 Japan	17	17	17	44	49	20	9	6	8	13
98 Australia	6	6	10	10	16	5	31	38	37	41
99 France	25	14	17	21	25	10	14	23	19	32
100 Netherlands	18	16	13	19	14	7	22	23	33	35
101 Belgium	15	13	10	14	26	10	21	26	28	37
102 Canada	12	8	9	10	12	5	36	50	31	27
103 Norway	12	7	9	11	13	6	36	42	30	34
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	26	16	8	17	28	11	10	19	28	37
105 United States	24	10	10	30	25	8	10	25	31	27
106 Denmark	18	13	12	17	11	6	23	27	36	37
107 Sweden	13	9	14	18	13	6	26	31	34	36
108 Switzerland	18	11	8	10	13	7	21	24	40	48
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**..**	**15 w**	**..**	**1 w**	**..**	**2 w**	**..**	**43 w**	**..**	**41 w**
109 Iraq	..	15	..	(.)	..	3	..	54	..	28
110 Iran	14	*11*	1	(.)	1	*3*	23	*45*	61	*41*
111 Libya	13	19	5	1	10	3	40	37	32	40
112 Saudi Arabia	..	11	..	1	..	2	..	41	..	46
113 Kuwait	..	12	..	1	..	2	..	45	..	40
Centrally planned economies	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**	**..**
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
121 Hungary	8	11	12	13	28	12	28	31	24	33
122 Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
123 USSR	12	..	4	..	18	..	30	..	36	..
124 Czechoslovakia	..	*12*	..	*14*	..	*15*	..	*36*	..	*23*
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. b. Figures in italics are for 1976, not 1977.

Table 11. Destination of Merchandise Exports

Origin	Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total)							
	Industrialized countries		Developing countries		Centrally planned economies		Capital-surplus oil exporters	
	1960	1978[a]	1960	1978[a]	1960	1978[a]	1960	1978[a]
Low-income countries	**65 w**	**66 w**	**27 w**	**23 w**	**7 w**	**5 w**	**1 w**	**6 w**
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	..	47	..	34	..	14	..	5
3 Lao PDR	..	*20*	..	77	..	(.)	..	*3*
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	69	64	24	26	1	4	6	6
6 Mali	93	50	7	20	0	30	(.)	(.)
7 Nepal	..	34	..	66	..	0	..	(.)
8 Somalia	85	22	15	14	0	13	(.)	51
9 Burundi	..	84	..	6	..	10	..	0
10 Chad	73	34	27	63	0	0	0	3
11 Mozambique	29	*71*	71	*29*	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
12 Burma	23	37	71	62	6	(.)	(.)	1
13 Upper Volta	4	50	96	48	0	2	0	0
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	66	55	23	20	8	13	3	12
16 Malawi	..	75	..	25	..	(.)	..	0
17 Rwanda	..	90	..	10	..	(.)	..	(.)
18 Sri Lanka	75	42	14	30	11	10	0	18
19 Guinea	63	..	19	..	18	..	(.)	..
20 Sierra Leone	99	96	1	4	0	0	0	(.)
21 Zaire	89	65	11	34	(.)	1	(.)	(.)
22 Niger	74	84	26	15	0	0	0	1
23 Benin	..	52	..	17	..	31	..	(.)
24 Pakistan	56	41	33	30	8	5	3	24
25 Tanzania	74	65	25	28	1	6	0	1
26 Afghanistan	48	*34*	24	*23*	28	*43*	0	(.)
27 Central African Rep.	83	79	17	21	0	(.)	0	(.)
28 Madagascar	79	75	20	21	1	4	(.)	(.)
29 Haiti	98	98	2	2	(.)	(.)	0	(.)
30 Mauritania	89	85	11	15	0	0	0	(.)
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda	62	70	34	26	4	2	0	2
33 Angola	64	*38*	34	*62*	2	*0*	0	*0*
34 Sudan	59	50	23	27	14	18	4	5
35 Togo	74	77	26	14	0	9	0	0
36 Kenya	77	62	22	35	1	2	(.)	1
37 Senegal	89	69	11	31	0	0	0	(.)
38 Indonesia	54	79	38	21	8	(.)	(.)	(.)
Middle-income countries	**70 w**	**67 w**	**24 w**	**25 w**	**5 w**	**5 w**	**1 w**	**3 w**
39 Egypt	26	54	29	12	43	30	2	4
40 Ghana	88	69	5	11	7	20	(.)	(.)
41 Yemen, PDR	42	35	56	51	(.)	10	2	4
42 Cameroon	93	85	6	13	1	2	(.)	0
43 Liberia	100	89	(.)	10	0	1	0	0
44 Honduras	77	86	23	14	0	0	0	0
45 Zambia	..	82	..	13	..	5	..	0
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	47	61	48	32	2	2	3	5
48 Bolivia	88	54	12	37	0	9	0	0
49 Philippines	94	81	5	14	1	4	(.)	1
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	46	65	36	13	18	18	(.)	4
51 Congo, People's Rep.	93	66	7	33	0	1	0	0
52 Nigeria	95	78	4	22	1	(.)	0	0
53 Papua New Guinea	..	87	..	12	..	1	..	0
54 El Salvador	88	74	12	26	0	0	0	(.)
55 Morocco	74	61	22	27	4	11	(.)	1
56 Peru	84	71	16	18	(.)	11	0	(.)
57 Ivory Coast	84	83	16	15	0	2	0	(.)
58 Nicaragua	91	69	9	31	(.)	0	0	0
59 Colombia	94	79	5	16	1	5	0	(.)
60 Paraguay	61	66	39	34	0	0	0	0
61 Ecuador	91	69	8	28	1	3	0	(.)
62 Dominican Rep.	92	84	7	14	0	2	1	0
63 Guatemala	94	71	6	27	0	1	0	1
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	34	57	28	18	24	19	14	6
65 Tunisia	76	68	19	23	3	3	2	6
66 Jordan	1	8	62	39	11	9	26	44

Origin	Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total)							
	Industrialized countries		Developing countries		Centrally planned economies		Capital-surplus oil exporters	
	1960	1978[a]	1960	1978[a]	1960	1978[a]	1960	1978[a]
67 Malaysia	58	62	35	32	7	5	0	1
68 Jamaica	96	84	4	15	0	1	0	(.)
69 Lebanon	24	8	28	26	6	10	42	56
70 Korea, Rep. of	89	73	11	17	0	(.)	0	10
71 Turkey	71	64	16	12	12	15	1	9
72 Algeria	93	94	6	4	1	2	(.)	0
73 Mexico	93	81	7	18	(.)	1	0	(.)
74 Panama	99	71	1	28	0	(.)	0	1
75 Taiwan	56	70	33	26	0	0	11	4
76 Chile	91	67	9	30	(.)	1	(.)	2
77 South Africa	71	82	27	18	2	(.)	(.)	0
78 Costa Rica	93	68	7	28	(.)	3	(.)	1
79 Brazil	81	64	13	26	6	7	(.)	3
80 Uruguay	82	54	8	38	10	7	0	1
81 Argentina	75	52	19	38	6	9	(.)	1
82 Portugal	56	80	42	17	2	3	(.)	(.)
83 Yugoslavia	48	35	18	16	33	43	1	6
84 Trinidad and Tobago	80	80	20	20	0	(.)	(.)	(.)
85 Venezuela	62	58	38	42	0	(.)	0	(.)
86 Hong Kong	54	70	42	26	3	1	1	3
87 Greece	65	60	12	16	22	12	1	12
88 Singapore	38	45	54	47	7	3	1	5
89 Spain	80	64	17	27	3	3	(.)	6
90 Israel	76	75	22	21	2	1	0	3
Industrialized countries	**67 w**	**67 w**	**25 w**	**23 w**	**3 w**	**4 w**	**2 w**	**6 w**
91 Ireland	96	90	4	7	(.)	1	(.)	3
92 Italy	65	66	27	20	6	5	2	9
93 New Zealand	95	73	4	19	1	5	(.)	3
94 United Kingdom	57	65	37	24	3	3	3	8
95 Finland	69	67	11	10	20	21	(.)	2
96 Austria	69	69	15	14	15	14	1	3
97 Japan	45	45	51	38	2	7	2	10
98 Australia	75	64	18	25	5	7	2	4
99 France	53	67	42	25	4	4	1	4
100 Netherlands	78	83	19	12	2	2	1	3
101 Belgium	79	83	16	12	4	2	1	3
102 Canada	90	87	9	9	1	3	(.)	1
103 Norway	80	82	15	13	5	4	(.)	1
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	70	71	23	17	5	6	2	6
105 United States	61	56	36	34	1	3	2	7
106 Denmark	83	82	12	12	4	3	1	3
107 Sweden	79	77	15	14	5	5	1	4
108 Switzerland	72	67	23	22	4	5	1	6
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**76 w**	**79 w**	**21 w**	**20 w**	**1 w**	**(.) w**	**(.) w**	**1 w**
109 Iraq	85	61	14	37	1	2	(.)	(.)
110 Iran	62	71	34	28	3	1	1	(.)
111 Libya	67	82	26	17	7	1	0	0
112 Saudi Arabia	74	72	26	28	0	0	0	(.)
113 Kuwait	91	60	9	33	0	(.)	0	7
Centrally planned economies	**21 w**	**..**	**6 w**	**..**	**70 w**	**..**	**1 w**	**..**
114 China	14	..	24	..	62	..	(.)	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	1	..	1	..	98	..	0	..
117 Cuba	72	..	9	..	19	..	(.)	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	20	27	9	15	71	50	(.)	8
120 Bulgaria	13	..	4	..	83	..	(.)	..
121 Hungary	22	..	8	..	69	..	1	..
122 Poland	29	..	10	..	60	..	1	..
123 USSR	18	..	10	..	71	..	1	..
124 Czechoslovakia	16	..	6	..	78	..	0	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	19	..	7	..	74	..	(.)	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.

Table 12. Trade in Manufactured Goods

Origin	Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total)								Value of manufactured exports (millions of dollars)	
	Industrialized countries		Developing countries		Centrally planned economies		Capital-surplus oil exporters			
	1963	1977a	1963	1977a	1963	1977a	1963	1977a	1963	1977a
Low-income countries	..	**81** w	..	**27** w	..	**12** w	..	**10** w		
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	58	15	42	85	0	0	0	0	1	2
2 Bangladesh	..	47	..	41	..	6	..	6	..	251
3 Lao PDR	..	83	..	17	..	0	..	0	(.)	2
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	..	28	..	68	..	2	..	2	(.)	12
6 Mali	14	29	66	71	20	0	0	0	(.)	2
7 Nepal	..	60	..	40	..	0	..	0	..	14
8 Somalia	..	20	..	67	..	13	..	0	2	2
9 Burundi	..	100	..	0	..	0	..	0	..	1
10 Chad	12	31	77	69	11	0	(.)	0	1	3
11 Mozambique	..	67	..	27	..	0	..	6	..	3
12 Burma	..	79	..	21	..	0	..	0	1	15
13 Upper Volta	12	50	88	50	0	0	0	0	1	3
14 Viet Nam	..	2	..	2	..	95	..	1	..	216
15 India	56	52	35	24	7	12	2	12	677	3,356
16 Malawi	..	34	..	66	..	0	..	0	..	7
17 Rwanda	..	0	..	100	..	0	..	0	(.)	(.)
18 Sri Lanka	70	65	28	24	2	1	(.)	10	4	96
19 Guinea	..	27	..	73	..	0	..	0	..	53
20 Sierra Leone	100	100	(.)	0	0	0	0	0	23	59
21 Zaire	..	88	..	11	..	1	..	0	1	75
22 Niger	23	89	77	11	0	0	0	0	1	56
23 Benin	18	28	82	72	0	0	0	0	1	3
24 Pakistan	49	45	48	26	1	8	2	21	109	681
25 Tanzania	..	85	..	15	..	0	..	0	16	35
26 Afghanistan	98	88	2	1	0	1	0	10	7	42
27 Central African Rep.	50	83	50	17	0	0	0	0	11	19
28 Madagascar	82	83	18	17	0	0	0	0	4	26
29 Haiti	..	93	..	7	..	0	..	0	..	51
30 Mauritania	95	84	5	16	0	0	0	0	3	6
31 Lesotho	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda	..	100	..	0	..	0	..	0	(.)	2
33 Angola	..	80	..	18	..	0	..	2	..	55
34 Sudan	35	90	54	10	0	0	11	0	(.)	5
35 Togo	45	42	55	58	0	(.)	0	0	1	9
36 Kenya	..	11	..	86	..	1	..	2	12	116
37 Senegal	74	50	26	50	(.)	0	0	0	9	36
38 Indonesia	..	44	..	56	..	(.)	..	(.)	2	191
Middle-income countries	..	**88** w	..	**30** w	..	**6** w	..	**5** w		
39 Egypt	..	13	..	11	..	65	..	11	88	429
40 Ghana	82	56	17	44	0	0	1	0	3	44
41 Yemen, PDR	..	48	..	52	..	0	..	0	..	1
42 Cameroon	23	69	77	31	0	0	0	0	4	30
43 Liberia	100	78	0	22	0	0	0	0	3	9
44 Honduras	3	22	97	78	0	0	0	0	2	49
45 Zambia	..	66	..	34	..	0	..	0	..	37
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	41	65	59	32	0	(.)	0	3	16	647
48 Bolivia	91	*93*	9	*7*	0	*0*	0	*0*	6	22
49 Philippines	92	82	8	16	0	(.)	(.)	2	34	764
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	10	..	25	..	0	..	65	..	1
51 Congo, People's Rep.	93	62	7	38	0	0	0	(.)	22	29
52 Nigeria	81	85	17	15	1	(.)	1	0	16	72
53 Papua New Guinea	..	100	..	0	..	0	..	0	2	15
54 El Salvador	1	*27*	99	*73*	0	*0*	0	*0*	18	209
55 Morocco	..	74	..	19	..	2	..	5	..	272
56 Peru	45	43	55	37	(.)	14	(.)	6	6	115
57 Ivory Coast	40	35	60	65	0	0	0	0	7	161
58 Nicaragua	..	8	..	92	..	0	..	0	3	105
59 Colombia	45	42	55	57	0	1	0	(.)	17	466
60 Paraguay	85	52	15	48	0	0	0	0	4	25
61 Ecuador	52	16	48	84	0	0	0	0	3	30
62 Dominican Rep.	..	97	..	3	..	0	..	0	1	128
63 Guatemala	..	*9*	..	*91*	..	*0*	..	*0*	15	*218*
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	..	11	..	16	..	42	..	31	21	100
65 Tunisia	42	86	53	10	0	2	5	2	12	311
66 Jordan	..	(.)	..	26	..	0	..	74	1	57

Origin	Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total)								Value of manufactured exports (millions of dollars)	
	Industrialized countries		Developing countries		Centrally planned economies		Capital-surplus oil exporters			
	1963	1977a	1963	1977a	1963	1977a	1963	1977a	1963	1977a
67 Malaysia	..	64	..	35	..	(.)	..	1	53	1,121
68 Jamaica	83	*68*	17	*29*	0	*3*	0	*0*	13	345
69 Lebanon	..	19	..	35	..	3	..	43	8	452
70 Korea, Rep. of	57	74	43	14	0	(.)	0	12	39	8,480
71 Turkey	73	74	14	9	13	5	(.)	12	6	431
72 Algeria	..	76	..	19	..	3	..	2	..	38
73 Mexico	69	61	31	39	(.)	(.)	(.)	0	147	1,182
74 Panama	5	10	95	90	0	0	0	0	(.)	23
75 Taiwan	..	30	..	52	..	13	..	5	129	7,925
76 Chile	38	57	62	43	(.)	0	(.)	(.)	22	145
77 South Africa	..	67	..	29	..	0	..	4	318	2,576
78 Costa Rica	..	12	..	88	..	(.)	..	0	5	203
79 Brazil	59	53	40	43	1	2	(.)	2	45	3,141
80 Uruguay	..	56	..	41	..	3	..	(.)	31	235
81 Argentina	52	31	46	63	2	6	(.)	(.)	79	1,349
82 Portugal	53	79	46	16	(.)	4	1	1	246	1,420
83 Yugoslavia	37	29	29	17	33	45	1	9	468	3,415
84 Trinidad and Tobago	40	86	60	14	0	(.)	0	(.)	10	105
85 Venezuela	79	52	21	48	(.)	0	(.)	0	43	153
86 Hong Kong	71	83	28	14	0	(.)	1	3	617	7,267
87 Greece	60	58	34	18	2	6	4	18	27	1,373
88 Singapore	5	54	95	43	(.)	(.)	(.)	3	352	3,626
89 Spain	62	60	35	32	2	3	1	5	227	7,214
90 Israel	72	75	26	21	2	1	0	3	203	2,453
Industrialized countries	**65 w**	**66 w**	**31 w**	**25 w**	**3 w**	**4 w**	**1 w**	**6 w**		
91 Ireland	94	92	6	6	(.)	1	(.)	1	133	2,420
92 Italy	64	64	29	21	5	6	2	9	3,842	37,630
93 New Zealand	..	85	..	14	..	(.)	..	1	40	520
94 United Kingdom	57	65	39	25	3	3	1	7	9,412	46,884
95 Finland	59	63	13	8	28	27	(.)	2	634	5,686
96 Austria	66	66	17	15	17	16	0	3	985	8,241
97 Japan	44	47	50	40	5	4	1	9	4,812	77,514
98 Australia	59	68	40	28	1	1	(.)	3	332	2,808
99 France	58	63	39	28	2	5	1	4	5,744	48,585
100 Netherlands	79	79	18	15	2	3	1	3	2,693	23,123
101 Belgium	85	83	13	12	1	2	1	3	3,572	28,991
102 Canada	87	91	13	8	(.)	(.)	(.)	1	2,165	21,046
103 Norway	78	69	19	26	3	4	(.)	1	529	4,654
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	75	69	22	19	2	6	1	6	12,812	104,361
105 United States	56	58	42	33	(.)	1	2	8	12,453	82,521
106 Denmark	73	78	19	15	8	4	0	3	752	5,580
107 Sweden	78	76	19	15	3	5	(.)	4	2,143	15,284
108 Switzerland	72	66	25	23	2	6	1	5	2,163	15,821
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**..**	**31 w**	**..**	**24 w**	**..**	**3 w**	**..**	**42 w**		
109 Iraq	(.)	9	21	79	(.)	0	79	12	5	18
110 Iran	64	39	28	13	1	31	7	17	33	158
111 Libya	33	..	22	..	45	..	0	..	(.)	..
112 Saudi Arabia	..	22	..	70	..	1	..	7	0	121
113 Kuwait	..	31	..	19	..	(.)	..	50	..	1,059
Centrally planned economies	**..**	**14 w**	**..**	**18 w**	**..**	**84 w**	**..**	**4 w**		
114 China	..	31	..	50	..	14	..	5	..	3,684
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	5	..	13	..	73	..	9	..	197
116 Albania	..	35	..	37	..	28	..	0	..	42
117 Cuba	..	72	..	4	..	24	..	0	..	10
118 Mongolia	..	2	..	0	..	98	..	0	..	32
119 Romania	..	26	..	17	..	52	..	5	..	4,763
120 Bulgaria	..	6	..	11	..	81	..	2	..	4,025
121 Hungary	..	20	..	14	..	62	..	4	..	3,939
122 Poland	..	19	..	9	..	70	..	2	..	8,351
123 USSR	..	10	..	25	..	59	..	6	..	21,020
124 Czechoslovakia	..	14	..	11	..	73	..	2	..	9,045
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	10	..	10	..	79	..	1	..	10,242

a. Figures in italics are for 1976, not 1977.

Table 13. Balance of Payments and Debt Service Ratios

	Current account balance before interest payments on external public debt (millions of dollars)		Interest payments on external public debt (millions of dollars)		Debt service as percentage of: GNP		Debt service as percentage of: Exports of goods and services	
	1970	1978[a]	1970	1978	1970	1978[a]	1970	1978[a]
Low-income countries					1.2 w	1.7 w	12.3 w	11.7 w
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	..	−302	..	42	..	1.3	..	11.7
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	−26	−98	6	13	1.2	0.8	11.4	7.5
6 Mali	−2	−72	(.)	3	0.2	1.1	1.2	7.1
7 Nepal	..	−25	(.)	1	0.3	0.2	10.9	1.4
8 Somalia	−5	−63	(.)	2	0.5	1.2	2.1	3.7
9 Burundi	..	−22	(.)	1	0.3	0.4	2.5	3.2
10 Chad	2	−188	(.)	3	1.0	2.3	3.7	13.0
11 Mozambique	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
12 Burma	−62	−137	3	17	1.0	1.2	16.1	18.0
13 Upper Volta	9	−79	(.)	3	0.6	0.9	4.0	3.8
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	−205	915	189	342	0.9	0.8	20.9	9.4
16 Malawi	−32	−116	3	9	1.8	2.0	7.0	8.7
17 Rwanda	6	−46	(.)	1	0.2	0.2	1.4	1.4
18 Sri Lanka	−45	−33	12	25	2.1	3.6	10.3	9.2
19 Guinea	..	−16	4	17	3.4	5.7	21.3	17.4
20 Sierra Leone	−14	−96	2	7	2.9	4.5	9.8	16.0
21 Zaire	−55	88	9	160	2.0	6.5	4.4	31.3
22 Niger	1	−81	1	4	0.6	0.8	3.8	2.9
23 Benin	−1	−70	(.)	3	0.7	1.5	2.2	6.4
24 Pakistan	−591	−550	76	179	1.9	2.1	21.6	12.2
25 Tanzania	−29	−442	6	18	2.1	1.1	8.2	7.4
26 Afghanistan	..	38	9	15	2.5	1.3	25.6	13.7
27 Central African Rep.	−11	−23	(.)	1	1.1	0.7	3.2	2.5
28 Madagascar	12	−51	2	6	0.8	0.6	3.5	3.2
29 Haiti	2	−39	(.)	3	1.0	1.0	7.7	5.8
30 Mauritania	−5	−65	(.)	10	2.0	6.6	3.2	17.0
31 Lesotho	..	−110	(.)	(.)	0.5	0.3	8.8	1.9
32 Uganda	24	−129	4	1	0.8	0.1	3.4	2.2
33 Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
34 Sudan	−29	−54	13	36	1.3	1.4	10.7	9.4
35 Togo	4	−234	1	13	0.9	5.9	2.9	15.2
36 Kenya	−38	−474	11	45	2.6	2.4	7.9	8.3
37 Senegal	−14	−114	2	31	0.8	5.4	2.8	14.9
38 Indonesia	−286	−773	24	492	0.9	3.1	6.9	13.0
Middle-income countries					1.5 w	2.9 w	9.3 w	13.8 w
39 Egypt	−116	−540	38	386	4.1	8.7	28.7	22.2
40 Ghana	−56	32	12	23	1.1	0.3	5.0	4.4
41 Yemen, PDR	−9	−20	..	1	..	0.2	..	1.7
42 Cameroon	−26	−112	4	46	0.9	2.0	3.1	7.7
43 Liberia	..	−122	6	13	5.5	3.5	..	5.4
44 Honduras	−61	−126	3	31	0.8	3.5	2.8	8.4
45 Zambia	131	−191	23	46	3.2	7.1	5.5	20.8
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	−234	−1,098	16	96	0.6	0.9	3.3	3
48 Bolivia	−16	−301	6	83	2.2	8.5	10.9	43
49 Philippines	−23	−991	25	167	1.4	2.8	7.5	13.4
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	80	(.)	3	0.2	0.5	..	1.1
51 Congo, People's Rep.	..	−156	3	11	3.2	3.3	..	7.2
52 Nigeria	−348	−3,696	20	75	0.7	0.3	4.1	1.2
53 Papua New Guinea	..	−12	1	23	0.1	1.8	..	4.0
54 El Salvador	12	−230	4	13	0.9	0.8	3.6	2.6
55 Morocco	−101	−1,040	23	252	1.5	4.3	7.7	18.7
56 Peru	245	119	43	317	2.4	7.4	11.6	31.1
57 Ivory Coast	−26	−533	11	199	2.8	5.9	6.7	14.1
58 Nicaragua	−32	23	7	48	3.2	4.6	11.0	12.5
59 Colombia	−249	305	44	172	1.7	1.7	11.6	9.8
60 Paraguay	−13	−109	3	15	1.7	1.4	11.1	7.3
61 Ecuador	−106	−54	7	96	1.5	2.8	9.1	11.7
62 Dominican Rep.	−98	−334	4	39	0.8	1.7	4.5	9.4
63 Guatemala	−2	−192	6	15	1.4	0.4	7.4	1.7
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	−64	−406	6	58	2.1	2.9	10.8	15.1
65 Tunisia	−35	−411	18	95	4.5	3.5	17.5	12.3
66 Jordan	−15	−256	2	24	0.7	2.5	3.6	4.0

	Current account balance before interest payments on external public debt (millions of dollars)		Interest payments on external public debt (millions of dollars)		Debt service as percentage of:			
					GNP		Exports of goods and services	
	1970	1978[a]	1970	1978	1970	1978[a]	1970	1978[a]
67 Malaysia	29	284	21	146	1.7	4.6	3.6	8.8
68 Jamaica	—145	—72	8	70	1.1	7.0	2.5	17.9
69 Lebanon	..	—494	1	4	0.2	..	..	0.8
70 Korea, Rep. of	—553	—455	70	653	3.1	3.9	19.4	10.5
71 Turkey	—28	—1,121	42	182	1.3	0.9	16.3	11.0
72 Algeria	—116	—2,977	10	561	0.8	5.9	3.2	20.9
73 Mexico	—850	—896	218	1,823	2.1	6.9	23.6	59.6
74 Panama	—57	—91	7	130	3.0	25.2	7.7	39.2
75 Taiwan	27	1,979	23	239	1.4	2.6	4.5	4.4
76 Chile	—13	—659	78	290	3.1	7.3	18.9	38.2
77 South Africa	—1,156	2,010	59	366	1.2	4.2	5.1	11.7
78 Costa Rica	—67	—309	7	63	2.9	7.2	9.7	23.0
79 Brazil	—701	—5,310	136	1,725	0.9	2.2	13.5	28.4
80 Uruguay	—29	—66	16	60	2.6	8.7	21.5	45.7
81 Argentina	—36	2,512	121	513	1.9	3.5	21.5	26.8
82 Portugal	..	—337	28	105	1.3	1.1	4.4	3.7
83 Yugoslavia	—276	—834	72	183	1.7	0.7	8.2	3.2
84 Trinidad and Tobago	—74	61	6	22	1.9	0.9	2.6	1.1
85 Venezuela	—64	—4,973	40	394	0.8	1.9	2.9	6.9
86 Hong Kong	..	*317*	..	15	(.)	0.7	..	..
87 Greece	—364	—1,056	41	206	1.0	1.7	7.2	8.5
88 Singapore	—565	—669	6	78	0.6	4.0	0.6	2.3
89 Spain	151	321	72	600	0.5	1.8	3.6	11.0
90 Israel	—572	—732	41	248	3.1	3.8	12.3	8.1
[redacted]								
91 Ireland	—189	—178						
92 Italy	902	6,355						
93 New Zealand	—29	—387						
94 United Kingdom	1,865	1,932						
95 Finland	—239	606						
96 Austria	—23	—1,410						
97 Japan	1,980	17,528						
98 Australia	—832	—3,845						
99 France	67	3,766						
100 Netherlands	—487	—1,449						
101 Belgium	537	—556						
102 Canada	1,078	—4,617						
103 Norway	—242	—2,145						
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	850	8,852						
105 United States	6,200	—4,432						
106 Denmark	—544	—1,469						
107 Sweden	—266	—954						
108 Switzerland	70	4,403						
[redacted]					..	..	..	..
109 Iraq	110	*1,209*	9	37	0.9	1.1	2.2	*1.1*
110 Iran	—422	*5,370*	85	391	3.0	*1.2*	12.2	*3.2*
111 Libya	645	1,024	..	..	..	..	..	..
112 Saudi Arabia	71	*12,793*	..	..	..	..	..	..
113 Kuwait	..	6,166	..	..	..	..	..	..
[redacted]								
114 China	..	..						
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..						
116 Albania	..	..						
117 Cuba	..	..						
118 Mongolia	..	..						
119 Romania	..	..						
120 Bulgaria	..	..						
121 Hungary	..	..						
122 Poland	..	..						
123 USSR	..	..						
124 Czechoslovakia	..	..						
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	..						

a. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978.
b. See the technical notes.

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Table 14. Flow of External Capital

	Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans (millions of dollars)						Net direct private investment (millions of dollars)	
	Gross inflow		Repayment of principal		Net inflow			
	1970	1978	1970	1978	1970	1978	1970	1978a
Low-income countries								
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	..	488	..	51	..	437	..	..
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	27	97	15	17	12	80	4	*6*
6 Mali	21	68	(.)	6	21	62	..	—5
7 Nepal	1	27	2	2	—1	25	..	..
8 Somalia	4	114	(.)	3	4	111	5	(.)
9 Burundi	1	23	(.)	2	1	21	..	..
10 Chad	6	43	2	12	4	31	1	*21*
11 Mozambique	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
12 Burma	16	315	18	38	—2	277	..	..
13 Upper Volta	2	44	2	5	(.)	39	(.)	..
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	890	1,150	307	595	583	555	6	..
16 Malawi	38	90	3	12	35	78	9	10
17 Rwanda	(.)	19	(.)	1	(.)	18	(.)	5
18 Sri Lanka	61	239	27	64	34	175	(.)	2
19 Guinea	90	112	10	47	80	65	10	..
20 Sierra Leone	8	83	10	28	—2	55	8	19
21 Zaire	31	348	28	342	3	6	42	15
22 Niger	12	69	1	6	11	63	1	..
23 Benin	2	38	1	9	1	29	7	..
24 Pakistan	484	748	114	204	370	544	23	36
25 Tanzania	50	171	10	20	40	151	..	..
26 Afghanistan	34	171	15	37	19	134	..	..
27 Central African Rep.	2	22	2	3	(.)	19	1	8
28 Madagascar	11	50	5	9	6	41	10	1
29 Haiti	4	43	4	8	(.)	35	3	10
30 Mauritania	4	111	3	18	1	93	1	—17
31 Lesotho	(.)	5	(.)	1	(.)	4	..	..
32 Uganda	26	25	4	3	22	22	4	1
33 Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
34 Sudan	54	290	22	40	32	250	..	..
35 Togo	5	200	2	32	3	168	1	..
36 Kenya	30	234	15	69	15	165	14	67
37 Senegal	18	196	5	75	13	121	5	..
38 Indonesia	441	1,616	59	977	382	639	83	272
Middle-income countries								
39 Egypt	302	2,464	247	822	55	1,642	..	297
40 Ghana	40	82	12	24	28	58	68	12
41 Yemen, PDR	1	89	..	1	1	88	..	..
42 Cameroon	28	287	4	58	24	229	16	—7
43 Liberia	7	74	12	14	—5	60	..	..
44 Honduras	29	163	3	28	26	135	8	13
45 Zambia	351	104	32	145	319	—41	—297	19
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	55	740	23	91	32	649	43	53
48 Bolivia	54	531	17	266	37	265	—76	12
49 Philippines	132	1,416	73	484	59	932	—29	163
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	2	101	(.)	12	2	89	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.	35	222	6	17	29	205	..	7
52 Nigeria	62	1,305	36	53	26	1,252	205	189
53 Papua New Guinea	25	29	(.)	10	25	19	..	34
54 El Salvador	8	80	6	12	2	68	4	23
55 Morocco	163	1,191	36	296	127	895	20	46
56 Peru	148	842	100	431	48	411	—70	25
57 Ivory Coast	77	948	27	223	50	725	31	10
58 Nicaragua	44	142	17	49	27	93	15	7
59 Colombia	235	341	75	231	160	110	39	60
60 Paraguay	15	139	7	20	8	119	4	22
61 Ecuador	42	503	16	108	26	395	89	40
62 Dominican Rep.	36	164	7	39	29	125	72	40
63 Guatemala	37	107	20	9	17	98	29	118
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	59	683	30	169	29	514	..	..
65 Tunisia	89	576	45	106	44	470	16	89
66 Jordan	14	221	3	34	11	187	..	22

	Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans (millions of dollars)						Net direct private investment (millions of dollars)	
	Gross inflow		Repayment of principal		Net inflow			
	1970	1978	1970	1978	1970	1978	1970	1978[a]
67 Malaysia	43	1,044	45	558	–2	486	94	596
68 Jamaica	15	221	6	114	9	107	161	–11
69 Lebanon	12	91	2	6	10	857	17	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	440	3,919	198	1,142	242	2,777	66	61
71 Turkey	328	798	128	262	200	536	58	95
72 Algeria	292	5,103	33	927	259	4,176	45	135
73 Mexico	797	8,606	476	4,416	321	4,190	323	530
74 Panama	67	986	24	442	43	544	33	*9*
75 Taiwan	154	621	54	394	100	227	62	110
76 Chile	397	1,491	163	926	234	565	–79	178
77 South Africa	519	1,173	146	1,422	373	–249	318	*–189*
78 Costa Rica	30	396	21	174	9	222	26	66
79 Brazil	1,063	10,055	333	2,406	730	7,649	407	1,886
80 Uruguay	37	416	47	366	–10	50	..	129
81 Argentina	489	3,203	342	1,578	147	1,625	11	298
82 Portugal	20	1,157	62	98	–42	1,059	..	50
83 Yugoslavia	180	445	168	196	12	249	..	..
84 Trinidad and Tobago	8	161	10	10	–2	151	83	140
85 Venezuela	224	2,707	42	356	182	2,351	–23	68
86 Hong Kong	(.)	117	(.)	79	(.)	38	..	..
87 Greece	164	754	61	354	103	400	50	18
88 Singapore	58	266	6	226	52	40	93	422
89 Spain	268	2,003	122	1,822	146	211	179	428
90 Israel	663	1,365	131	290	532	1,075	40	129
[redacted]								
91 Ireland							32	250
92 Italy							496	342
93 New Zealand							22	9
94 United Kingdom							–440	–1,515
95 Finland							–34	–29
96 Austria							85	74
97 Japan							–261	–2,341
98 Australia							787	1,266
99 France							248	660
100 Netherlands							–14	–1,231
101 Belgium							162	776
102 Canada							566	–1,721
103 Norway							32	407
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.							–280	–1,953
105 United States							–6,120	–10,404
106 Denmark							75	101
107 Sweden							–105	–334
108 Switzerland							..	..
[redacted]								
109 Iraq	63	308	18	195	45	113	24	..
110 Iran	940	2,901	235	960	705	1,941	25	*802*
111 Libya	..	..	..	..	..	..	139	–950
112 Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	..	..	..	20	*822*
113 Kuwait	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	–131
[redacted]								
114 China							..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.							..	..
116 Albania							..	..
117 Cuba							..	..
118 Mongolia							..	..
119 Romania							..	..
120 Bulgaria							..	..
121 Hungary							..	..
122 Poland							..	..
123 USSR							..	..
124 Czechoslovakia							..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.							..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. b. See the technical notes for Table 13.

Table 15. External Public Debt and International Reserves

	External public debt outstanding and disbursed				Gross international reserves		
	Millions of dollars		As percentage of GNP		Millions of dollars		In months of import coverage
	1970	1978	1970	1978[a]	1970	1978[a]	1978[a]
Low-income countries			**18.1** *w*	**21.7** *w*			**3.5** *w*
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	..	2,798	..	38.2	..	322	2.3
3 Lao PDR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	169	551	9.5	15.4	72	218	4.4
6 Mali	238	539	88.1	65.3	1	11	0.5
7 Nepal	3	88	0.3	5.4	95	181	7.8
8 Somalia	77	496	41.1	101.7	21	131	4.9
9 Burundi	7	64	3.1	10.6	15	83	*12.8*
10 Chad	32	156	11.8	23.4	2	14	*0.9*
11 Mozambique	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
12 Burma	102	818	4.7	18.1	98	151	3.7
13 Upper Volta	21	191	6.4	21.6	36	39	*2.1*
14 Viet Nam	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	7,936	15,326	14.8	13.1	1,023	8,316	10.2
16 Malawi	121	390	38.7	36.8	29	77	2.2
17 Rwanda	2	95	0.9	11.1	8	87	3.7
18 Sri Lanka	317	1,013	17.1	41.0	43	406	4.4
19 Guinea	314	916	72.5	81.7	..	..	..
20 Sierra Leone	59	275	14.3	36.1	39	35	1.3
21 Zaire	311	2,566	17.1	33.4	189	196	1.3
22 Niger	32	194	8.7	16.2	19	131	*3.4*
23 Benin	41	146	16.0	19.5	16	18	*0.9*
24 Pakistan	3,059	7,568	30.5	40.8	194	795	2.3
25 Tanzania	248	1,095	19.4	25.1	65	96	0.9
26 Afghanistan	547	1,216	58.1	30.8	50	606	10.4
27 Central African Rep.	19	138	11.2	26.5	1	27	1.5
28 Madagascar	94	259	10.9	11.7	37	59	1.2
29 Haiti	40	163	10.3	13.8	4	41	1.6
30 Mauritania	27	574	16.8	138.1	3	82	2.5
31 Lesotho	8	28	9.2	7.5	..	..	..
32 Uganda	128	252	9.8	3.0	57	..	..
33 Angola	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
34 Sudan	309	2,076	11.6	38.6	22	29	0.4
35 Togo	40	494	15.4	65.4	35	73	1.5
36 Kenya	313	953	20.3	17.9	220	369	2.1
37 Senegal	103	587	12.2	29.8	22	23	*0.5*
38 Indonesia	2,443	13,089	27.1	27.6	160	2,676	2.6
Middle-income countries			**10.8** *w*	**17.6** *w*			**2.5** *w*
39 Egypt	1,639	9,879	23.7	71.5	165	1,049	1.9
40 Ghana	489	843	22.6	5.3	58	330	3.6
41 Yemen, PDR	1	349	0.3	47.5	60	194	5.6
42 Cameroon	131	1,167	13.0	30.2	81	57	0.5
43 Liberia	158	334	49.6	42.3	..	18	*0.5*
44 Honduras	90	591	12.9	34.9	20	187	2.6
45 Zambia	596	1,396	34.5	51.6	515	96	1.0
46 Zimbabwe	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand	322	1,777	4.9	8.2	911	2,559	4.9
48 Bolivia	477	1,666	46.4	40.7	46	314	3.3
49 Philippines	633	4,188	9.2	18.0	255	2,104	4.0
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	147	464	49.9	14.3	..	1,461	15.3
51 Congo, People's Rep.	129	726	49.4	85.5	9	11	0.2
52 Nigeria	478	2,180	6.4	4.5	223	2,037	1.7
53 Papua New Guinea	36	370	6.2	21.2	..	431	5.1
54 El Salvador	88	333	8.6	11.0	63	381	3.5
55 Morocco	711	5,139	18.6	40.1	141	773	2.2
56 Peru	848	5,367	14.0	53.1	338	738	3.3
57 Ivory Coast	256	2,818	18.3	39.5	119	455	1.5
58 Nicaragua	155	964	20.6	45.8	50	58	0.9
59 Colombia	1,249	2,833	18.1	12.2	207	2,810	8.3
60 Paraguay	98	447	16.7	17.4	18	467	9.2
61 Ecuador	213	1,563	13.3	21.5	85	762	4.7
62 Dominican Rep.	212	724	14.6	16.1	32	176	1.7
63 Guatemala	106	374	5.7	6.0	80	857	6.0
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	232	2,091	13.6	26.6	57	*622*	*2.6*
65 Tunisia	545	2,359	38.8	40.5	60	479	2.4
66 Jordan	118	840	19.0	36.1	258	1,069	6.2

	External public debt outstanding and disbursed				Gross international reserves		
	Millions of dollars		As percentage of GNP		Millions of dollars		In months of import coverage
	1970	1978	1970	1978[a]	1970	1978[a]	1978[b]
67 Malaysia	390	2,671	10.0	17.6	667	3,670	5.5
68 Jamaica	154	1,036	11.5	39.4	139	53	0.5
69 Lebanon	64	125	4.2	..	405	3,918	*25.4*
70 Korea, Rep. of	1,797	11,992	20.9	26.1	610	2,828	1.8
71 Turkey	1,854	6,188	14.4	12.2	440	1,662	3.6
72 Algeria	937	13,168	18.5	52.6	352	3,230	3.6
73 Mexico	3,238	25,775	9.8	28.7	756	2,269	2.0
74 Panama	194	1,910	19.0	84.1	16	151	1.1
75 Taiwan	601	2,903	10.6	12.1	627	1,950	1.8
76 Chile	2,066	4,359	26.2	26.2	392	1,405	4.0
77 South Africa	1,089	5,704	6.3	13.3	1,057	2,636	2.3
78 Costa Rica	134	963	13.8	29.3	16	212	1.8
79 Brazil	3,589	28,821	8.0	15.6	1,190	12,191	6.7
80 Uruguay	267	766	11.0	15.7	186	1,111	12.5
81 Argentina	1,880	6,801	7.6	11.4	682	5,934	12.2
82 Portugal	473	2,642	7.0	14.0	1,565	5,873	11.7
83 Yugoslavia	1,198	3,454	8.5	6.4	144	2,756	2.6
84 Trinidad and Tobago	101	417	12.5	12.2	43	1,813	8.0
85 Venezuela	728	6,921	6.7	17.1	1,047	8,571	6.6
86 Hong Kong	2	223	0.1	1.6	..	..	..
87 Greece	905	3,123	8.9	9.7	318	1,851	2.8
88 Singapore	152	1,134	7.9	14.8	1,012	5,302	4.6
89 Spain	1,209	7,631	3.3	5.5	1,851	13,394	7.2
90 Israel	2,274	9,209	41.3	65.7	451	2,890	3.5
Industrialized countries[b]							**4.2 w**
91 Ireland					698	2,770	4.4
92 Italy					5,547	29,831	5.4
93 New Zealand					258	467	1.2
94 United Kingdom					2,918	21,184	2.7
95 Finland					458	1,438	1.8
96 Austria					1,806	9,804	5.6
97 Japan					4,876	37,824	4.7
98 Australia					1,709	3,823	2.2
99 France					5,199	32,328	3.8
100 Netherlands					3,362	17,469	3.4
101 Belgium					2,947	13,591	2.9
102 Canada					4,732	8,562	1.7
103 Norway					813	3,116	2.0
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.					13,879	75,287	5.8
105 United States					15,237	69,448	3.8
106 Denmark					488	3,577	2.3
107 Sweden					775	5,479	2.5
108 Switzerland					5,317	36,584	15.1
Capital-surplus oil exporters			..	..			**7.9 w**
109 Iraq	274	878	8.8	4.0	472	*7,237*	*9.2*
110 Iran	2,193	8,251	20.8	*8.2*	217	12,840	*6.4*
111 Libya	..	..	..	..	1,596	4,659	6.0
112 Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	..	670	20,227	*12.1*
113 Kuwait	..	..	..	..	209	3,072	5.7
Centrally planned economies[b]							
114 China					..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.					..	..	..
116 Albania					..	..	..
117 Cuba					..	..	..
118 Mongolia					..	..	..
119 Romania					..	..	..
120 Bulgaria					..	..	..
121 Hungary					..	..	..
122 Poland					..	..	..
123 USSR					..	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia					..	..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.					..	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. b. See the technical notes for Table 13.

Table 16. Official Development Assistance from OECD and OPEC Members

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980[a]
							Amount		
OECD							**Millions of US dollars**		
92 Italy	77	60	147	182	226	186	375	279	320
93 New Zealand	..	..	14	66	53	52	55	62	65
94 United Kingdom	407	472	500	910	885	1,120	1,456	2,067	2,453
95 Finland	..	2	7	48	51	49	55	86	104
96 Austria	..	10	11	79	48	108	166	127	174
97 Japan	105	244	458	1,148	1,105	1,424	2,215	2,638	3,071
98 Australia	59	119	212	552	377	400	588	620	690
99 France	823	752	971	2,093	2,146	2,267	2,705	3,358	3,836
100 Netherlands	35	70	196	608	728	908	1,074	1,404	1,547
101 Belgium	101	102	120	378	340	371	536	631	714
102 Canada	75	96	337	848	763	945	1,060	1,042	1,151
103 Norway	5	11	37	184	218	295	355	428	491
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	223	456	599	1,689	1,592	1,717	2,347	3,350	3,581
105 United States	2,702	4,023	3,153	4,161	4,360	4,682	5,664	4,567	4,567
106 Denmark	5	13	59	205	214	258	388	448	488
107 Sweden	7	38	117	566	608	779	783	956	1,124
108 Switzerland	4	12	30	104	112	119	173	205	218
Total	4,628	6,478	6,967	13,820	13,829	15,680	19,994	22,267	24,594
OECD							**As percentage of donor GNP**		
92 Italy	.22	.10	.16	.11	.13	.10	.14	.09	.09
93 New Zealand	..	..	.23	.52	.41	.39	.34	.30	.30
94 United Kingdom	.56	.47	.41	.39	.40	.46	.48	.52	.52
95 Finland	..	.02	.06	.18	.17	.16	.17	.21	.22
96 Austria	..	.11	.07	.21	.12	.22	.29	.19	.23
97 Japan	.24	.27	.23	.23	.20	.21	.23	.26	.27
98 Australia	.37	.53	.59	.59	.41	.42	.54	.52	.51
99 France	1.35	.76	.66	.62	.62	.60	.57	.59	.59
100 Netherlands	.31	.36	.61	.75	.83	.86	.82	.93	.94
101 Belgium	.88	.60	.46	.59	.51	.46	.55	.56	.59
102 Canada	.19	.19	.41	.52	.39	.48	.52	.47	.46
103 Norway	.11	.16	.32	.66	.70	.83	.90	.93	.95
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	.31	.40	.32	.40	.36	.33	.37	.44	.44
105 United States	.53	.58	.32	.27	.26	.25	.27	.19	.18
106 Denmark	.09	.13	.38	.58	.56	.60	.75	.75	..
107 Sweden	.05	.19	.38	.82	.82	.99	.90	.94	..
108 Switzerland	.04	.09	.15	.19	.19	.19	.20	.21	.22
OECD							**National currencies**		
92 Italy (billions of lire)	48	38	92	119	188	148	318	233	262
93 New Zealand (millions of dollars)	..	..	13	55	53	54	53	61	64
94 United Kingdom (millions of pounds)	145	168	208	411	490	642	759	974	1,096
95 Finland (millions of markkaa)	..	6	29	177	195	196	226	335	400
96 Austria (millions of schillings)	..	260	286	1,376	861	1,785	2,411	1,698	2,327
97 Japan (billions of yen)	38	88	165	341	328	383	466	578	669
98 Australia (millions of dollars)	53	106	189	422	308	361	514	555	611
99 France (millions of francs)	4,063	3,713	5,393	8,975	10,255	11,762	12,207	14,287	16,334
100 Netherlands (millions of guilders)	133	253	710	1,538	1,925	2,229	2,323	2,817	3,106
101 Belgium (millions of francs)	5,050	5,100	6,000	13,903	13,129	13,234	16,836	18,500	20,913
102 Canada (millions of dollars)	73	104	353	863	752	1,005	1,209	1,221	1,347
103 Norway (millions of kroner)	36	78	264	962	1,190	1,570	1,861	2,167	2,470
104 Germany, Fed. Rep. (millions of deutsche marks)	937	1,824	2,192	4,156	4,009	3,987	4,715	6,140	6,550
105 United States (millions of dollars)	2,702	4,023	3,153	4,161	4,360	4,682	5,664	4,567	4,567
106 Denmark (millions of kroner)	35	90	443	1,178	1,294	1,549	2,140	2,357	2,573
107 Sweden (millions of kroner)	36	196	605	2,350	2,647	3,504	3,538	4,098	4,743
108 Switzerland (millions of francs)	17	52	131	260	281	284	309	341	361
OECD							**Summary**		
ODA (billions of US dollars, nominal prices)	4.6	6.5	7.0	13.8	13.8	15.7	20.0	22.3	24.6
ODA as percentage of GNP	.51	.49	.34	.36	.33	.33	.35	.34	.34
ODA (billions of US dollars, constant 1978 prices)	13.1	16.7	14.9	17.9	17.3	18.0	20.0	20.1	20.2
GNP (trillions of US dollars, nominal prices)	.9	1.3	2.0	3.8	4.2	4.7	5.6	6.5	7.2
ODA deflator[c]	.35	.39	.47	.77	.80	.87	1.00	1.11	1.22

1961[a]	1962[a]	1963[a]	1964[a]	1965[a]
385	461	554	605	668
73	81	90	99	108
2,573	2,674	2,765	2,903	3,041
121	141	164	191	223
212	256	294	336	384
3,532	4,061	4,671	5,371	6,177
768	854	943	1,062	1,172
4,282	4,786	5,369	5,932	6,546
1,749	1,976	2,213	2,457	2,745
814	928	1,057	1,205	1,374
1,279	1,420	1,552	1,701	1,863
558	631	707	790	882
4,029	4,533	5,100	5,737	6,336
6,250	6,966	7,662	8,416	9,421
571	638	707	781	861
1,259	1,400	1,545	1,702	1,872
276	318	350	400	455
28,731	32,124	35,743	39,688	44,128
.10	.10	.11	.11	.11
.30	.30	.30	.30	.30
.49	.45	.42	.40	.38
.23	.24	.26	.27	.28
.25	.27	.28	.29	.30
.27	.28	.28	.29	.30
.50	.50	.50	.51	.51
.59	.59	.60	.60	.60
.94	.96	.97	.98	.99
.60	.61	.63	.65	.67
.45	.45	.45	.44	.44
.96	.97	.98	.99	1.00
.44	.44	.45	.46	.46
.22	.22	.22	.22	.22
.70	.70	.70	.70	.70
.95	.95	.95	.95	.95
.25	.26	.26	.27	.28
315	377	453	495	547
72	80	89	98	106
1,150	1,195	1,235	1,297	1,359
465	542	631	734	857
2,835	3,423	3,931	4,493	5,134
770	885	1,018	1,170	1,346
681	757	836	941	1,039
18,233	20,379	22,861	25,258	27,873
3,512	3,968	4,444	4,334	5,512
23,842	27,181	30,960	35,294	40,244
1,497	1,662	1,816	1,991	2,180
2,807	3,174	3,556	3,974	4,437
7,369	8,291	9,328	10,494	11,589
6,250	6,966	7,662	8,416	9,241
3,010	3,363	3,727	4,117	4,539
5,313	5,908	6,520	7,182	7,899
457	526	579	662	753
28.7	32.1	35.7	39.7	44.1
.36	.36	.36	.36	.36
21.6	22.3	23.2	24.1	25.2
8.0	9.0	9.9	11.0	12.1
1.33	1.44	1.54	1.65	1.75

		Amount				
		1975	1976	1977	1978[b]	1979[b]
OPEC		Millions of US dollars				
52	Nigeria	14	83	64	38	28
72	Algeria	41	54	48	44	45
85	Venezuela	31	103	52	109	83
109	Iraq	218	232	61	172	861
110	Iran	593	753	224	278	21
111	Libya	261	94	115	169	146
112	Saudi Arabia	1,997	2,407	2,410	1,470	1,970
113	Kuwait	976	615	1,518	1,268	1,099
	Qatar	339	195	197	106	251
	United Arab Emirates	1,046	1,060	1,177	690	207
	Total OAPEC[d]	4,879	4,656	5,526	3,919	4,579
	Total OPEC	5,516	5,596	5,866	4,344	4,711
OPEC		As percentage of donor GNP				
52	Nigeria	.05	.25	.16	.08	.05
72	Algeria	.28	.33	.25	.18	.14
85	Venezuela	.11	.33	.14	.28	.18
109	Iraq	1.65	1.44	.32	.76	2.94
110	Iran	1.13	1.13	.27	.33	.03
111	Libya	2.31	.63	.65	.93	.58
112	Saudi Arabia	5.40	5.73	4.32	2.76	3.15
113	Kuwait	8.12	4.36	10.61	6.35	5.14
	Qatar	15.62	7.95	7.93	3.65	5.60
	United Arab Emirates	14.12	11.02	10.22	5.60	1.58
	Total OAPEC[d]	4.99	4.03	3.95	2.55	2.43
	Total OPEC	2.71	2.27	1.96	1.35	1.28

		Net bilateral flow to low-income countries						
		1960	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
OECD		As percentage of donor GNP						
92	Italy	.03	.04	.06	.01	.01	.02	.01
93	New Zealand	..	..	..	.14	.06	.04	.03
94	United Kingdom	.22	.23	.15	.11	.14	.11	.15
95	Finland	..	..	..	.06	.07	.06	.04
96	Austria	..	.06	.05	.02	.02	.01	.01
97	Japan	.12	.13	.11	.08	.08	.06	.07
98	Australia	..	.08	.09	.10	.07	.07	.08
99	France	.01	.12	.10	.12	.12	.10	.10
100	Netherlands	.19	.08	.24	.24	.26	.33	.34
101	Belgium	.27	.56	.30	.31	.26	.24	.23
102	Canada	.11	.10	.22	.24	.14	.13	.17
103	Norway	.02	.04	.12	.25	.22	.30	.39
104	Germany, Fed. Rep.	.13	.14	.10	.12	.09	.07	.10
105	United States	.22	.26	.14	.08	.05	.03	.04
106	Denmark	..	.02	.10	.20	.21	.24	.21
107	Sweden	.01	.07	.12	.41	.40	.44	.37
108	Switzerland	..	.02	.05	.10	.07	.05	.08
	Total	.18	.20	.13	.11	.09	.07	.09

a. Estimated.
b. Provisional.
c. See the technical notes.
d. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Table 17. Population Growth, Past and Projected, and Hypothetical Stationary Population[a]

	Average annual growth of population (percent)		Projected population (millions)		Hypothetical size of stationary population (millions)	Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1	Year of reaching stationary population
	1960–70	1970–78	1980	2000			
Low-income countries	**2.5 w**	**2.2 w**	**1,248 t**	**2,050 t**	**4,074 t**		
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	2.5	2.7	89	143	314	2035	2160
3 Lao PDR	2.2	1.3	3	5	11	2035	2175
4 Bhutan	2.0	2.1	1	2	4	2035	2165
5 Ethiopia	2.4	2.5	33	52	139	2045	2175
6 Mali	2.4	2.5	7	11	28	2040	2170
7 Nepal	2.0	2.2	14	21	46	2035	2160
8 Somalia	2.4	2.3	4	6	17	2045	2170
9 Burundi	2.4	2.0	5	8	21	2045	2160
10 Chad	1.8	2.2	5	7	18	2045	2165
11 Mozambique	2.2	2.5	10	17	44	2040	2135
12 Burma	2.2	2.2	34	51	92	2020	2145
13 Upper Volta	1.6	1.6	6	9	24	2040	2170
14 Viet Nam	3.1	2.9	55	87	149	2015	2105
15 India	2.5	2.0	672	974	1,645	2020	2150
16 Malawi	2.8	2.9	6	11	32	2045	2165
17 Rwanda	2.6	2.9	5	8	24	2045	2160
18 Sri Lanka	2.4	1.7	15	21	31	2010	2070
19 Guinea	2.8	2.9	5	9	23	2045	2170
20 Sierra Leone	2.2	2.5	3	6	14	2035	2160
21 Zaire	2.0	2.7	28	47	125	2045	2160
22 Niger	3.3	2.8	5	9	24	2040	2170
23 Benin	2.6	2.8	4	6	15	2035	2160
24 Pakistan	2.8	3.1	82	139	332	2035	2150
25 Tanzania	2.7	3.0	18	32	92	2045	2145
26 Afghanistan	2.2	2.2	15	25	65	2045	2175
27 Central African Rep.	2.2	2.2	2	3	8	2045	2165
28 Madagascar	2.2	2.5	9	14	38	2045	2160
29 Haiti	1.5	1.7	5	8	17	2030	2145
30 Mauritania	2.5	2.7	2	3	7	2040	2150
31 Lesotho	2.0	2.3	1	2	5	2045	2155
32 Uganda	3.7	2.9	13	23	58	2035	2130
33 Angola	1.5	2.3	7	11	29	2040	2155
34 Sudan	2.2	2.6	18	31	88	2045	2135
35 Togo	2.7	2.7	3	4	12	2040	2135
36 Kenya	3.4	3.3	16	32	109	2045	2140
37 Senegal	2.4	2.6	6	9	24	2040	2150
38 Indonesia	2.2	1.8	142	204	350	2020	2155
Middle-income countries	**2.5 w**	**2.4 w**	**916 t**	**1,409 t**	**2,599 t**		
39 Egypt	2.5	2.2	42	62	101	2015	2105
40 Ghana	2.4	3.0	12	21	56	2040	2130
41 Yemen, PDR	1.9	1.9	2	3	6	2030	2125
42 Cameroon	1.8	2.2	8	13	31	2040	2135
43 Liberia	3.1	3.3	2	3	9	2040	2130
44 Honduras	3.1	3.3	4	7	15	2030	2090
45 Zambia	2.6	3.0	6	10	28	2040	2130
46 Zimbabwe	3.9	3.3	7	13	37	2040	2105
47 Thailand	3.0	2.7	46	68	103	2005	2095
48 Bolivia	2.5	2.6	6	9	20	2030	2120
49 Philippines	3.0	2.7	48	75	126	2015	2075
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	1.8	1.9	6	9	19	2030	2170
51 Congo, People's Rep.	2.1	2.5	2	3	7	2045	2115
52 Nigeria	2.5	2.5	85	153	425	2040	2135
53 Papua New Guinea	2.3	2.4	3	5	9	2025	2120
54 El Salvador	2.9	2.9	5	8	14	2015	2075
55 Morocco	2.5	2.9	20	34	70	2025	2090
56 Peru	2.8	2.7	18	29	57	2025	2090
57 Ivory Coast	3.7	5.6	8	14	37	2040	2130
58 Nicaragua	2.9	3.3	3	5	9	2020	2090
59 Colombia	3.0	2.3	27	39	57	2005	2070
60 Paraguay	2.6	2.8	3	5	9	2015	2075
61 Ecuador	3.1	3.3	8	14	26	2020	2080
62 Dominican Rep.	2.9	2.9	5	9	16	2015	2075
63 Guatemala	2.8	2.9	7	12	23	2025	2085
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	3.2	3.2	9	15	33	2025	2085
65 Tunisia	1.9	2.0	6	9	14	2010	2075
66 Jordan	3.0	3.3	3	5	12	2025	2090

	Average annual growth of population (percent)		Projected population (millions)		Hypothetical size of stationary population (millions)	Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1	Year of reaching stationary population
	1960–70	1970–78	1980	2000			
67 Malaysia	2.9	2.7	14	20	30	2005	2070
68 Jamaica	1.4	1.7	2	3	5	2005	2065
69 Lebanon	2.8	2.5	3	5	8	2010	2070
70 Korea, Rep. of	2.4	1.9	38	50	66	2005	2070
71 Turkey	2.5	2.5	45	65	100	2010	2075
72 Algeria	2.4	3.2	19	34	94	2040	2100
73 Mexico	3.3	3.3	70	116	205	2015	2075
74 Panama	2.9	2.6	2	3	4	2005	2065
75 Taiwan	2.6	2.0	18	24	30	2005	2065
76 Chile	2.1	1.7	11	15	19	2005	2070
77 South Africa	2.6	2.7	29	49	107	2030	2090
78 Costa Rica	3.4	2.5	2	3	5	2005	2065
79 Brazil	2.9	2.8	126	201	345	2015	2075
80 Uruguay	1.1	0.3	3	4	4	2005	2070
81 Argentina	1.4	1.3	27	33	41	2005	2065
82 Portugal	0.0	1.0	10	12	14	2005	2100
83 Yugoslavia	1.0	0.9	22	26	29	2005	2095
84 Trinidad and Tobago	2.0	1.2	1	2	2	2005	2065
85 Venezuela	3.4	3.3	15	24	40	2010	2070
86 Hong Kong	2.5	1.9	5	6	8	2005	2065
87 Greece	0.5	0.7	9	10	11	2005	2065
88 Singapore	2.4	1.5	2	3	4	2005	2065
89 Spain	1.1	1.2	38	44	51	2005	2065
90 Israel	3.4	2.7	4	5	8	2020	2080
[illegible]	1.0 w	0.7 w	673 t	798 t	774 t		
91 Ireland	0.4	1.2	3	4	5	2005	2065
92 Italy	0.7	0.7	57	61	53	2005	2035
93 New Zealand	1.7	1.6	3	4	5	2005	2075
94 United Kingdom	0.5	0.1	56	58	59	2005	2025
95 Finland	0.4	0.4	5	5	5	2005	2020
96 Austria	0.5	0.2	7	8	8	2005	2025
97 Japan	1.0	1.2	117	131	134	2005	2015
98 Australia	2.0	1.6	14	17	19	2005	2075
99 France	1.0	0.6	54	58	61	2005	2030
100 Netherlands	1.3	0.8	14	15	16	2005	2025
101 Belgium	0.5	0.3	10	10	10	2005	2025
102 Canada	1.8	1.2	24	28	30	2005	2030
103 Norway	0.8	0.6	4	4	5	2005	2030
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	0.9	0.1	61	61	61	2005	2005
105 United States	1.3	0.8	225	252	273	2005	2030
106 Denmark	0.7	0.4	5	5	5	2005	2020
107 Sweden	0.7	0.4	8	8	8	2005	2005
108 Switzerland	1.6	0.1	6	7	7	2005	2005
[illegible]	2.9 w	3.2 w	94 t	166 t	269 t		
109 Iraq	3.1	3.3	13	23	48	2025	2085
110 Iran	2.7	2.9	38	59	102	2015	2105
111 Libya	3.8	4.1	3	5	12	2030	2090
112 Saudi Arabia	2.6	3.5	9	15	35	2030	2090
113 Kuwait	9.8	6.1	1	2	6	2030	2085
[illegible]	1.7 w	1.4 w	1,288 t	1,726 t	2,151 t		
114 China	2.1	1.6	977	1,251	1,555	2005	2065
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	2.8	2.6	18	27	43	2010	2070
116 Albania	2.8	2.5	3	4	6	2005	2060
117 Cuba	2.0	1.6	10	13	17	2005	2070
118 Mongolia	2.9	2.9	2	3	4	2005	2090
119 Romania	1.0	0.9	22	26	30	2005	2090
120 Bulgaria	0.8	0.5	9	10	10	2005	2080
121 Hungary	0.4	0.4	11	11	12	2005	2085
122 Poland	1.0	0.9	36	41	47	2005	2090
123 USSR	1.2	0.9	266	310	360	2005	2095
124 Czechoslovakia	0.5	0.7	15	17	19	2005	2090
125 German Dem. Rep.	−0.1	−0.2	17	17	18	2005	2015
Total[b]			4,387	6,029	9,771		

a. For the assumptions used in the projections, see the technical notes.

b. Excludes countries with populations of less than one million.

Table 18. Demographic and Fertility-related Indicators

	Crude birth rate per thousand population		Crude death rate per thousand population		Percentage change in:		Total fertility rate	Percentage of women in reproductive age group (aged 15–44)	Percentage of married women using contraceptives[a]	
	1960	1978	1960	1978	Crude birth rate 1960–78	Crude death rate 1960–78	1978	1978	1970	1977
Low-income countries	**48** *w*	**38** *w*	**24** *w*	**15** *w*	**—14.4** *w*	**—31.5** *w*	**5.4** *w*	**44** *w*	..	..
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	51	46	25	18	—9.8	—28.0	6.1	45	..	9
3 Lao PDR	44	45	23	22	2.3	—4.3	6.4	40	..	..
4 Bhutan	46	44	28	23	—4.3	—17.9	6.2	43	..	..
5 Ethiopia	51	49	28	25	—3.9	—10.7	6.7	42	..	..
6 Mali	50	49	27	22	—2.0	—18.5	6.7	41	..	..
7 Nepal	46	45	29	21	—2.2	—27.6	6.5	42	1	4
8 Somalia	57	48	29	20	—15.8	—31.0	6.1	44	..	..
9 Burundi	48	47	27	20	—2.1	—25.9	6.3	42	..	..
10 Chad	46	44	29	21	—4.3	—27.6	5.9	42	..	..
11 Mozambique	46	46	26	19	0.0	—26.9	6.1	41	..	..
12 Burma	43	39	22	14	—9.3	—36.4	5.5	42	..	..
13 Upper Volta	49	48	27	22	—2.0	—18.5	6.5	42	..	..
14 Viet Nam	47	37	21	9	—21.3	—57.1	5.5	41	..	..
15 India	43	35	21	14	—18.6	—33.3	5.0	44	12	17
16 Malawi	53	52	27	20	—1.9	—25.9	7.0	39	..	..
17 Rwanda	51	51	27	19	0.0	—29.6	6.9	40	..	..
18 Sri Lanka	36	26	9	6	—27.8	—33.3	3.6	46	8	41
19 Guinea	47	46	30	21	—2.1	—30.0	6.2	42	..	..
20 Sierra Leone	47	46	27	19	—2.1	—29.6	6.1	41	..	..
21 Zaire	48	46	24	19	—4.2	—20.8	6.1	42	..	(.)
22 Niger	52	51	27	22	—1.9	—18.5	7.1	41	..	..
23 Benin	51	49	27	19	—3.9	—29.6	6.7	41	..	..
24 Pakistan	48	45	23	15	—6.3	—34.8	6.7	40	*4*	*6*
25 Tanzania	47	48	22	16	2.1	—27.3	6.5	40	..	..
26 Afghanistan	48	48	30	22	0.0	—26.7	6.9	41	..	*1*
27 Central African Rep.	42	42	26	19	0.0	—26.9	5.5	42	..	..
28 Madagascar	47	45	27	19	—4.3	—29.6	6.1	41	..	..
29 Haiti	45	43	23	17	—4.4	—26.1	5.9	42	..	*5*
30 Mauritania	51	50	27	22	—2.0	—18.5	6.9	41	..	..
31 Lesotho	40	40	23	16	0.0	—30.4	5.4	42	..	..
32 Uganda	45	45	21	14	0.0	—33.3	6.1	41	..	..
33 Angola	50	48	31	23	—4.0	—25.8	6.4	42	..	..
34 Sudan	47	45	25	18	—4.3	—28.0	6.6	42	..	..
35 Togo	51	50	27	19	—2.0	—29.6	6.7	41	..	..
36 Kenya	51	51	19	14	0.0	—26.3	7.8	39	*2*	*4*
37 Senegal	48	49	27	22	2.1	—18.5	6.5	41	..	..
38 Indonesia	47	37	23	17	—21.3	—26.1	4.9	44	(.)	19
Middle-income countries	**40** *w*	**35** *w*	**14** *w*	**11** *w*	**—17.4** *w*	**—29.9** *w*	**4.9** *w*	**43** *w*	..	..
39 Egypt	45	37	19	13	—17.8	—31.6	5.0	44	*9*	*21*
40 Ghana	49	48	24	17	—2.0	—29.2	6.7	41	2	4
41 Yemen, PDR	54	48	30	21	—11.1	—30.0	7.0	41	..	..
42 Cameroon	43	42	27	19	—2.3	—29.6	5.7	41	..	..
43 Liberia	51	51	25	18	0.0	—28.0	6.9	40	..	..
44 Honduras	51	47	19	12	—7.8	—36.8	6.9	39	..	*9*
45 Zambia	51	49	24	17	—3.9	—29.2	6.9	40	..	..
46 Zimbabwe	47	48	19	14	2.1	—26.3	6.6	40	..	5
47 Thailand	46	32	17	8	—30.4	—52.9	4.5	42	27	*40*
48 Bolivia	48	44	23	15	—8.3	—34.8	6.5	41	..	..
49 Philippines	45	35	15	9	—22.2	—40.0	5.0	42	2	22
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	49	48	29	25	—2.0	—13.8	6.8	41	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.	46	45	27	19	—2.2	—29.6	6.0	42	..	..
52 Nigeria	52	50	25	18	—3.8	—28.0	6.9	41	..	..
53 Papua New Guinea	44	41	23	16	—6.8	—30.4	6.0	42	..	3
54 El Salvador	48	39	17	9	—18.8	—47.1	5.5	41	..	22
55 Morocco	52	45	23	13	—13.5	—43.5	6.5	41	*1*	5
56 Peru	47	39	19	12	—17.0	—36.8	5.6	43	..	*1*
57 Ivory Coast	50	50	27	19	0.0	—29.6	6.7	42	..	..
58 Nicaragua	51	45	19	13	—11.8	—31.6	6.2	41	..	*19*
59 Colombia	46	31	14	8	—32.6	—42.9	4.0	45	..	36
60 Paraguay	43	39	13	9	—9.3	—30.8	5.8	41	..	16
61 Ecuador	47	44	14	10	—6.4	—28.6	6.5	41	..	*6*
62 Dominican Rep.	50	37	16	9	—26.0	—43.8	5.3	42	..	31
63 Guatemala	48	41	18	12	—14.6	—33.3	5.7	43	..	*3*
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	47	45	26	13	—4.3	—50.0	7.4	38	..	(.)
65 Tunisia	49	32	21	12	—34.7	—42.9	4.6	42	*8*	18
66 Jordan	48	46	20	13	—4.2	—35.0	7.0	41	..	..

	Crude birth rate per thousand population		Crude death rate per thousand population		Percentage change in:		Total fertility rate	Percentage of women in reproductive age group (aged 15–44)	Percentage of married women using contra-ceptives[a]	
	1960	1978	1960	1978	Crude birth rate 1960–78	Crude death rate 1960–78	1978	1978	1970	1977
67 Malaysia	39	29	9	6	–25.6	–33.3	3.9	44	7	36
68 Jamaica	39	29	9	6	–25.6	–33.3	4.2	39	..	*40*
69 Lebanon	43	33	14	8	–23.3	–42.9	4.7	42	14	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	41	21	13	8	–48.8	–38.5	2.8	47	32	44
71 Turkey	44	32	17	10	–27.3	–41.2	4.4	43	8	38
72 Algeria	50	48	23	14	–4.0	–39.1	7.3	39	..	..
73 Mexico	45	38	12	8	–15.6	–33.3	5.7	41	..	*21*
74 Panama	41	31	10	6	–24.4	–40.0	4.1	43	..	44
75 Taiwan	39	21	7	5	–46.2	–28.6	2.5	49	44	*65*
76 Chile	37	22	12	7	–40.5	–41.7	2.7	46	..	..
77 South Africa	39	38	15	10	–2.6	–33.3	5.1	42	..	..
78 Costa Rica	47	28	10	5	–40.4	–50.0	3.6	46	..	67
79 Brazil	40	36	11	9	–10.0	–18.2	4.9	43	2	..
80 Uruguay	22	20	9	9	–9.1	0.0	2.9	41	..	..
81 Argentina	24	21	9	8	–12.5	–11.1	2.9	43	..	..
82 Portugal	24	18	8	10	–25.0	25.0	2.5	42	..	..
83 Yugoslavia	23	18	10	8	–21.7	–20.0	2.2	45	59	..
84 Trinidad and Tobago	37	22	7	6	–40.5	–14.3	2.6	46	*44*	..
85 Venezuela	45	36	10	7	–20.0	–30.0	4.9	43	..	..
86 Hong Kong	35	19	7	6	–45.7	–14.3	2.6	45	51	*77*
87 Greece	19	15	8	9	–21.1	12.5	2.3	40	..	..
88 Singapore	38	17	8	6	–55.3	–25.0	2.1	51	45	71
89 Spain	21	18	9	8	–14.3	–11.1	2.6	41	..	..
90 Israel	26	26	8	7	0.0	–12.5	3.5	42	..	..
Industrialized countries	**20** w	**14** w	**10** w	**9** w	**–31.3** w	**–6.0** w	**1.8** w	**43** w	..	..
91 Ireland	21	21	12	11	0.0	–8.3	3.5	39	..	..
92 Italy	18	13	10	9	–27.8	–10.0	1.9	41	..	..
93 New Zealand	26	17	9	8	–34.6	–11.1	2.2	44	..	..
94 United Kingdom	17	12	12	12	–29.4	0.0	1.7	39	*72*	..
95 Finland	19	14	9	9	–26.3	0.0	1.7	44	*77*	..
96 Austria	18	11	13	12	–38.9	–7.7	1.7	39	..	..
97 Japan	18	15	8	6	–16.7	–25.0	1.8	46	..	*61*
98 Australia	22	16	9	8	–27.3	–11.1	2.1	44	*66*	..
99 France	18	14	12	10	–22.2	–16.7	1.9	41	*64*	..
100 Netherlands	21	13	8	8	–38.1	0.0	1.6	44	*59*	*71*
101 Belgium	17	12	12	11	–29.4	–8.3	1.8	41	..	*67*
102 Canada	27	16	8	8	–40.7	0.0	1.9	47	..	..
103 Norway	18	13	9	10	–27.8	11.1	1.8	39	..	..
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	17	9	11	12	–47.1	9.1	1.4	40	..	..
105 United States	24	15	9	9	–37.5	0.0	1.8	44	65	..
106 Denmark	17	12	9	10	–29.4	11.1	1.7	41	67	..
107 Sweden	15	12	10	11	–20.0	10.0	1.7	40	..	..
108 Switzerland	18	11	10	9	–38.9	–10.0	1.5	43	..	..
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**48** w	**43** w	**21** w	**14** w	**–10.5** w	**–35.0** w	**6.5** w	**41** w	..	..
109 Iraq	51	47	19	13	–7.8	–31.6	7.0	41	..	23
110 Iran	47	40	21	14	–14.9	–33.3	5.9	41	3	24
111 Libya	49	47	19	13	–4.1	–31.6	7.4	40	..	..
112 Saudi Arabia	51	51	28	15	0.0	–46.4	8.0	39	..	..
113 Kuwait	44	47	10	5	6.8	–50.0	7.0	42	..	..
Centrally planned economies	**32** w	**18** w	**13** w	**7** w	**–41.5** w	**–40.1** w	**2.4** w	**45** w	..	..
114 China	36	18	15	6	–50.0	–60.0	2.3	46	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	41	33	13	8	–19.5	–38.5	4.5	44	..	..
116 Albania	41	30	11	6	–26.8	–45.5	4.2	44	..	..
117 Cuba	32	19	9	6	–40.6	–33.3	2.5	44	..	..
118 Mongolia	41	37	15	8	–9.8	–46.7	5.4	42	..	..
119 Romania	20	19	9	9	–5.0	0.0	2.6	42	..	..
120 Bulgaria	18	16	9	11	–11.1	22.2	2.3	42	..	..
121 Hungary	16	16	10	12	0.0	20.0	2.2	41	..	..
122 Poland	24	19	8	9	–20.8	12.5	2.3	45	*57*	..
123 USSR	24	18	7	10	–25.0	42.9	2.4	43	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia	17	18	10	11	5.9	10.0	2.4	41	66	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	17	13	13	13	–23.5	0.0	1.8	40	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes.

Table 19. Labor Force

	Percentage of population of working age (15–64 years)		Percentage of labor force in:						Average annual growth of labor force (percent)		
			Agriculture		Industry		Services				
	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960–70	1970–80	1980–2000
Low-income countries	**56** w	**55** w	**77** w	**72** w	**9** w	**11** w	**14** w	**17** w	**1.7** w	**1.9** w	**2.2** w
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	53	54	87	74	3	11	10	15	2.5	2.4	2.5
3 Lao PDR	56	51	83	75	4	7	13	18	1.4	0.3	2.0
4 Bhutan	56	55	95	93	2	2	3	5	1.7	2.0	1.9
5 Ethiopia	54	52	88	81	5	7	7	12	2.2	1.8	2.2
6 Mali	54	52	94	88	3	6	3	6	2.0	2.2	2.5
7 Nepal	57	55	95	93	2	2	3	5	1.5	2.0	2.1
8 Somalia	54	54	88	82	4	7	8	11	1.7	2.3	2.4
9 Burundi	55	53	90	85	3	5	7	10	1.9	1.6	2.3
10 Chad	57	54	95	86	2	6	3	8	1.5	2.0	2.3
11 Mozambique	56	53	81	67	8	18	11	15	1.9	1.7	2.2
12 Burma	59	55	68	53	11	20	21	27	1.1	1.5	2.0
13 Upper Volta	54	53	92	83	5	12	3	5	1.2	1.4	2.3
14 Viet Nam	..	52	81	73	5	8	14	19	1.0	1.9	2.6
15 India	57	56	74	74	11	11	15	15	1.5	1.7	2.0
16 Malawi	52	50	92	86	3	5	5	9	2.3	2.4	2.8
17 Rwanda	53	51	95	91	1	2	4	7	2.2	2.5	2.8
18 Sri Lanka	54	58	56	54	14	15	30	31	2.1	2.1	2.1
19 Guinea	55	54	88	82	6	11	6	7	2.4	2.2	2.1
20 Sierra Leone	55	53	78	67	12	18	10	15	1.5	1.8	2.3
21 Zaire	53	53	83	76	9	13	8	11	1.4	2.1	2.4
22 Niger	53	51	95	91	1	3	4	6	3.0	2.6	2.9
23 Benin	53	51	54	46	9	15	37	39	2.0	2.2	2.1
24 Pakistan	52	51	61	58	18	19	21	23	1.8	2.5	2.9
25 Tanzania	54	51	89	83	4	6	7	11	2.1	2.3	2.7
26 Afghanistan	55	53	85	79	6	9	9	12	1.9	1.8	2.5
27 Central African Rep.	58	56	94	89	2	3	4	8	1.7	1.6	2.3
28 Madagascar	55	53	93	86	2	4	5	10	1.8	2.0	2.3
29 Haiti	55	53	80	70	6	8	14	22	0.7	1.4	2.4
30 Mauritania	53	52	91	85	3	5	6	10	2.2	2.3	2.7
31 Lesotho	57	55	93	87	2	4	5	9	1.6	1.9	2.1
32 Uganda	54	52	89	83	4	6	7	11	3.2	2.5	2.5
33 Angola	55	53	69	60	12	16	19	24	1.0	1.9	2.4
34 Sudan	53	53	86	79	6	9	8	12	2.1	2.3	2.7
35 Togo	53	51	80	69	8	14	12	17	2.2	2.1	2.6
36 Kenya	50	48	86	79	5	8	9	13	2.9	2.8	3.3
37 Senegal	54	53	84	77	5	8	11	15	1.8	1.9	2.2
38 Indonesia	56	56	75	60	8	11	17	29	1.8	2.1	1.8
Middle-income countries	**55** w	**55** w	**56** w	**45** w	**17** w	**23** w	**25** w	**32** w	**2.0** w	**2.4** w	**2.5** w
39 Egypt	55	56	58	51	12	26	30	23	2.2	2.2	2.3
40 Ghana	53	51	54	54	14	19	22	27	1.6	2.4	2.9
41 Yemen, PDR	52	51	70	60	15	21	15	19	1.4	1.3	2.8
42 Cameroon	57	55	87	82	5	7	8	11	1.3	1.3	1.7
43 Liberia	52	50	80	71	10	13	10	16	2.3	2.6	2.9
44 Honduras	52	49	70	64	11	14	19	22	2.5	3.0	3.3
45 Zambia	53	51	79	68	7	11	14	21	2.4	2.4	2.8
46 Zimbabwe	52	50	69	60	11	15	20	25	3.1	2.6	3.0
47 Thailand	53	53	84	77	4	8	12	15	2.1	2.9	2.3
48 Bolivia	55	53	61	51	18	24	21	25	1.9	2.4	2.9
49 Philippines	52	52	61	48	15	16	24	36	2.1	2.4	2.7
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	54	51	83	76	7	11	10	13	1.5	1.4	2.3
51 Congo, People's Rep.	56	54	52	35	17	26	31	39	1.5	2.0	2.7
52 Nigeria	52	54	71	56	10	17	19	27	1.8	2.0	2.9
53 Papua New Guinea	57	55	89	82	4	7	7	11	1.8	1.9	2.0
54 El Salvador	52	51	62	52	17	22	21	26	2.5	2.8	3.3
55 Morocco	53	50	62	53	14	20	24	27	1.9	2.9	3.3
56 Peru	52	53	53	39	19	21	28	40	2.0	3.0	3.1
57 Ivory Coast	54	54	89	81	2	3	9	16	3.6	4.5	2.4
58 Nicaragua	50	49	62	44	16	15	22	41	2.6	3.3	3.6
59 Colombia	50	56	52	30	19	23	29	47	3.0	3.2	2.6
60 Paraguay	51	52	56	50	19	19	25	31	2.3	3.1	3.4
61 Ecuador	52	52	58	46	19	25	23	29	2.9	3.2	3.2
62 Dominican Rep.	49	51	67	57	12	16	21	27	2.3	3.4	3.3
63 Guatemala	51	54	57	57	14	20	19	23	2.5	3.0	2.8
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	52	48	54	49	19	22	27	29	2.1	2.9	3.5
65 Tunisia	53	54	56	45	18	24	26	31	0.7	2.9	2.6
66 Jordan	52	51	44	27	26	39	30	34	2.8	2.9	3.2

	Percentage of population of working age (15–64 years)		Percentage of labor force in:						Average annual growth of labor force (percent)		
			Agriculture		Industry		Services				
	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960–70	1970–80	1980–2000
67 Malaysia	51	54	63	50	12	16	25	34	2.8	3.0	2.8
68 Jamaica	54	51	39	28	25	17	36	55	0.4	2.4	3.3
69 Lebanon	53	55	38	12	23	27	39	61	2.1	3.0	2.8
70 Korea, Rep. of	54	60	66	41	9	37	25	22	2.9	2.8	2.0
71 Turkey	55	56	78	60	11	14	11	26	1.4	2.2	2.1
72 Algeria	52	49	67	30	12	25	21	45	0.2	3.5	3.5
73 Mexico	51	51	55	39	20	26	25	35	2.8	3.3	3.5
74 Panama	52	55	51	35	14	18	35	47	3.3	2.8	2.6
75 Taiwan	52	63	56	37	11	37	33	26	2.4	1.9	1.6
76 Chile	57	61	30	20	30	26	40	54	1.4	2.6	2.1
77 South Africa	55	54	32	30	30	29	38	41	3.2	2.6	3.0
78 Costa Rica	50	57	51	29	19	23	30	48	3.4	3.6	2.7
79 Brazil	54	55	52	41	15	22	33	37	2.7	2.8	2.9
80 Uruguay	64	63	21	12	29	33	50	55	0.9	0.2	1.1
81 Argentina	64	63	20	14	36	29	44	57	1.3	1.2	1.2
82 Portugal	63	63	44	27	29	37	27	36	0.2	0.8	0.9
83 Yugoslavia	63	66	63	33	18	32	19	35	1.0	1.1	0.7
84 Trinidad and Tobago	53	60	22	16	34	36	44	48	2.4	2.6	2.2
85 Venezuela	51	54	35	20	22	27	43	53	2.7	3.9	3.2
86 Hong Kong	56	65	8	3	52	57	40	40	3.1	3.0	1.3
87 Greece	65	64	56	39	20	28	24	33	(.)	0.6	0.5
88 Singapore	55	65	8	2	23	38	69	60	2.7	2.7	1.4
89 Spain	64	63	42	18	31	43	27	39	0.2	1.2	0.9
90 Israel	59	59	14	7	35	36	51	57	3.5	2.4	2.1
Industrialized countries	**63** w	**65** w	**17** w	**6** w	**36** w	**39** w	**45** w	**55** w	**1.2** w	**1.1** w	**0.6** w
91 Ireland	58	58	36	20	25	37	39	43	(.)	1.0	1.6
92 Italy	66	64	31	13	40	48	29	39	—0.1	0.7	0.4
93 New Zealand	59	63	15	10	37	35	48	55	2.2	2.1	1.2
94 United Kingdom	65	64	4	2	48	43	48	55	0.6	0.3	0.4
95 Finland	62	68	36	14	31	37	33	49	0.5	1.0	0.4
96 Austria	66	63	24	10	46	40	30	50	—0.7	0.8	0.4
97 Japan	64	68	33	13	30	39	37	48	1.8	1.3	0.7
98 Australia	61	64	11	6	40	34	49	60	2.6	1.8	0.9
99 France	62	63	22	9	39	40	39	51	0.6	1.1	0.6
100 Netherlands	61	65	11	6	42	45	47	49	1.6	1.3	0.5
101 Belgium	65	65	8	3	48	43	44	54	0.3	0.7	0.3
102 Canada	59	66	13	6	35	30	52	64	2.5	2.0	0.9
103 Norway	63	63	20	8	37	38	43	54	0.5	0.7	0.6
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	68	65	14	4	48	48	38	48	0.2	0.7	(.)
105 United States	60	65	7	2	36	33	57	65	1.7	1.5	0.9
106 Denmark	64	64	18	8	37	37	45	55	1.1	0.6	0.4
107 Sweden	66	64	14	5	45	37	41	58	1.0	0.3	0.2
108 Switzerland	66	66	12	6	50	47	38	47	1.9	0.4	0.2
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**51** w	**51** w	**57** w	**42** w	**20** w	**29** w	**23** w	**29** w	**2.6** w	**2.8** w	**2.9** w
109 Iraq	51	51	53	42	18	25	29	33	2.8	2.9	3.2
110 Iran	51	51	54	40	23	33	23	27	2.5	2.6	2.9
111 Libya	53	51	53	21	17	27	30	52	5.2	3.5	3.0
112 Saudi Arabia	54	52	71	62	10	13	19	25	2.3	3.5	2.7
113 Kuwait	63	53	1	2	34	35	65	63	7.3	4.1	3.1
Centrally planned economies	**58** w	**62** w	**64** w	**49** w	**20** w	**31** w	**16** w	**20** w	**1.4** w	**1.7** w	**1.2** w
114 China	56	61	75	62	15	25	10	13	1.7	1.9	1.4
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	53	56	62	49	23	32	15	19	2.3	2.9	2.7
116 Albania	54	57	71	62	18	24	11	14	2.3	2.7	2.4
117 Cuba	61	59	39	25	22	31	39	44	0.8	2.0	2.0
118 Mongolia	54	53	70	56	13	21	17	23	2.1	2.4	2.7
119 Romania	65	64	64	50	21	31	15	19	0.8	0.6	0.7
120 Bulgaria	66	66	56	40	25	38	19	22	0.7	0.3	0.3
121 Hungary	66	66	38	18	35	55	27	27	0.5	0.4	0.2
122 Poland	61	66	48	33	29	39	23	28	1.8	1.4	0.8
123 USSR	63	65	42	17	29	47	29	36	0.7	1.2	0.7
124 Czechoslovakia	64	64	26	12	46	50	28	38	0.9	0.8	0.7
125 German Dem. Rep.	65	63	18	10	48	51	34	39	—0.2	0.5	0.3

Table 20. Urbanization

	Urban population				Percentage of urban population				Number of cities of over 500,000 persons	
	As percentage of total population		Average annual growth rate (percent)		In largest city		In cities of over 500,000 persons			
	1960	1980	1960–70	1970–80	1960	1980	1960	1980	1960	1980
Low-income countries	**17** *w*	**21** *w*	**3.7** *w*	**4.0** *w*	**14** *w*	**16** *w*	**24** *w*	**45** *w*	**20** *t*	**76** *t*
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	5	11	6.5	6.6	20	30	20	51	1	3
3 Lao PDR	8	13	4.1	4.8	69	48	0	0	0	0
4 Bhutan	3	4	4.2	4.5	..	..	0	0	0	0
5 Ethiopia	6	15	6.1	6.9	30	37	0	37	0	1
6 Mali	11	20	5.4	5.5	32	34	0	0	0	0
7 Nepal	3	5	4.3	4.7	41	27	0	0	0	0
8 Somalia	17	30	5.3	5.1	..	34	0	0	0	0
9 Burundi	2	2	2.4	2.6	..	..	0	0	0	0
10 Chad	7	18	6.8	6.7	..	39	0	0	0	0
11 Mozambique	4	9	6.6	6.8	75	83	0	83	0	1
12 Burma	19	27	3.9	4.0	23	23	23	29	1	1
13 Upper Volta	5	9	5.3	4.1	..	41	0	0	0	0
14 Viet Nam	15	23	5.3	5.1	32	21	32	50	1	4
15 India	18	22	3.3	3.3	7	6	26	47	11	36
16 Malawi	4	9	6.6	6.2	..	19	0	0	0	0
17 Rwanda	2	4	5.3	5.9	..	..	0	0	0	0
18 Sri Lanka	18	27	4.3	3.7	28	16	0	16	0	1
19 Guinea	10	19	6.1	6.1	37	80	0	80	0	1
20 Sierra Leone	13	25	5.5	5.6	37	47	0	0	0	0
21 Zaire	16	34	5.2	7.2	14	28	14	38	1	2
22 Niger	6	13	7.0	6.8	..	31	0	0	0	0
23 Benin	10	14	5.3	3.9	..	63	0	63	0	1
24 Pakistan	22	28	4.0	4.3	20	21	33	52	2	7
25 Tanzania	5	12	6.3	8.3	34	50	0	50	0	1
26 Afghanistan	8	15	5.4	5.6	33	17	0	17	0	1
27 Central African Rep.	23	41	5.3	4.9	40	36	0	0	0	0
28 Madagascar	11	18	5.1	5.2	44	36	0	36	0	1
29 Haiti	16	35	3.9	4.2	42	56	0	56	0	1
30 Mauritania	3	23	15.8	8.6	..	39	0	0	0	0
31 Lesotho	2	5	7.5	7.8	..	..	0	0	0	0
32 Uganda	5	12	6.3	7.0	38	52	0	52	0	1
33 Angola	10	21	5.1	5.8	44	64	0	64	0	1
34 Sudan	10	25	6.9	6.8	30	31	0	31	0	1
35 Togo	10	17	5.6	5.6	..	60	0	0	0	0
36 Kenya	7	14	6.6	6.8	40	57	0	57	0	1
37 Senegal	23	25	2.9	3.3	53	65	0	65	0	1
38 Indonesia	15	20	3.8	3.6	20	23	34	49	3	9
Middle-income countries	**37** *w*	**51** *w*	**4.2** *w*	**3.8** *w*	**29** *w*	**30** *w*	**36** *w*	**49** *w*	**52** *t*	**115** *t*
39 Egypt	38	45	3.6	3.0	38	39	53	53	2	2
40 Ghana	23	36	4.6	5.2	25	35	0	48	0	2
41 Yemen, PDR	28	37	3.2	3.5	61	50	0	0	0	0
42 Cameroon	14	35	5.6	7.5	26	21	0	21	0	1
43 Liberia	21	33	5.6	5.6	..	..	0	0	0	0
44 Honduras	23	36	5.5	5.5	31	33	0	0	0	0
45 Zambia	23	38	5.4	5.4	..	35	0	35	0	1
46 Zimbabwe	13	23	6.8	6.4	40	50	0	50	0	1
47 Thailand	13	14	3.7	3.5	65	69	65	68	1	1
48 Bolivia	24	33	4.1	4.3	47	44	0	44	0	1
49 Philippines	30	36	3.9	3.6	27	30	27	36	1	3
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	3	10	7.5	7.3	..	25	0	0	0	0
51 Congo, People's Rep.	33	37	2.6	3.2	77	56	0	0	0	0
52 Nigeria	13	20	4.7	4.9	13	17	22	57	2	9
53 Papua New Guinea	3	17	15.3	8.5	..	25	0	0	0	0
54 El Salvador	38	41	3.2	3.4	26	22	0	0	0	0
55 Morocco	29	41	4.2	4.5	16	13	16	29	1	5
56 Peru	46	67	5.0	4.4	38	39	38	44	1	2
57 Ivory Coast	19	38	7.3	8.2	27	33	0	33	0	1
58 Nicaragua	41	53	4.2	4.5	41	47	0	47	0	1
59 Colombia	48	70	5.2	3.9	17	26	28	53	3	5
60 Paraguay	36	39	3.0	3.5	44	44	0	44	0	1
61 Ecuador	34	45	4.5	4.5	31	29	0	52	0	2
62 Dominican Rep.	30	51	5.8	5.3	50	54	0	70	0	2
63 Guatemala	33	39	3.6	3.7	41	36	41	36	1	1
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	37	50	4.8	4.7	35	33	35	55	1	2
65 Tunisia	36	52	3.8	3.8	40	31	40	31	1	1
66 Jordan	43	56	4.5	4.6	31	37	0	37	0	1

	Urban population				Percentage of urban population				Number of cities of over 500,000 persons	
	As percentage of total population		Average annual growth rate (percent)		In largest city		In cities of over 500,000 persons			
	1960	1980	1960–70	1970–80	1960	1980	1960	1980	1960	1980
67 Malaysia	25	29	3.6	3.5	19	27	0	27	0	1
68 Jamaica	34	50	3.5	3.6	77	65	0	65	0	1
69 Lebanon	44	76	6.2	4.5	64	79	64	79	1	1
70 Korea, Rep. of	28	55	6.2	4.8	35	41	61	77	3	7
71 Turkey	30	47	5.1	4.6	18	24	32	42	3	4
72 Algeria	30	61	6.1	6.4	27	12	27	12	1	1
73 Mexico	51	67	4.8	4.5	28	32	36	48	3	7
74 Panama	41	54	4.4	3.9	30	33	0	33	0	1
75 Taiwan	58	77	3.3	4.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
76 Chile	68	81	3.1	2.4	38	44	38	44	1	1
77 South Africa	47	50	2.8	3.1	16	13	44	53	4	7
78 Costa Rica	37	43	4.2	3.4	67	64	0	64	0	1
79 Brazil	46	65	4.8	4.3	14	16	35	52	6	14
80 Uruguay	80	84	1.3	0.7	56	52	56	52	1	1
81 Argentina	74	82	2.0	1.8	46	45	54	60	3	5
82 Portugal	23	31	1.5	2.5	47	42	47	42	1	1
83 Yugoslavia	28	42	3.2	2.9	11	10	11	23	1	3
84 Trinidad and Tobago	22	22	1.7	1.4	..	..	0	0	0	0
85 Venezuela	67	83	4.8	4.2	26	26	26	39	1	3
86 Hong Kong	89	90	2.6	1.9	100	100	100	100	1	1
87 Greece	43	62	2.6	2.4	51	57	51	70	1	2
88 Singapore	100	100	2.4	1.5	100	100	100	100	1	1
89 Spain	57	74	2.6	2.3	13	16	37	44	5	6
90 Israel	77	89	4.3	3.1	46	35	46	35	1	1
Industrialized countries	**67 w**	**77 w**	**1.8 w**	**1.2 w**	**19 w**	**18 w**	**48 w**	**55 w**	**99 t**	**152 t**
91 Ireland	46	58	1.6	2.2	51	48	51	48	1	1
92 Italy	59	69	1.5	1.3	13	17	46	55	7	9
93 New Zealand	76	85	2.4	1.9	25	30	0	30	0	1
94 United Kingdom	86	91	0.8	0.3	24	20	61	52	15	18
95 Finland	38	62	3.2	2.5	28	27	0	27	0	1
96 Austria	50	54	0.9	0.5	51	39	51	39	1	1
97 Japan	62	78	2.4	2.0	18	22	35	41	5	9
98 Australia	81	89	2.5	1.8	26	24	62	68	4	5
99 France	62	78	2.4	1.4	25	23	34	35	4	7
100 Netherlands	80	76	1.0	0.5	9	9	27	24	3	3
101 Belgium	66	72	1.2	0.5	17	14	28	24	2	2
102 Canada	69	80	2.7	1.7	14	17	31	66	2	10
103 Norway	32	53	3.5	2.7	50	32	50	32	1	1
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	77	85	1.4	0.5	20	18	48	45	11	12
105 United States	67	73	1.7	1.2	13	12	61	77	40	67
106 Denmark	74	84	1.5	0.9	40	32	40	32	1	1
107 Sweden	73	87	1.8	1.0	15	15	15	15	1	3
108 Switzerland	51	58	2.2	0.7	19	22	19	22	1	1
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**35 w**	**58 w**	**5.8 w**	**5.5 w**	**26 w**	**36 w**	**28 w**	**51 w**	**2 t**	**13 t**
109 Iraq	43	72	6.2	5.4	35	55	35	70	1	3
110 Iran	34	50	4.7	4.9	26	28	26	47	1	6
111 Libya	23	52	8.0	8.2	57	64	0	64	0	1
112 Saudi Arabia	30	67	7.8	6.5	15	18	0	41	0	3
113 Kuwait	72	88	10.4	7.2	75	32	0	0	0	0
Centrally planned economies	**29 w**	**36 w**	**3.0 w**	**2.6 w**	**9 w**	**7 w**	**31 w**	**37 w**	**76 t**	**133 t**
114 China	19	25	3.6	3.1	6	6	42	44	38	65
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	40	60	5.0	4.3	15	12	15	19	1	2
116 Albania	31	37	3.8	3.4	27	25	0	0	0	0
117 Cuba	55	65	2.9	2.4	38	31	38	31	1	1
118 Mongolia	36	50	5.2	4.1	53	52	0	0	0	0
119 Romania	34	48	2.8	2.5	22	17	22	17	1	1
120 Bulgaria	39	64	3.8	2.5	23	18	23	18	1	1
121 Hungary	40	54	1.7	2.2	45	38	45	38	1	1
122 Poland	48	57	1.8	1.7	17	15	41	43	5	8
123 USSR	49	65	2.7	2.2	6	4	21	33	25	50
124 Czechoslovakia	47	63	2.1	2.0	17	12	17	12	1	1
125 German Dem. Rep.	72	77	0.1	0.2	9	9	14	17	2	3

Table 21. Indicators Related to Life Expectancy

	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Infant mortality rate (aged 0–1)[a]		Child death rate (aged 1–4)[a]	
	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978
Low-income countries	**42** *w*	**50** *w*	..	..	**30** *w*	**20** *w*
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh	40	47	..	*139*	29	23
3 Lao PDR	40	42	..	..	29	27
4 Bhutan	36	41	..	..	41	28
5 Ethiopia	36	39	*126*	..	43	37
6 Mali	37	42	210	..	41	32
7 Nepal	36	43	..	..	35	23
8 Somalia	36	43	..	..	43	31
9 Burundi	37	45	..	..	41	28
10 Chad	35	43	..	..	45	30
11 Mozambique	37	46	..	..	41	27
12 Burma	44	53	..	..	25	15
13 Upper Volta	37	42	263	..	41	32
14 Viet Nam	41	62	..	..	28	6
15 India	43	51	..	..	28	18
16 Malawi	37	46	..	..	41	27
17 Rwanda	37	46	..	*127*	41	27
18 Sri Lanka	62	69	63	..	7	2
19 Guinea	35	43	..	..	45	30
20 Sierra Leone	37	46	..	..	41	27
21 Zaire	40	46	..	..	37	27
22 Niger	37	42	212	..	41	32
23 Benin	37	46	206	..	41	27
24 Pakistan	44	52	..	..	27	17
25 Tanzania	42	51	..	*185*	32	20
26 Afghanistan	34	42	..	*237*	42	27
27 Central African Rep.	37	46	190	..	40	27
28 Madagascar	37	46	..	..	41	27
29 Haiti	42	51	..	..	39	23
30 Mauritania	37	42	..	..	41	32
31 Lesotho	42	50	..	..	34	21
32 Uganda	44	53	*160*	..	30	17
33 Angola	33	41	..	..	49	34
34 Sudan	39	46	..	..	46	31
35 Togo	37	46	177	..	41	27
36 Kenya	47	53	126	..	25	14
37 Senegal	37	42	93	..	41	32
38 Indonesia	41	47	*125*	..	31	20
Middle-income countries	**54** *w*	**61** *w*	..	..	**18** *w*	**10** *w*
39 Egypt	46	54	..	108	31	18
40 Ghana	40	48	*141*	..	36	23
41 Yemen, PDR	36	44	..	..	54	36
42 Cameroon	37	46	167	..	40	27
43 Liberia	40	48	..	..	36	23
44 Honduras	46	57	*130*	*118*	30	14
45 Zambia	40	48	..	..	36	23
46 Zimbabwe	45	54	..	..	28	16
47 Thailand	51	61	..	*68*	15	6
48 Bolivia	43	52	..	*158*	36	22
49 Philippines	51	60	98	*65*	16	7
50 Yemen Arab. Rep.	36	39	..	..	55	31
51 Congo, People's Rep.	37	46	180	..	40	27
52 Nigeria	39	48	..	..	38	24
53 Papua New Guinea	41	50	159	..	32	19
54 El Salvador	50	63	..	60	24	8
55 Morocco	47	55	..	..	30	17
56 Peru	48	56	..	..	28	16
57 Ivory Coast	37	46	..	..	41	27
58 Nicaragua	47	55	..	*37*	30	17
59 Colombia	53	62	..	*98*	17	9
60 Paraguay	56	63	..	..	16	8
61 Ecuador	51	60	140	*66*	23	10
62 Dominican Rep.	51	60	..	37	23	10
63 Guatemala	47	57	..	*77*	31	15
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	48	57	..	..	29	14
65 Tunisia	48	57	*148*	*123*	29	15
66 Jordan	47	56	..	..	30	16

	Life expectancy at birth (years)		Infant mortality rate (aged 0–1)[a]		Child death rate (aged 1–4)[a]	
	1960	1978	1960	1978	1960	1978
67 Malaysia	57	67	..	*31*	9	3
68 Jamaica	64	70	*63*	*20*	7	3
69 Lebanon	58	65	..	..	14	6
70 Korea, Rep. of	54	63	62	37	13	5
71 Turkey	51	61	..	*118*	24	10
72 Algeria	47	56	..	..	30	16
73 Mexico	58	65	78	60	14	6
74 Panama	62	70	90	*47*	10	3
75 Taiwan	64	72	56	*25*	8	1
76 Chile	57	67	108	*55*	14	5
77 South Africa	53	60	..	..	17	10
78 Costa Rica	62	70	80	*28*	10	3
79 Brazil	57	62	128	*92*	13	9
80 Uruguay	68	71	..	*46*	4	3
81 Argentina	65	71	55	..	6	3
82 Portugal	63	69	78	*39*	7	*2*
83 Yugoslavia	62	69	88	34	*4*	*2*
84 Trinidad and Tobago	63	70	45	29	8	3
85 Venezuela	59	66	72	*40*	12	5
86 Hong Kong	65	72	42	12	3	1
87 Greece	68	73	40	19	2	1
88 Singapore	64	70	31	*12*	4	1
89 Spain	68	73	44	16	2	1
90 Israel	69	72	31	15	2	*1*
Industrialized countries	**69** w	**74** w	**29** w	**13** w	**1** w	**1** w
91 Ireland	69	73	29	*16*	*1*	1
92 Italy	69	73	44	*18*	*2*	*1*
93 New Zealand	71	73	21	*14*	*1*	*1*
94 United Kingdom	70	73	22	*14*	1	*1*
95 Finland	68	72	21	*9*	1	*1*
96 Austria	68	72	38	15	*1*	*1*
97 Japan	68	76	31	*10*	3	*1*
98 Australia	70	73	20	*13*	1	*1*
99 France	70	73	27	11	1	*1*
100 Netherlands	73	74	18	10	1	*1*
101 Belgium	70	72	31	12	1	*1*
102 Canada	71	74	27	*12*	*1*	*1*
103 Norway	73	75	19	*9*	1	*1*
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	69	72	34	15	1	*1*
105 United States	70	73	26	*14*	*1*	*1*
106 Denmark	72	74	22	9	1	*1*
107 Sweden	72	75	17	*8*	1	*1*
108 Switzerland	71	74	21	*10*	1	*1*
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**46** w	**58** w	..	**94** w	**29** w	**16** w
109 Iraq	46	55	..	92	31	17
110 Iran	46	52	..	..	24	14
111 Libya	47	55	..	*53*	30	17
112 Saudi Arabia	38	53	..	118	48	28
113 Kuwait	60	69	..	*39*	12	2
Centrally planned economies	**58** w	**70** w	..	..	**10** w	**1** w
114 China	53	70	..	..	14	1
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	54	63	..	..	13	5
116 Albania	62	69	..	..	6	2
117 Cuba	64	72	35	*25*	8	1
118 Mongolia	52	63	..	..	14	5
119 Romania	66	70	76	*31*	3	1
120 Bulgaria	67	72	45	22	3	1
121 Hungary	67	70	48	24	2	*1*
122 Poland	66	71	57	*22*	*2*	*1*
123 USSR	68	70	41	..	1	1
124 Czechoslovakia	69	70	24	19	1	*1*
125 German Dem. Rep.	68	72	39	13	2	*1*

a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes.

Table 22. Health-related Indicators

	Population per:				Percentage of population with access to safe water	Daily calorie supply per capita	
	Physicians		Nursing persons			Total	As percentage of requirement
	1960	1977	1960	1977	1975	1977	1977
Low-income countries	**18,020** *w*	**9,800** *w*	**9,050** *w*	**8,790** *w*	**28** *w*	**2,052** *w*	**91** *w*
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	..	..	..	..	..	1,926	78
2 Bangladesh	..	9,260	..	42,080	53	1,812	78
3 Lao PDR	*38,000*	21,600	..	2,440	..	2,082	94
4 Bhutan	..	..	..	..	..	2,028	88
5 Ethiopia	*89,360*	76,320	..	20,310	6	1,754	75
6 Mali	*38,640*	24,100	*4,980*	3,080	9	2,117	90
7 Nepal	72,000	*35,210*	..	*51,220*	9	2,002	91
8 Somalia	36,570	..	6,220	..	33	2,033	88
9 Burundi	*77,160*	*50,840*	*6,850*	*6,980*	..	2,254	97
10 Chad	*70,930*	42,150	*8,040*	4,220	26	1,762	74
11 Mozambique	20,000	..	*4,660*	..	..	1,906	81
12 Burma	*9,900*	5,120	..	5,190	17	2,286	106
13 Upper Volta	59,850	55,770	..	1,280	10	1,875	79
14 Viet Nam	..	5,620	..	..	..	1,801	83
15 India	*5,800*	*3,620*	*9,630*	*5,680*	33	2,021	91
16 Malawi	42,400	48,200	*12,920*	3,890	33	2,066	90
17 Rwanda	*138,100*	36,440	11,200	9,830	35	2,264	98
18 Sri Lanka	4,500	*6,270*	*4,150*	*2,260*	20	2,126	96
19 Guinea	48,000	16,630	*3,890*	2,450	10	1,943	84
20 Sierra Leone	*19,960*	..	*5,900*	..	..	2,150	93
21 Zaire	36,850	*15,540*	3,440	*1,940*	16	2,271	104
22 Niger	*74,050*	42,610	*8,450*	5,160	27	2,139	91
23 Benin	47,000	26,910	..	3,010	20	2,249	98
24 Pakistan	11,000	*3,780*	..	*10,040*	29	2,281	99
25 Tanzania	21,020	15,450	10,440	2,760	39	2,063	89
26 Afghanistan	*22,460*	19,890	*23,210*	*25,100*	6	2,695	110
27 Central African Rep.	*35,600*	17,610	*2,760*	1,560	16	2,242	99
28 Madagascar	*9,620*	10,300	*3,110*	3,540	26	2,486	115
29 Haiti	*10,600*	5,940	*11,880*	3,510	14	2,100	93
30 Mauritania	*39,150*	15,160	*7,320*	3,430	..	1,976	86
31 Lesotho	*22,530*	18,640	..	4,340	17	2,245	99
32 Uganda	*12,960*	27,600	*9,420*	4,300	35	2,110	91
33 Angola	14,000	..	..	..	..	2,133	91
34 Sudan	*27,880*	8,700	*3,040*	1,340	46	2,184	93
35 Togo	*35,130*	*18,360*	*5,340*	*2,040*	16	2,069	90
36 Kenya	*10,560*	*11,950*	*2,230*	*1,120*	17	2,032	88
37 Senegal	*22,380*	15,700	..	1,610	37	2,261	95
38 Indonesia	*41,000*	*14,580*	..	*2,820*	12	2,272	105
Middle-income countries	**3,960** *w*	**4,310** *w*	..	**1,860** *w*	**60** *w*	**2,590** *w*	**108** *w*
39 Egypt	*2,600*	1,070	2,730	1,150	66	2,760	109
40 Ghana	*12,160*	9,930	*5,430*	840	35	1,983	86
41 Yemen, PDR	..	*7,510*	..	*1,570*	24	1,945	81
42 Cameroon	*40,190*	16,510	*6,150*	2,230	26	2,069	89
43 Liberia	12,270	*9,260*	5,810	*2,900*	20	2,404	104
44 Honduras	12,610	*3,420*	..	1,240	46	2,015	89
45 Zambia	*11,990*	*10,190*	*9,920*	*1,930*	42	2,002	87
46 Zimbabwe	..	7,110	..	1,390	..	2,576	108
47 Thailand	7,800	*8,170*	4,900	*3,540*	22	1,929	105
48 Bolivia	3,660	*1,850*	..	3,070	34	1,974	83
49 Philippines	..	2,760	..	3,060	39	2,189	97
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	..	13,830	..	4,930	4	2,192	91
51 Congo, People's Rep.	*16,260*	*6,350*	*1,510*	*660*	38	2,284	103
52 Nigeria	*56,900*	*15,800*	*6,020*	*4,030*	..	1,951	83
53 Papua New Guinea	..	*11,800*	..	1,930	20	2,268	85
54 El Salvador	5,660	3,600	..	900	53	2,051	90
55 Morocco	9,400	10,140	..	1,830	55	2,534	105
56 Peru	2,250	1,560	2,210	750	47	2,274	97
57 Ivory Coast	23,280	*15,220*	2,920	*2,370*	19	2,517	105
58 Nicaragua	2,740	*1,670*	..	..	70	2,44	109
59 Colombia	2,400	1,970	*3,740*	1,250	64	2,364	102
60 Paraguay	*2,300*	*2,160*	..	*2,260*	13	2,824	122
61 Ecuador	2,600	*1,570*	*2,280*	..	42	2,104	92
62 Dominican Rep.	..	..	..	..	55	2,094	93
63 Guatemala	*4,410*	*2,490*	*9,040*	..	40	2,156	98
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	4,600	*2,510*	6,660	*3,810*	75	2,684	108
65 Tunisia	10,000	4,800	..	1,070	70	2,674	112
66 Jordan	*5,900*	1,940	1,650	950	56	2,107	62

1.7

	Population per:				Percentage of population with access to safe water	Daily calorie supply per capita	
	Physicians[a]		Nursing persons[a]				
	1960	1977	1960	1977	1975	Total 1977	As percentage of requirement 1977
67 Malaysia	*6,940*	*4,350*	*1,780*	1,080	62	2,610	117
68 Jamaica	2,600	3,520	..	550	86	2,660	119
69 Lebanon	..	..	..	..	..	2,495	101
70 Korea, Rep. of	*3,000*	1,960	..	510	62	2,785	119
71 Turkey	*3,000*	1,770	..	1,400	75	2,907	115
72 Algeria	..	5,360	..	1,490	77	2,372	99
73 Mexico	1,700	1,820	..	1,400	62	2,654	114
74 Panama	2,700	1,260	..	1,450	79	2,341	101
75 Taiwan	2,330	*1,570*	7,550	*1,760*	..	2,805	120
76 Chile	1,810	1,620	650	*450*	84	2,656	109
77 South Africa	*2,090*	..	*540*	..	..	2,831	116
78 Costa Rica	2,600	1,390	1,700	450	77	2,550	114
79 Brazil	*3,600*	1,700	..	..	77	2,562	107
80 Uruguay	*960*	*710*	..	..	98	3,036	114
81 Argentina	660	*530*	..	..	66	3,347	126
82 Portugal	*1,200*	710	*1,430*	500	65	3,076	126
83 Yugoslavia	1,620	760	*1,350*	410	..	3,445	136
84 Trinidad and Tobago	*2,570*	*1,970*	..	*580*	..	2,694	111
85 Venezuela	*1,430*	930	*1,890*	380	..	2,435	99
86 Hong Kong	2,990	1,280	*2,950*	970	..	2,883	126
87 Greece	*790*	450	*2,080*	600	..	3,400	136
88 Singapore	2,400	1,260	*650*	340	100	3,074	134
89 Spain	*820*	560	..	900	..	3,149	128
90 Israel	*410*	..	*360*	..	..	3,141	122
Industrialized countries	**820** w	**630** w	..	**220** w	..	**3,377** w	**131** w
91 Ireland	*950*	830	*180*	200	..	3,541	141
92 Italy	640	*490*	*920*	*330*	..	3,428	136
93 New Zealand	*690*	740	..	200	..	3,345	127
94 United Kingdom	1,100	750	*420*	300	..	3,336	132
95 Finland	1,570	620	*220*	110	..	3,100	114
96 Austria	*550*	430	400	260	..	3,535	134
97 Japan	*920*	850	*460*	290	..	2,949	126
98 Australia	860	650	..	120	..	3,428	129
99 France	930	610	530	170	..	3,434	136
100 Netherlands	900	580	..	270	..	3,338	124
101 Belgium	780	470	..	*250*	..	3,583	136
102 Canada	910	560	*300*	*130*	..	3,374	127
103 Norway	850	540	*330*	100	..	3,175	118
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	670	490	*450*	260	..	3,381	127
105 United States	*760*	580	*340*	150	..	3,576	135
106 Denmark	810	510	*270*	170	..	3,418	127
107 Sweden	1,150	560	..	130	..	3,221	120
108 Switzerland	740	500	*390*	220	..	3,485	130
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**5,470** w	**1,880** w	..	**1,770** w	**86** w	**2,983** w	**115** w
109 Iraq	5,600	2,230	*6,680*	2,860	62	2,134	89
110 Iran	3,800	..	..	..	51	3,138	130
111 Libya	5,800	900	2,390	290	100	2,985	126
112 Saudi Arabia	13,000	1,690	..	860	64	2,624	88
113 Kuwait	*760*	790	*190*	270	89	..	..
Centrally planned economies	**940** w	**380** w	**410** w	**240** w	..	**2,782** w	**114** w
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	2,467	105
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	2,837	121
116 Albania	*2,860*	960	*540*	370	..	2,730	113
117 Cuba	*1,200*	*1,100*	*910*	..	..	2,720	118
118 Mongolia	*1,010*	*480*	*290*	*250*	..	2,523	104
119 Romania	*780*	730	*620*	640	..	3,444	130
120 Bulgaria	*640*	440	*550*	220	..	3,611	144
121 Hungary	640	430	*440*	200	..	3,521	134
122 Poland	*940*	610	*490*	260	..	3,656	140
123 USSR	*520*	300	*340*	210	..	3,460	135
124 Czechoslovakia	*590*	390	*280*	160	..	3,340	139
125 German Dem. Rep.	950	520	..	..	..	3,641	139

a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes.

Table 23. Education[a]

	Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group						Number enrolled in secondary school as percentage of age group		Number enrolled in higher education as percentage of population aged 20–24		Adult literacy rate (percent)	
	Total		Male		Female							
	1960	1977	1960	1977	1960	1977	1960	1977	1960	1976	1960	1975
Low-income countries	**54** *w*	**77** *w*	**72** *w*	**90** *w*	**37** *w*	**64** *w*	**14** *w*	**24** *w*	**2** *w*	**4** *w*	**29** *w*	**38** *w*
1 Kampuchea, Dem.	64	..	82	..	46	..	3	..	(.)	..	*36*	..
2 Bangladesh	47	61	66	103	26	58	8	23	1	2	*22*	26
3 Lao PDR	25	92	34	99	16	84	1	14	(.)	(.)	*28*	..
4 Bhutan	3	11	5	16	(.)	7	..	1	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia	7	26	11	..	3	..	(.)	8	(.)	(.)	..	*10*
6 Mali	10	*28*	14	*36*	6	*20*	1	*7*	..	1	*3*	10
7 Nepal	10	71	19	108	1	32	6	14	1	*2*	*9*	19
8 Somalia	9	44	13	57	5	32	1	4	(.)	*1*	*2*	60
9 Burundi	18	23	27	28	9	18	1	*3*	(.)	(.)	*14*	25
10 Chad	16	*41*	29	*61*	4	*21*	(.)	*3*	..	(.)	..	15
11 Mozambique	48	..	60	..	36	..	2	..	..	(.)	8	..
12 Burma	56	*80*	61	*83*	52	*78*	10	*22*	1	*2*	*60*	67
13 Upper Volta	8	*16*	12	*20*	5	*12*	(.)	*2*	..	(.)	*2*	*5*
14 Viet Nam	..	*141*	..	*140*	..	*142*	..	*51*	..	*3*	..	87
15 India	61	80	80	95	40	64	20	*28*	3	6	*28*	36
16 Malawi	63	62	81	75	45	50	1	*4*	..	(.)	..	*25*
17 Rwanda	49	*61*	68	*66*	30	*57*	2	*2*	..	(.)	*16*	*23*
18 Sri Lanka	..	*86*	..	*89*	..	*82*	27	*47*	1	*1*	*75*	*78*
19 Guinea	30	..	44	.	16	..	2	..	..	..	7	..
20 Sierra Leone	23	*37*	30	*45*	15	*29*	2	*11*	(.)	*1*	..	15
21 Zaire	60	93	85	109	32	78	3	19	(.)	*1*	*31*	15
22 Niger	5	23	7	29	3	16	(.)	*3*	..	(.)	1	8
23 Benin	26	*58*	38	*80*	15	*37*	2	11	..	1	*8*	*11*
24 Pakistan	30	*51*	46	*69*	13	*32*	11	*17*	1	*2*	*15*	21
25 Tanzania	25	*70*	33	*79*	18	*60*	2	*3*	..	(.)	*10*	*66*
26 Afghanistan	9	20	15	33	2	6	1	7	(.)	1	8	12
27 Central African Rep.	32	81	53	106	12	57	1	*9*	..	1	*7*	..
28 Madagascar	52	92	58	98	45	86	4	*12*	(.)	*2*	..	*50*
29 Haiti	46	*71*	50	..	42	..	4	..	(.)	*1*	15	23
30 Mauritania	8	31	14	40	3	21	(.)	4	..	(.)	5	*17*
31 Lesotho	83	*119*	63	*98*	102	*139*	3	*15*	(.)	*1*	..	*55*
32 Uganda	49	53	65	63	32	44	3	7	(.)	*1*	*35*	..
33 Angola	21	..	28	..	13	..	2	..	(.)	..	*5*	..
34 Sudan	25	41	35	47	14	34	3	13	(.)	1	*13*	*20*
35 Togo	44	106	63	135	24	78	2	27	..	*1*	10	18
36 Kenya	47	104	64	110	30	98	2	17	(.)	*1*	*20*	*40*
37 Senegal	27	47	36	57	17	37	3	*11*	1	*2*	*6*	*10*
38 Indonesia	71	86	86	91	58	81	6	21	1	*2*	*39*	62
Middle-income countries	**81** *w*	**97** *w*	**87** *w*	**100** *w*	**74** *w*	**93** *w*	**17** *w*	**40** *w*	**4** *w*	**11** *w*	**54** *w*	**71** *w*
39 Egypt	66	72	80	87	52	56	16	46	5	*14*	26	*44*
40 Ghana	38	74	52	84	25	64	5	29	(.)	1	27	30
41 Yemen, PDR	13	*77*	20	*99*	5	*54*	5	*26*	..	*1*	..	*27*
42 Cameroon	65	*119*	87	*132*	43	*106*	2	*17*	..	*1*	*19*	..
43 Liberia	31	*57*	45	*74*	18	*40*	2	*14*	(.)	*2*	*9*	*30*
44 Honduras	67	*89*	68	*90*	67	*88*	8	*13*	1	*6*	*45*	57
45 Zambia	42	*95*	51	*104*	34	*87*	2	*16*	..	*2*	..	*39*
46 Zimbabwe	96	*98*	107	*106*	86	*90*	6	*9*	(.)	..	*39*	..
47 Thailand	83	*83*	88	*86*	79	*79*	13	*27*	2	5	68	84
48 Bolivia	64	*80*	76	*88*	50	*72*	12	*26*	4	*10*	39	*63*
49 Philippines	95	*105*	98	*103*	93	*108*	26	*56*	13	24	72	*87*
50 Yemen Arab Rep.	8	*25*	14	*43*	(.)	*6*	(.)	*5*	..	1	*3*	*13*
51 Congo, People's Rep.	78	*155*	103	*166*	53	*143*	4	*52*	1	*3*	*16*	50
52 Nigeria	36	..	46	..	27	..	4	..	(.)	*1*	*15*	..
53 Papua New Guinea	32	*60*	59	*70*	7	*49*	1	*12*	..	*3*	29	32
54 El Salvador	80	77	82	79	77	75	13	22	1	*8*	*49*	*62*
55 Morocco	47	68	67	86	27	50	5	*17*	1	4	14	*28*
56 Peru	83	110	95	115	71	106	15	52	4	16	*61*	72
57 Ivory Coast	46	*92*	68	*115*	24	*69*	2	*17*	(.)	*2*	*5*	20
58 Nicaragua	66	92	65	..	66	..	7	29	1	*10*	..	57
59 Colombia	77	103	77	100	77	105	12	39	2	9	*63*	*81*
60 Paraguay	98	102	105	106	90	98	11	25	2	*6*	*75*	81
61 Ecuador	83	101	87	101	79	100	12	44	3	*28*	*68*	74
62 Dominican Rep.	98	*102*	99	*101*	98	*103*	7	*27*	1	*9*	65	67
63 Guatemala	45	65	50	71	39	60	7	16	2	5	32	47
64 Syrian Arab Rep.	65	103	89	120	39	85	16	51	4	*12*	30	53
65 Tunisia	66	100	88	118	43	81	12	22	1	5	*16*	55
66 Jordan	77	83	94	87	59	79	25	53	1	7	*32*	70

	Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group						Number enrolled in secondary school as percentage of age group		Number enrolled in higher education as percentage of population aged 20–24		Adult literacy rate (percent)	
	Total		Male		Female							
	1960	1977	1960	1977	1960	1977	1960	1977	1960	1976	1960	1975
67 Malaysia	96	93	108	94	83	91	19	*43*	1	*3*	*53*	*60*
68 Jamaica	92	97	92	96	93	98	45	*58*	2	*7*	82	86
69 Lebanon	102	..	105	..	99	..	19	..	6	..	..	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	94	*111*	99	*111*	89	*111*	27	*88*	5	*11*	71	93
71 Turkey	75	98	90	106	58	90	14	43	3	8	38	60
72 Algeria	46	90	55	105	37	75	8	25	(.)	4	*10*	37
73 Mexico	80	116	82	120	77	114	11	39	3	*10*	65	76
74 Panama	96	86	98	88	94	84	29	115	5	22	73	78
75 Taiwan	96	*100*	..	..	..	..	33	*76*	4	*12*	54	*82*
76 Chile	109	117	111	119	107	116	24	50	4	13	84	88
77 South Africa	89	..	94	..	85	..	15	..	3	..	57	..
78 Costa Rica	96	111	97	111	95	110	21	44	5	18	..	90
79 Brazil	95	*90*	97	*89*	93	*90*	11	*24*	2	*12*	61	*76*
80 Uruguay	111	*95*	111	*95*	111	*94*	37	*60*	8	*13*	..	94
81 Argentina	98	110	98	110	99	111	23	41	11	29	91	94
82 Portugal	..	130	..	134	..	127	..	59	4	14	62	70
83 Yugoslavia	111	100	113	101	108	99	58	79	9	21	77	85
84 Trinidad and Tobago	88	*81*	89	*81*	87	*81*	24	*38*	1	*5*	*93*	*95*
85 Venezuela	100	*104*	100	*105*	100	*103*	21	*38*	4	*21*	*63*	*82*
86 Hong Kong	87	119	93	121	79	117	20	59	4	*10*	70	90
87 Greece	102	*105*	104	*107*	101	*103*	37	*82*	4	*18*	*81*	..
88 Singapore	111	110	121	114	101	107	32	55	6	*9*	..	*75*
89 Spain	110	*114*	106	*114*	116	*115*	23	*76*	4	*22*	87	..
90 Israel	98	97	99	97	97	98	48	*68*	10	*24*	*84*	88
Industrialized countries	**114** *w*	**96** *w*	**109** *w*	**102** *w*	**108** *w*	**102** *w*	**68** *w*	**87** *w*	**17** *w*	**36** *w*	..	**99** *w*
91 Ireland	110	*109*	107	*110*	112	*109*	35	92	9	*18*	..	*98*
92 Italy	111	*105*	112	*106*	109	*105*	34	*73*	7	*27*	*91*	98
93 New Zealand	108	*111*	110	*112*	106	*110*	73	*85*	13	*28*	..	*99*
94 United Kingdom	92	*105*	92	*105*	92	*105*	66	*82*	9	*19*	..	99
95 Finland	97	88	100	89	95	88	74	95	7	20	99	100
96 Austria	105	100	106	100	104	100	50	73	8	21	..	99
97 Japan	103	100	103	100	102	99	74	93	10	29	98	99
98 Australia	103	92	103	92	103	92	51	73	13	24	..	100
99 France	144	*108*	144	*106*	143	*110*	46	*83*	10	*24*	..	99
100 Netherlands	105	102	105	101	104	102	58	94	13	29	..	99
101 Belgium	109	105	111	105	108	104	69	88	9	*23*	..	99
102 Canada	107	102	108	102	105	102	46	91	16	37	..	98
103 Norway	100	101	100	101	101	101	57	91	7	24	..	*99*
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	133	*90*	..	..	..	..	..	*84*	6	*25*	..	99
105 United States	118	*94*	..	..	..	..	86	*93*	32	*56*	98	*99*
106 Denmark	103	*103*	103	*103*	103	*103*	65	*77*	10	*30*	..	99
107 Sweden	96	96	95	96	96	97	55	69	9	*30*	..	*99*
108 Switzerland	118	85	118	85	118	86	26	55	7	16	..	99
Capital-surplus oil exporters	**43** *w*	**94** *w*	**61** *w*	**113** *w*	**26** *w*	**74** *w*	**12** *w*	**45** *w*	**1** *w*	**6** *w*	**15** *w*	**80** *w*
109 Iraq	65	100	94	123	36	76	19	44	2	*9*	*18*	..
110 Iran	41	*98*	56	*119*	27	*77*	12	*49*	1	*5*	16	*50*
111 Libya	59	148	92	156	24	140	9	70	1	7	..	50
112 Saudi Arabia	12	*47*	22	*59*	2	*35*	2	19	(.)	4	*3*	..
113 Kuwait	117	93	131	99	102	87	37	68	..	13	*47*	60
Centrally planned economies	**101** *w*	**119** *w*	**101** *w*	**118** *w*	**101** *w*	**120** *w*	**45** *w*	**72** *w*	**11** *w*	**20** *w*	..	..
114 China	..	127	..	125	..	129	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	*113*	..	*115*	..	*112*	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	94	..	102	..	86	..	20	..	5	..	..	..
117 Cuba	109	*122*	109	*125*	109	*119*	14	*50*	3	*11*	..	*96*
118 Mongolia	79	*108*	79	*111*	78	*105*	51	*81*	8	*8*	..	..
119 Romania	98	102	101	102	95	101	24	77	5	10	..	98
120 Bulgaria	93	96	94	97	92	96	55	88	11	21	..	..
121 Hungary	101	98	103	98	100	98	46	68	7	*12*	97	98
122 Poland	109	101	110	102	107	99	50	67	9	18	95	98
123 USSR	100	*97*	100	*98*	100	*97*	49	*73*	11	*22*	98	99
124 Czechoslovakia	93	96	93	96	93	97	25	38	11	15	95	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	112	*94*	111	*92*	113	*95*	39	*93*	16	*29*	..	..

a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes.

Table 24. Income Distribution

	Year	Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households[a]					
		Lowest 20 percent	Second quintile	Third quintile	Fourth quintile	Highest 20 percent	Highest 10 percent
Low-income countries							
1 Kampuchea, Dem.		..	..	..	..	..	..
2 Bangladesh		..	..	..	..	..	..
3 Lao PDR		..	..	..	..	..	..
4 Bhutan		..	..	..	..	..	..
5 Ethiopia		..	..	..	..	..	..
6 Mali		..	..	..	..	..	..
7 Nepal		..	..	..	..	..	..
8 Somalia		..	..	..	..	..	..
9 Burundi		..	..	..	..	..	..
10 Chad		..	..	..	..	..	..
11 Mozambique		..	..	..	..	..	..
12 Burma		..	..	..	..	..	..
13 Upper Volta		..	..	..	..	..	..
14 Viet Nam		..	..	..	..	..	..
15 India	1964–65	6.7	10.5	14.3	19.6	48.9	35.2
16 Malawi		..	..	..	..	..	..
17 Rwanda		..	..	..	..	..	..
18 Sri Lanka	1969–70	7.5	11.7	15.7	21.7	43.4	28.2
19 Guinea		..	..	..	..	..	..
20 Sierra Leone		..	..	..	..	..	..
21 Zaire		..	..	..	..	..	..
22 Niger		..	..	..	..	..	..
23 Benin		..	..	..	..	..	..
24 Pakistan		..	..	..	..	..	..
25 Tanzania		..	..	..	..	..	..
26 Afghanistan		..	..	..	..	..	..
27 Central African Rep.		..	..	..	..	..	..
28 Madagascar		..	..	..	..	..	..
29 Haiti		..	..	..	..	..	..
30 Mauritania		..	..	..	..	..	..
31 Lesotho		..	..	..	..	..	..
32 Uganda		..	..	..	..	..	..
33 Angola		..	..	..	..	..	..
34 Sudan		..	..	..	..	..	..
35 Togo		..	..	..	..	..	..
36 Kenya		..	..	..	..	..	..
37 Senegal		..	..	..	..	..	..
38 Indonesia		..	..	..	..	..	..
Middle-income countries							
39 Egypt		..	..	..	..	..	..
40 Ghana		..	..	..	..	..	..
41 Yemen, PDR		..	..	..	..	..	..
42 Cameroon		..	..	..	..	..	..
43 Liberia		..	..	..	..	..	..
44 Honduras	1967	2.3	5.0	8.0	16.9	67.8	50.0
45 Zambia		..	..	..	..	..	..
46 Zimbabwe		..	..	..	..	..	..
47 Thailand		..	..	..	..	..	..
48 Bolivia		..	..	..	..	..	..
49 Philippines	1970–71	3.7	8.2	13.2	21.0	53.9	..
50 Yemen Arab Rep.		..	..	..	..	..	..
51 Congo, People's Rep.		..	..	..	..	..	..
52 Nigeria		..	..	..	..	..	..
53 Papua New Guinea		..	..	..	..	..	..
54 El Salvador		..	..	..	..	..	..
55 Morocco		..	..	..	..	..	..
56 Peru	1972	1.9	5.1	11.0	21.0	61.0	42.9
57 Ivory Coast		..	..	..	..	..	..
58 Nicaragua		..	..	..	..	..	..
59 Colombia		..	..	..	..	..	..
60 Paraguay		..	..	..	..	..	..
61 Ecuador		..	..	..	..	..	..
62 Dominican Rep.		..	..	..	..	..	..
63 Guatemala		..	..	..	..	..	..
64 Syrian Arab Rep.		..	..	..	..	..	..
65 Tunisia		..	..	..	..	..	..
66 Jordan		..	..	..	..	..	..

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	Year	Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households[a]					
		Lowest 20 percent	Second quintile	Third quintile	Fourth quintile	Highest 20 percent	Highest 10 percent
67 Malaysia	1970	3.3	7.3	12.2	20.7	56.6	39.6
68 Jamaica	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
69 Lebanon	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
70 Korea, Rep. of	1976	5.7	11.2	15.4	22.4	45.3	27.5
71 Turkey	1973	3.4	8.0	12.5	19.5	56.5	40.7
72 Algeria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
73 Mexico	1977	2.9	7.0	12.0	20.4	57.7	40.6
74 Panama	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
75 Taiwan	1971	8.7	13.2	16.6	22.3	39.2	24.7
76 Chile	1968	4.4	9.0	13.8	21.4	51.4	34.8
77 South Africa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
78 Costa Rica	1971	3.3	8.7	13.3	19.9	54.8	39.5
79 Brazil	1972	2.0	5.0	9.4	17.0	66.6	50.6
80 Uruguay	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
81 Argentina	1970	4.4	9.7	14.1	21.5	50.3	35.2
82 Portugal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
83 Yugoslavia	1973	6.5	11.9	17.6	24.0	40.0	22.5
84 Trinidad and Tobago	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
85 Venezuela	1970	3.0	7.3	12.9	22.8	54.0	35.7
86 Hong Kong	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
87 Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
88 Singapore	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
89 Spain	1974	6.0	11.8	16.9	23.1	42.2	26.7
90 Israel	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Industrialized countries							
91 Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
92 Italy	1969	5.1	10.5	16.2	21.7	46.5	30.9
93 New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
94 United Kingdom	1973	6.3	12.6	18.4	23.9	38.8	23.5
95 Finland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
96 Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
97 Japan	1969	7.9	13.1	16.8	21.2	41.0	27.2
98 Australia	1966–67	6.6	13.5	17.8	23.4	38.8	23.7
99 France	1970	4.3	9.8	16.3	22.7	46.9	30.4
100 Netherlands	1967	6.5	11.6	16.4	22.7	42.9	27.7
101 Belgium	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
102 Canada	1969	5.0	11.8	17.9	24.3	41.0	25.1
103 Norway	1970	6.3	12.9	18.8	24.7	37.3	22.2
104 Germany, Fed. Rep.	1973	6.5	10.3	15.0	22.0	46.2	30.3
105 United States	1972	4.5	10.7	17.3	24.7	42.8	26.6
106 Denmark	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
107 Sweden	1972	6.6	13.1	18.5	24.8	37.0	21.3
108 Switzerland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Capital-surplus oil exporters							
109 Iraq	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
110 Iran	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
111 Libya	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
112 Saudi Arabia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
113 Kuwait	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Centrally planned economies							
114 China	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
115 Korea, Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
116 Albania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
117 Cuba	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
118 Mongolia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
119 Romania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
120 Bulgaria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
121 Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
122 Poland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
123 USSR	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
124 Czechoslovakia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
125 German Dem. Rep.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..

a. These estimates should be treated with caution. See the technical notes.

Technical Notes

Table 1. Basic Indicators

The estimates of *population* for mid-1978 are primarily from the UN Population Division. In some cases the UN population data were adjusted by using more recent data from the World Bank and the US Bureau of the Census.

The data on *area* are from the UN *Demographic Yearbook, 1977.*

Gross national product (GNP) measures the total domestic and foreign output claimed by residents of a country.[1] It comprises gross domestic product (see the technical notes for Table 2) and factor incomes (such as investment receipts and workers' remittances) accruing to residents from abroad, less the income earned in the domestic economy accruing to persons abroad. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation.

The *GNP per capita* figures were calculated according to the *World Bank Atlas* method: GNP in national currency units was expressed first in weighted-average prices for the base period 1976–78, converted into dollars at the GNP-weighted average exchange rate for this period, and adjusted for US inflation. The resulting estimate of GNP was then divided by the population in mid-1978. This method reduces the effect of temporary undervaluations or overvaluations of a particular currency and generally assures greater comparability of the estimates of GNP per capita among countries.

The GNP per capita figure of $230 reported for China is based on the official estimate of "net material product" released by the Government, plus an allowance for depreciation and for services not covered by that concept. These data were received only recently, and analysis to assure that the data are reasonably comparable to those of other countries has not yet been possible.

The *average annual rate of inflation* was calculated from the "implicit gross domestic product (GDP) deflator," which is calculated by dividing, for each year of the period, the value of GDP in current market prices by the value of GDP in constant market prices, both in national currency. This measure of inflation has limitations, especially for the oil-producing countries in the light of the sharp increase in oil prices in late 1973.

The *adult literacy rate* is the percentage of persons aged 15 and over who can read and write. These rates are based primarily on information from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), supplemented by World Bank data. For some countries the estimates are for years other than, but generally not more than two years distant from, those specified. Thus the series are not strictly comparable for all countries.

Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years newborn children would live if subject to the mortality risks prevailing for the cross-section of population at the time of their birth. Data are from the UN Population Division, supplemented by World Bank estimates.

The *index of food production per capita* shows the average annual quantity of food produced per capita in 1976–78 in relation to that in 1969–71. The estimates were derived from those of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which are calculated by dividing indices of the quantity of food production by indices of total population. Food is considered to comprise cereals, starchy roots, sugar cane, sugar beet, pulses, edible oils, nuts, fruits, vegetables, livestock and livestock products. Quantities of food production are measured net of animal feed, seeds for use in agriculture, and food lost in processing and distribution.

The country-group averages in this table are weighted by country population.

The accompanying table shows basic indicators for 29 countries that have a population of less than a million and are members of the United Nations, the World Bank, or both.

Tables 2 and 3. Growth and Structure of Production

Most of the definitions used are those of the UN *System of National Accounts.*

Gross domestic product (GDP)

1. GNP figures generally are for 1978. Exceptions are Iran, for which 1977 estimates are the most recent, and Democratic Kampuchea and Lebanon, for which 1974 estimates are the most recent.

UN/World Bank members with a population of less than 1 million	Population (millions) Mid-1978	Area (thousands of square kilometers)	GNP per capita (dollars) 1978	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1978	Average index of food production per capita (1969–71 = 100) 1976–78
Maldives	0.1	(.)	150	47	..
Cape Verde	0.3	4	160	60	..
Comoros	0.4	2	180	46	..
Gambia, The	0.6	11	230	41	82
Guinea-Bissau	0.6	36	290	41	105
Equatorial Guinea	0.3	28	..	46	..
Western Samoa	0.2	3	..	68	..
Solomon Islands	0.2	28	430	..	112
Djibouti	0.3	22	450	45	..
Sao Tome and Principe	0.1	1	490	..	..
Grenada	0.1	(.)	530	69	..
Guyana	0.8	215	560	67	95
Swaziland	0.5	17	590	46	109
Botswana	0.8	600	620	48	100
Mauritius	0.9	2	830	67	103
Seychelles	0.1	(.)	1,130	..	..
Fiji	0.6	18	1,420	71	90
Barbados	0.3	(.)	1,960	71	76
Suriname	0.4	163	2,110	68	108
Cyprus	0.7	9	2,120	72	98
Malta	0.3	(.)	2,170	71	121
Bahamas	0.2	14	2,520	69	..
Oman	0.8	212	2,570	47	..
Gabon	0.5	268	3,580	44	88
Bahrain	0.4	1	4,100	65	..
Iceland	0.2	103	8,390	75	114
Luxembourg	0.4	3	10,540	72	105
Qatar	0.2	11	12,740	48	..
United Arab Emirates	0.8	84	14,230	48	..

Note: Recent data on the adult literacy rate were available for only five of these countries: The Gambia, 10 percent in 1976; Botswana, 35 percent in 1978; Swaziland, 65 percent in 1978; Mauritius, 80 percent in 1972; and Barbados, 99 percent in 1976.

measures the total final output of goods and services produced by an economy—that is, within a country's territory by residents and nonresidents, regardless of its allocation to domestic and foreign claims. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation. For most countries, GDP by industrial origin is measured at factor cost, but for some countries without complete national accounts series at factor cost, market price series were used. GDP at factor cost is equal to GDP at market prices, less indirect taxes net of subsidies.

The *agricultural sector* comprises agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing. The *industrial sector* comprises mining, *manufacturing*, construction, and electricity, water and gas. All other branches of economic activity are categorized as *services*.

National accounts series in national currency units were used to compute the indicators in these tables. The growth rates in Table 2 were calculated from constant price series, the shares of GDP in Table 3 from current price series.

The average growth rates for the country groups in Table 2 are weighted by country GDP in 1970 in dollars. The average sectoral shares in Table 3 are weighted by country GDP in current dollars.

Tables 4 and 5. Growth of Consumption and Investment; Structure of Demand

GDP is defined in the technical notes for Table 2.

Public consumption (or general government consumption) includes all current expenditure for purchases of goods and services by all levels of government. In addition, capital expenditure on national defense and security is regarded as consumption expenditure.

Private consumption is the market value of all goods and services purchased or received as income in kind by households and nonprofit institutions. It includes imputed rent for owner-occupied dwellings.

Gross domestic investment consists of the outlays for additions to the fixed assets of the economy, plus the net value of inventory changes.

Gross domestic saving shows the amount of gross domestic investment financed from domestic output. Comprising public and private saving, it is the difference between gross domestic investment and the deficit on the current account of goods and nonfactor services, excluding net current transfers.

Exports of goods and nonfactor services represent the value of all goods and nonfactor services sold to the rest of the world; they include merchandise, freight, insurance, travel and other nonfactor services. The value of factor services, such as investment receipts and workers' remittances from abroad, is excluded.

The *resource balance* is the difference between exports and imports of goods and nonfactor services.

National accounts series in national currency units were used to compute the indicators in these tables. The growth rates in Table 4 were calculated from constant price series, the shares of GDP in Table 5 from current price series.

The country-group averages in Table 5 are weighted by country GDP in current dollars.

Table 6. Industrialization

The percentage *distribution of value added* among manufacturing industries was calculated from data obtained from the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), with the base values expressed in 1970 dollars.

The classification of manufacturing industries is in accord with the UN International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). *Food and agriculture* comprise ISIC Major Groups 311, 313 and 314; *Textiles and clothing* 321–24; *Machinery and transport equipment* 382–84; and *Chemicals* 351 and 352. *Other manufacturing* comprises ISIC Major Division 3, less all of the above.

The figures for *value added in manufacturing* are from the World Bank's national accounts series in national currencies, converted into 1970 dollars.

To calculate *gross manufacturing output per capita*, ratios of gross output to value added in manufacturing, derived from various issues of the UN *Yearbook of Industrial Statistics*, were applied to the World Bank's data on value added in manufacturing. Per capita values were then calculated by using mid-year estimates of country population.

Table 7. Energy

All data on energy are from UN sources. They refer to commercial forms of primary energy: coal and lignite, petroleum, natural gas and natural gas liquids, and hydroelectricity and nuclear power—all converted into coal equivalents. The use of firewood and other traditional fuels, though substantial in some developing countries, is not taken into account because reliable and comprehensive data are not available.

The country-group averages of growth rates of *energy production* are weighted by volumes of country production in 1974; those of growth rates of *energy consumption*, by volumes of country consumption in 1974; those of *energy consumption per capita*, by country population.

Energy consumption per dollar of GDP refers to the ratio of total energy consumption to GDP in 1975 dollars. This indicator shows the intensity of energy use in an economy. The country-group averages are weighted by country GDP in 1975 dollars.

Energy imports refer to the dollar value of energy imports—Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revised Section 3—and are expressed as a percentage of earnings from merchandise exports. The country-group averages are weighted by country merchandise exports in current dollars.

Because data on energy imports do not permit a distinction between petroleum imports for fuel and for use in the petrochemicals industry, these percentages may be overestimates of the dependence on imported energy.

Table 8. Growth of Merchandise Trade

The statistics on merchandise trade are from UN publications and the UN trade data system, supplemented by statistics from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and from International Monetary Fund (IMF), *Direction of Trade* and *International Financial Statistics*.

Merchandise exports and imports cover, with some exceptions, all international changes in ownership of merchandise passing across the customs borders of the reporting countries. Exports are valued f.o.b. (free on board), imports c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight). These values are in current dollars.

The *growth rates of merchandise exports and imports* are in real terms and calculated from quantum (volume) indices of exports and imports. For the majority of developing countries these indices are from the UNCTAD *Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics* and supplementary data that show revisions. For industrialized countries the indices are from the UN *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* and UN *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*.

The *terms of trade*, or the "net barter terms of trade," are calculated as the ratio of a country's index of export unit values to that of import unit values. The terms-of-trade index numbers shown for 1960 and 1978, with 1970 = 100, thus indicate changes in export prices in relation to import prices. The unit value indices are from the same sources cited above for the growth rates of exports and imports.

Tables 9 and 10. Structure of Merchandise Trade

The shares in these tables are derived from trade values in current dollars reported in UN trade tapes and the UN *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*.

Merchandise exports and imports are defined in the technical notes for Table 8.

In the categorization of exports in Table 9, *fuels, minerals and metals* are the commodities in SITC Revised Section 3, Divisions 27 and 28, and the nonferrous metals of Division 68. *Other primary commodities* comprise SITC Sections 0, 1, 2 and 4 (food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, inedible crude materials, oils, fats and waxes) less Divisions 27 and

28 (minerals, crude fertilizers and metalliferous ores). *Textiles and clothing* represent SITC Divisions 65 and 84 (textiles, yarns, fabrics and clothing). *Machinery and transport equipment* are the commodities in SITC Section 7. *Other manufactures*, calculated as the residual from the total value of manufactured exports, represent SITC Sections 5 to 9 less Section 7 and Divisions 65, 68 and 84.

In the categorization of imports in Table 10, *food* commodities are those in SITC Revised Sections 0, 1 and 4 and in Division 22 (food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, oils and fats). *Fuels* are the commodities in SITC Section 3. *Other primary commodities* comprise SITC Section 2 (crude materials, less Division 22 (oilseeds and nuts) plus Division 68 (nonferrous metals). *Machinery and transport equipment* are the commodities in SITC Section 7. *Other manufactures*, calculated as the residual from the total value of manufactured imports, represent SITC Sections 5 to 9 less Section 7 and Division 68.

The country-group averages in Table 9 are weighted by country merchandise exports in current dollars; those in Table 10, by country merchandise imports in current dollars.

Table 11. Destination of Merchandise Exports

Merchandise exports are defined in the technical notes for Table 8. All trade shares in this table are based on statistics on the value of trade in current dollars in IMF, *Direction of Trade*. Unallocated exports are distributed among the country groups in proportion to their respective shares of allocable trade. The country groups in this table follow those in the data source and differ somewhat from those used elsewhere in the volume: *industrialized countries* also include Gibraltar, Iceland and Luxembourg; *developing countries* also include Cuba, which in other tables is grouped with centrally planned economies; *capital-surplus oil exporters* also include Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates.

The country-group averages are weighted by country merchandise exports in current dollars.

Table 12. Trade in Manufactured Goods

The data in this table are from the United Nations and are among those used to compile Special Table B in the UN *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*. *Manufactured goods* are the commodities in SITC Revised Sections 5 through 9 (chemicals and related products, manufactured articles, machinery and transport equipment) excluding Division 68 (nonferrous metals).

The country groups are the same as those in Table 11. The country-group averages are weighted by country manufactured exports in current dollars.

Table 13. Balance of Payments and Debt Service Ratios

The *current account balance* is the difference between (i) exports of goods and services plus inflows of unrequited official and private transfers and (ii) imports of goods and services plus unrequited transfers to the rest of the world. Excluded from this figure are all *interest payments on external public and publicly guaranteed debt*, which are shown separately. These interest payments represent those on the disbursed portion of outstanding public and publicly guaranteed debt plus commitment charges on undisbursed debt. The current account estimates are from IMF data files; estimates of interest payments are from the World Bank Debt Reporting System.

Debt service is the sum of interest payments and repayments of principal on external public and publicly guaranteed debt. Debt-service data are from the World Bank Debt Reporting System. The ratio of debt service to exports of goods and services is one of several rules of thumb commonly used to assess the ability to service debt. The debt-service ratios in the table do not cover unguaranteed private debt, which for some countries is substantial; the debt contracted for purchases of military equipment usually is not reported. The average ratios of debt service to GNP for the country groups are weighted by country GNP in current dollars. The average ratios of debt service to exports of goods and services are weighted by country exports of goods and services in current dollars.

The World Bank Debt Reporting System is concerned solely with developing countries and does not collect data on external debt for other groups of countries. Nor are comparable data for those countries available from other sources.

Table 14. Flow of External Capital

Data on the *gross inflow* and *repayment of principal* (amortization) of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans are from the World Bank Debt Reporting System. The *net inflow* is the gross inflow less the repayment of principal.

Net direct private investment is the net amount invested or reinvested by nonresidents of the country in enterprises in which they or other nonresidents exercise significant managerial control; these net figures also take into account the value of direct investment abroad by residents. IMF data files were used in compiling these estimates.

Table 15. External Public Debt and International Reserves

External public debt outstanding represents the amount of public and publicly guaranteed loans that has been disbursed, net of canceled loan commitments and repayments of principal. The data refer to the end of the year indicated and are from the World Bank Debt Reporting System. In estimating external public debt as a percentage of GNP, GNP was converted from national currencies to dollars at the average official exchange rate for the year in question. The country-group averages are weighted by country GNP in current dollars.

Gross international reserves comprise the sum of a country's holdings of gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the reserve position of IMF members in the Fund, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. The gold component of these reserves is valued throughout at year-end London prices: that is, $37.37 an ounce in 1970 and $226.00 an ounce in 1978. The data for holdings of international reserves are from IMF data files. The reserve levels for 1970 and 1978 refer to the end of the year indicated and are in current dollars. The reserve holdings at the end of 1978 are also expressed in the number of months of imports of goods and services they could pay for, with imports at the average level for 1977 or 1978. The country-group averages are weighted by country imports of goods and services in current dollars.

Table 16. Official Development Assistance from OECD and OPEC Members

Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net disbursements of loans and grants made at concessional financial terms by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with the objective of promoting economic development and welfare. It includes the value of technical cooperation and assistance.

Amounts shown are net disbursements to developing countries and multilateral institutions. The disbursements to multilateral institutions are now reported for all DAC members on the basis of the date of issue of notes; some DAC members previously reported on the basis of the date of encashment. *Net bilateral flows to low-income countries* exclude unallocated bilateral flows and all disbursements to multilateral institutions.

Figures for 1978 and earlier years are actual figures published by the OECD; those for 1979 are preliminary estimates. All others are projections by World Bank staff, based on OECD and World Bank estimates of GNP growth, information on budget appropriations for aid, and statements on aid policy by governments. They are projections based on present plans rather than predictions of what will occur.

The nominal values shown in the summary for ODA from OECD countries were converted into 1978 prices using the dollar GNP deflator. This deflator is based on price increases in OECD countries (excluding Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) measured in dollars. It takes into account the parity changes between the dollar and national currencies. For example, when the dollar depreciates, price increases measured in national currencies have to be adjusted upward by the amount of the depreciation to obtain price increases in dollars.

The table this year, in addition to showing totals for OPEC, shows totals for the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The donor members of OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

Table 17. Population Growth, Past and Projected, and Hypothetical Stationary Population

The *growth rates of population* are period averages calculated from mid-year country populations. The country-group averages are weighted by country population in 1970.

The *projections of population* for 1980 and 2000, and to the year in which it will eventually become stationary, were made for each country separately. Starting with information on total population, fertility rates, and mortality rates in the base year 1978, these parameters were projected to 1980 and thereafter for five-year intervals on the basis of generalized assumptions until the population became stationary. The base-year estimates are from UN, *World Population Trends and Prospects by Country, 1950–2000*, and from the World Bank, the Population Council and the US Bureau of the Census.

The *net reproduction rate* (NRR) indicates the number of daughters that a newborn girl will bear during her lifetime, assuming fixed age-specific fertility rates and a fixed set of mortality rates.

The NRR thus measures the extent to which a cohort of newborn girls will reproduce themselves under given schedules of fertility and mortality. An NRR of 1 indicates that fertility is at replacement level: at this rate child-bearing women, on the average, bear only enough daughters to replace themselves in the population. A population

continues to grow after replacement-level fertility has been reached because its past higher birth rates will have produced an age distribution with a relatively high proportion of women in, or still to enter, the reproductive ages. The time taken for a country's population to become stationary after reaching replacement-level fertility thus depends on its age structure and previous fertility patterns.

A *stationary population* is one in which age- and sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over a long period, while age-specific fertility rates have simultaneously remained at replacement level (NRR = 1). In such a population, the birth rate is constant and equal to the death rate, the age structure also is constant, and the growth rate is zero.

For all of the projections, it was assumed that international migration would have no effect.

The estimates of the hypothetical size of the stationary population, the assumed year of reaching replacement-level fertility and the year of reaching a stationary population are speculative. *They should not be regarded as predictions.* They are included to provide a summary indication of the long-run implications of recent trends on the basis of highly stylized assumptions. A fuller description of the methods and assumptions used to calculate the estimates is available from the Economic Analysis and Projections Department of the World Bank.

Table 18. Demographic and Fertility-related Indicators

The *crude birth and death rates* indicate the number of live births and deaths per thousand population in a year. They are from the same sources mentioned in the technical notes for Table 17.

The *total fertility rate* represents the number of children that would be born per woman, if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and bear children at each age in accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. The rates given are from the same sources mentioned in the technical notes for Table 17.

The *percentage of women in the reproductive age group* refers to women of child-bearing age (15–44 years) as a percentage of the total female population. The estimates were derived from the population estimates in Table 1.

The *percentage of married women using contraceptives* refers only to married women of child-bearing age (15–44 years). These data are mainly derived from Dorothy Nortman and Ellen Hofstatter, *Population and Family Planning Programs: A Factbook* (New York: Population Council, various issues); Dorothy Nortman, "Changing Contraceptive Patterns: A Global Perspective," *Population Bulletin*, vol. 32, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, August 1977); and Office of Population, *Family Planning Service Statistics, Annual Report, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development). The data refer to a variety of years, generally not more than two years distant from those specified.

All country-group averages are weighted by country population.

Table 19. Labor Force

The *population of working age* refers to the population between 15 and 64 years of age. The estimates for 1978 are based on the population estimates in Table 1; those for 1960 are from the UN Population Division. The country-group averages are weighted by country population.

The *labor force* comprises economically active persons, including the armed forces and the unemployed, but excluding housewives, students and economically inactive groups. *Agriculture, industry and services* are defined in the same manner as in Table 2. The estimates of the sectoral distribution of the labor force in 1960 are from International Labour Office (ILO), *Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950–2000;* most of those for 1978 are geometric extrapolations of ILO estimates for 1960 and 1970 in the same source. The country-group averages are weighted by country labor force.

The *labor force growth rates* were derived from the Bank's population projections and ILO data on activity rates, again from the source cited above. The country-group averages for 1960–70 and 1970–80 are weighted by country labor force in 1970; those for 1980–2000, by projections of country labor force in 1980.

The application of ILO activity rates to the Bank's latest population estimates may be inappropriate for some countries in which there have been important changes in levels of unemployment and underemployment, in international and internal migration, or in both. The labor force projections for 1980–2000 should thus be treated with caution.

Table 20. Urbanization

The data on *urban population as a percentage of total population* are from unpublished estimates and projections by the UN Population Division, supplemented by data from the World Bank and from various issues of the UN *Demographic Yearbook.*

The *growth rates of urban population* were calculated from the World Bank's population estimates; the estimates of urban population shares were calculated from the sources cited above.

Data on urban agglomeration

are also from the United Nations.

Because the estimates in this table are based on the national definitions of what is "urban," cross-country comparisons should be interpreted with caution.

The country-group averages for urban population as a percentage of total population are weighted by country population; the other country-group averages in this table are weighted by country urban population.

Table 21. Indicators Related to Life Expectancy

Life expectancy at birth is defined in the technical notes for Table 1.

The *infant mortality rate* is the number of infants who die before reaching 1 year of age, per thousand live births in a given year. The data are from a variety of sources, including different issues of the UN *Demographic Yearbook* and the US Bureau of the Census publication, *World Population: 1977;* they refer to a variety of years, generally not more than two years distant from those specified.

The *child death rate* is the number of deaths of children aged 1–4 per thousand children in the same age group in a given year. For countries with reliable death registration, these rates are from different issues of the UN *Demographic Yearbook;* they refer to a variety of years, generally not more than two years distant from those specified. For other countries, the rates were derived from the appropriate Coale-Demeny Model life tables to correspond to the expectation of life at birth for 1960 and 1978.[2]

The country-group averages in this table are weighted by country population.

2. Ansley J. Coale and Paul Demeny, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

Table 22. Health-related Indicators

The estimates of *population per physician and nursing person* were derived from World Health Organization (WHO) data, some of which have been revised to reflect new information supplied by reporting countries. They also take into account revised estimates of population, which are shown in Table 1. Nursing persons include graduate, practical and assistant nurses. Because country definitions of nursing personnel vary—and because the data shown are for a variety of years, generally not more than two years distant from those specified—the data for these two indicators are not strictly comparable between countries.

The *percentage of total population with access to safe water,* estimated by the WHO, is the proportion of persons with reasonable access to safe water, which is defined as including treated surface water and such untreated but uncontaminated water as that from boreholes, springs and sanitary wells.

The *daily calorie supply per capita* was calculated by dividing the calorie equivalent of the food supplies in a country by its population. Food supplies comprise domestic production, imports less exports, and changes in stocks; they exclude animal feed, seeds for use in agriculture, and food lost in processing and distribution. The *daily calorie requirement per capita* refers to the calories needed to sustain a person at normal levels of activity and health, taking into account age and sex distributions, average body weights, and environmental temperatures. Both sets of estimates are from the Food and Agriculture Organization.

The country-group averages in this table are weighted by country population.

Table 23. Education

The data in this table refer to a variety of years, generally not more than two years distant from those specified, and are mostly from UNESCO.

The data on *number enrolled in primary school* refer to estimates of total, male, and female enrollment of students of all ages in primary school; they are expressed as percentages of the total, male, or female populations of primary-school age to give "gross primary enrollment ratios." Although primary-school age is generally considered to be 6–11 years, the differences in country practices in the ages and duration of schooling are reflected in the ratios given. For countries with universal primary education, the gross enrollment ratios may exceed 100 percent because some pupils may be below or above the official primary-school age.

The data on *number enrolled in secondary school* were calculated in the same manner, with secondary-school age generally considered to be 12–17 years.

The data on *number enrolled in higher education* are from UNESCO.

The *adult literacy rate* is defined in the technical notes for Table 1.

The country-group averages in this table are weighted by country population.

Table 24. Income Distribution

The data in this table refer to the distribution of total disposable household income accruing to percentile groups of households ranked by total household income. The distributions cover rural and urban areas and refer to different years between 1965 and 1977.

The distributions for the industrialized countries are from Malcolm Sawyer, *Income Distribution in OECD Countries* (OECD Occasional Studies, July 1976); they refer to

posttax income and conceptually are roughly comparable with the distributions for developing countries. The estimates for Latin American countries other than Mexico come from the preliminary results of a joint project of the World Bank and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Those for Mexico are the results from the 1977 Household Budget Survey. The estimates for most developing countries in Asia are from the preliminary results of a joint project of the World Bank and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). The distributions for other developing countries are from data gathered by the World Bank from national sources.

Because the collection of data on income distribution has not been systematically organized and integrated into the official statistical system in many countries, estimates were typically derived from surveys designed for other purposes, most often consumer expenditure surveys, which also collect some information on income. These surveys use a variety of income concepts and sample designs. With few exceptions the analysis of data does not take into account the differences in household size. Furthermore, the coverage of many of these surveys is too limited to provide reliable nationwide estimates of income distribution. Thus, although the estimates are considered the best available, they do not avoid all these problems and should be interpreted with extreme caution.

The scope of the indicator is similarly limited. Because households vary in size, a distribution in which households are ranked according to per capita household income, not according to their total household income, is superior for many purposes. The distinction is important because households with low per capita incomes frequently are large households, whose total income may be relatively high. For this reason it is best to use the distribution of individuals ranked by per capita household income when comparing two distributions for welfare purposes—say, those of two countries or those of rural and urban areas in a country. Information on the distribution of per capita household income exists, however, for only a few countries. The World Bank recently launched the Living Standards Measurement Study to develop procedures and applications that can assist countries in improving their collection and analysis of data on income distribution.

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Note: Because the United Nations no longer reports data on Taiwan, most of the indicators for Taiwan come from its statistical publications.

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ISSN 0163-5085

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